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Semantic messes are never just accidents.  
They are usually slips of the collective unconscious.  
 (Lemert, 1991, p. 166)  
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1. Abstract 
Contemporary international relations theory seem at a cross-roads, either accepting 
the inclusion of non-Western models of international relations or assuming that the 
Westphalian model has evolved into what is now a generally valid world system with 
regional peculiarities. In the first case, decline in the Western understanding of the 
state as the sacrosanct unit actor revives fears of a clash of civilsations and a 
“rebeginning of history”. In the latter, global politics are to continue without much 
change except in the balance of power. This paper has tried to fill a void in these 
discussions by questioning the basic assumption of the state systems. Why are they 
“felt” as “natural”?  
To answer this question, the paper has looked at what lies at the core of nation states 
by looking at what seems to be their opposite, empire, not necessarily as a superstate 
but rather the structure beyond the nation state or “national” administration. Post-
Marxian scholars of ideology have exposed how the universalistic appeal of these 
structures give imperial designs of single power centres within state systems a sense 
of natural legitimacy or innate justness of the system, of its values and of the central 
power base by projecting a certain vision of a universal future into the collective 
imaginary, be it the Christian communitas, the Muslim dar as-Salam, the Confucian 
datong.  In trying to understand this natural legitimacy of a political structure, this 
paper looked at understandings of ideology from Destutt de Tracy to Bourdieu’s 
social capital, Castoriadis’ social imaginary to contemporary debate. It then looked at 
research on imperial designs, definitions and typologies, attempting a 
conceptualisation of the imperial imaginary. It then looked at the origins of the 
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Confucian imperial imaginary and followed its evolution until today. It attempted to 
show continuities in the perception of the world system and the role China proper 
plays within that system.  
It proved Feuerwerker’s assumption that “geographical and economic-demographic 
capabilities do not autonomously determine any policy for the leaders of the Chinese 
state. For these parameters to have any effect, they must be mediated by the implicit 
or explicit decisions of specific policymakers who, in effect, assign them their values. 
(Feuerwerker, 1972, p. 3).” Looking at key intellectuals in contemporary foreign 
policy discourse, this paper exposed continuities and explained through its analytical 
framework of ideological empire how these continuities persist and perpetuate even 
in at a moment in which these continuities are still generally denied as relics of a 
shedded past or used in disguise. It sheds light into the discrepancies between 
discourse and practise in Chinese foreign policy, domestic expectations on foreign 
policy actors’ discourse and behaviour.  
Much is being said about the determinants of Chinese foreign policy, few works have 
looked beyond the convenient classical frameworks. This is one, however possibly 
misguided attempt, to put imperial designs at the centre of IR debate. 
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2. Preface 
Professor Wang Gung-wu asked in a recent speech, 
What kind of China is now rising? Will it be a nation-state that will emulate 
the national empires that dominated the 19th and 20th centuries? Will it be a 
regional hegemon? Or will it be, as the Chinese authorities today promise, a 
benign and peace-loving multinational state that would exercise influence not 
as any kind of empire but follow whatever is the modern equivalent of tianxia?  
(Wang, 2006, p. 13) 
Zeng Xianghong, a Chinese international relations scholar, replied, 
„è̀ʡVɲƦǦ"øBûńøΖŒ®̖ͪǘʇąʝ ɸ"
øX˗ƗƦ͏ɋń}ɱÊŕƔ®ƲrʇʧŕǴƧæʔ"øǇ0
ʧśǙʇɾʪŮǚȍ (Zeng, 2010, p. 2) 
“The ideal of a ‘harmonious society’ is the basis of a judgement the Chinese 
people make towards the international situation, it applies resources from 
traditional Chinese thought to express a certain aspiration towards the 
direction of global development, it means that China has proposed a new 
world order.” 
This thesis is attempting to take two theoretical tools, the concept of the imaginary 
and the concept of empire, out of their politicised use in contemporary social theory 
and through them look at the recurring role of the Confucian world order in Chinese 
political discourse.  
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This study attempts to give politological impetus to the vital necessity of 
understanding the native discourse rationale in the politics of a global superpower on 
the rise and provides a tenative response to Wang Gung-wu’s question on how to 
read Chinese growing influence in the world not only based on its rational, pragmatic 
foreign policy, but much more importantly on how world politics fit into the 
imaginary role the Chinese state plays towards its citizens and the values it claims to 
represent.  
Wang Gung-wu concluded that, 
The new Chinese elites may recognise that, beyond the nation-state, there are 
new, fresh and vibrant values of universal validity that could be accepted and 
used to support, restore and even enhance those that their ancestors had 
espoused.  (Wang, 2006, p. 15) 
I have been writing on thesis for five years, in Vienna, Cairo, Hong Kong and 
different parts of China, but mostly in Beijing. In these five years, as a visiting 
student at Peking University and a civil servant for the Austrian ministries of defence 
and foreign affairs in China, I have had the privilege to question my thesis’ 
assumptions with conversations qith leading intellectuals, dissidents and politicians 
shaping China’s future foreign policy discourse, more or less consciously. When I set 
out to write this thesis, I began looking at how China used Confucian “moral” 
discourse in its relations to the Arab world. I originally had hoped to include the 
discourse from the other side, how Islamist and Panarb “moral” discourse shaped 
Arab relations to China, e.g. in Xinjiang or Tang dynasty trade settlements in coastal 
Fujian. I have come to see that the universality of “moral” assertions is rarely 
questionned anywhere, be that in Vienna, Cairo or Beijing, and especially so within 
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the academic élite of the authoriarian state the People’s Republic is, where an 
academic career depends most of the time on the appropriation and development of 
political theory with the purpose of affirming state legitimacy. This thesis uses and 
questions a Western analytical framework for lack of a Chinese alternative, highlights 
the continuity in this process of reaffirmation of state legitimacy within the 
Confucian political immaginary.  
The translations in this thesis are, if not differently noted, my own. I have made an 
effort to include the Chinese text, classic and contemporary, in simplified characters 
in order to enrich reading for those who read Chinese. In some cases, I resort to the 
transcribing Chinese text according to the pinyin transcription system commonly used 
in the People’s Republic of China and increasingly around the world. The pinyin 
transcriptions serve to highlight continuities in discourse for non-Chinese readers. 
The classical Chinese texts are taken from the Chinese Text Project (www.ctext.org), 
an immensely valuable online database of pre-Modern Chinese texts. 
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4. A Conceptual History of Ideology 
4.1. Discovery of Ideology by Baron Destutt de Tracy 
The person who is generally credited for coining the term “ideology” is Baron 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy. Destutt de Tracy, a French aristocrat turned revolutionary 
in the wake of the French Revolution, continued a line of thought commenced by 
Condillac, Locke and, as Hans Barth traced back, Francis Bacon.  (Barth, 1976, p. 3) 
The French ideologue-aristocrat followed Condillac in the attempt to include human 
“idea” into a positivist, enlightened scientific recording of universal validity. Destutt 
de Tracy adopted Locke's reasoning that the human mind can be observed and 
described like a natural object and, curiously but consistently, places his “new 
science”, which he calls ideology, into the sphere of zoology. Attempting to 
understand the origin and anatomy of the basic moral conceptualizations of things. 
Destutt de Tracy was looking for a science of ideas or in his words: 
I of necessity looked back on the ancient history of the science, to show, that 
true logic is absolutely the same science with that of the formation, the 
expression, and combination of our ideas; that is to say, that which has been 
since called Ideology, general grammar, or analysis of the understanding.  
(Destutt de Tracy, 1973, p. 1) 
He based his search for the science of ideas, i.e. Ideology, rather naively on “the 
observation of two facts, which result manifestly from the scrupulous observation of 
our intellectual operations”  (Destutt de Tracy, 1973, p. 2), namely that firstly 
perceptions are identical with sensations and secondly and consequentially 
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judgements cannot be erroneous by themselves. Their falsity can only be asserted in 
context with preceding judgements. Basing himself on these two assumptions, 
Destutt de Tracy assumes that through critical, scientific analysis of these judgements 
or ideas an ideologue would arrive at what he calls “first truths”, basic principles that 
serve as premise to the whole spectrum of ideas.  Ideas should be reduced to their 
constitutive sensations. These cannot be false, only their contextualisation can be 
false. Through this process of exposing the source of error, i.e. not the idea itself but 
its contextualization, in order to unmask false reasoning resembles Francis Bacon's 
classic theory of the idols  (Barth, 1976, p. 3) and inadvertently foreshadows the 
Marxist detection of “false consciousness”. Destutt de Tracy, however, does not dig 
that much into the question of falsification of reasoning or even subsequent 
questioning of Weltanschauungen, worldviews, as a whole. What Destutt de Tracy was 
looking for was a mere zoology of man that understands the basic functioning of the 
production, reproduction and competition of ideas and arrive through this 
epistemological enterprise to conclusions of scientific value on the eternally true 
basic human sensation and its falsifiable products, i.e. ideas. By exposing false 
reasoning these scientific conclusions should be normative for the establishment of a 
new, enlightened and elevated society.  
The claim of normativity of his Ideology can only be understood by looking at the 
institutional background he comes from. From 1797 Destutt de Tracy worked at the 
Section of Analysis of Sensations and Ideas at the Moral and Political Sciences 
division of the Institut National in Paris on the early years of the French Revolution. 
The Institut National essentially was a group of scientists and philosophers aiming at 
providing a theoretical framework for the societal reconstruction after the revolution 
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brought down the ancien régime. Napoleon Bonaparte himself was member of the 
Institut National and supported its work in the earlier stages of his imperial aspirations. 
He even claimed to have invented the term “ideologue” himself  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 
67). The Institut National supported Napoleon's coup d'état on the 18th Brumaire, 1799 
and Destutt de Tracy was made Consul, but then soon experienced first-hand a 
change in the legitimising discourse of the new Empire. Napoleon turned away from 
his old supporters, the revolutionary, enlightened aristocrats looking for a sombre 
truth in science and turned to the old tune of grandeur by the grace of god, a thinly 
veiled return to the ancien régime discourse. There he found a consolidated system of 
legitimizing beliefs, the dominant ideology in Gramsci's terms that suited and gladly 
perpetuated his claims to power. Despite the turning tide, Destutt de Tracy began 
publishing his Projet d'éléments d'idéologie in 1801. Two years later the Moral and 
Political Sciences division was abolished by a decree, which directly condemned the 
ideologues of political effectiveness. Destutt de Tracy and his ideologues attempted 
scientific exploration of a reason in human sensation directly went against a new 
wave of religiosity and the mystical in the first years of the new century. Not much 
time had passed until the “Babel of reason” received general incrimination and 
Destutt de Tracy's aim to institute Ideology as a subject to be taught at the écoles 
centrales was never to be realized.  (Barth, 1976, p. 11)  
In 1812 Napoleon condemned the ideologues: 
It is to the doctrine of the ideologues - this this diffuse metaphysics, which in 
a contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes and on this foundation 
would erect the legislation of peoples, instead of adapting the laws to a 
knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history - to which one 
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must attribute all the misfortunes which have befallen our beloved France.  
(Eagleton, 2007, p. 68) 
Napoleon accused the idéologues of being too “scientific”, to neglect the apparently 
irrational but instinctively right “knowledge of the human heart”. In terms of the 
conventional contemporary understanding of the term ideology, Napoleon accused 
the ideologues of not being ideological.  
Despite imperial censure, Destutt de Tracy continued to work on a second volume 
of his Eléments d'Idéologie in which he adopted a more materialistic approach towards 
reasoning and thus prepares the ground for a nexus between the Marxian concept of 
ideology and its theorem of fetishism. Destutt de Tracy was held in regards by 
Thomas Jefferson, who translated Eléments d'Idéologie into English in 1817  (Ideals and 
Ideologies, 1999, p. 4) and had him elected to the American Philosophical Society. Karl 
Marx, who according to Emmet Kennedy most probably had only read the second 
volume of the Eléments on economics, accused the aristocrat-idéologue of being a 
“cold-blooded bourgeois-doctrinaire”. 1  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 69) It seems as though 
the philosophe of the French enlightenment, who tried to introduce scientific method 
into the analysis of human consciousness has been grossly misunderstood by his 
contemporaries, be that on grounds of an arguably deficient line of reasoning or on 
grounds of political opportunism. There is no doubt to the fact, as pointed out by 
Eagleton, that through excessive rationalism the “science of ideas” has shifted from 
“denoting a sceptical scientific materialism to signifying a sphere of abstract, 
disconnected ideas; and it is this meaning of the word which will then be taken up by 
Marx and Engels”.  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 70)  
                                                
1 Barth claims that Marx in fact was familiar with the fundamentals of Destutt de Tracy's work on 
ideology.  (Barth, 1976, p. 48) 
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4.2. Ideology in Marx and Engels 
For roughly a quarter of a century, from the publication of Destutt de Tracy’s 
Eléments to the publication of Die Deutsche Ideologie by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
in 1846/47 there will be no comprehensive attempt to re-conceptualize ideology, 
nonetheless the term remains in usage, yet oscillating between the meaning given to 
it by Destutt de Tracy and the derogatory usage by Napoleon. Hegel defines 
Ideology as the “reduction of thought to sensation”, Schopenhauer equated the 
ideological method with Kantian transcendentalism. For Franz von Baader the 
idéologues embodied “the spirit of irreligion”, he accused them of “pretending to have 
discovered the art of manufacturing [ideas]”.  (Barth, 1976, p. 15) 
The term ideology will be given a new meaning in the works of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels.  
György Márkus in his study on Concepts of Ideology in Marx stresses that whereas 
Marx's theory of ideology is one of his major contributions to social theory and 
philosophy, he “never intended nor claimed to create a systematic theory of ideology.” 
But, he concedes, “the heterogeneous and mostly critical uses he made of this 
concept can be seen in retrospect to have enclosed a definite field of investigation 
and to have suggested/outlined an essentially unified theoretical approach to this 
field.”  (Markus, 1991, p. 101) 
Ideology does not anymore denote Destutt de Tracy’s science of ideas, but rather an 
abstract but vital function that serves to perpetuate an existing class system by 
providing a veil of universal validity to otherwise questionable elements of the very 
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system. Marx expressively depicts the force of such ideology in “The Eighteenth 
Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte”: 
Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus 
freien Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar 
vorgefundenen, gegeben Umständen. Die Tradition aller toten Geschlechter 
lastet wie ein Alp auf dem Gehirne der Lebenden. Und wenn sie eben damit 
beschäftigt scheinen, sich und die Dinge umzuwälzen, noch nicht 
Dagewesenes zu schaffen, gerade in solchen Epochen revolutionärer Krise 
beschwören sie ängstlich die Geister der Vergangenheit zu ihrem Dienste 
herauf, entlehnen ihnen Namen, Schlachtparole, Kostüm, um in dieser 
altehrwürdigen Verkleidung und mit dieser erborgten Sprache die neue 
Weltgeschichtsszene aufzuführen. (Marx, 1967, p. 15) 
In the beginning to his account of the events leading to the rise of Napoleon III, 
Marx defines ideology in a way that will be the core of Marxist and post-Marxist 
analyses of ideology from Althusser to Castoriadis. The defining elements of 
ideology, i.e. symbolism, the nature of consciousness, the nexus between 
consciousness and action, its perpetuating and normative functions will be pillars of 
subsequent understanding of ideology and will be dealt with as they appear in the 
development of this Marxist and post-Marxist social theory.   
The Marxian term of ideology requires for its understanding a preliminary look at the 
philosophical antecedents to Marxian thought.  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
provided a decisive impetus by asserting that the inability to perceive a thing in itself, 
limited by the perceptive capacities of the human mind, as postulated by Immanuel 
Kant, the objective world can but be the self-alienation of the Absolute Subject, Geist. 
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(Tunick, 1992, pp. 12-13) Hegel bases his thought thus on an ultimate deterministic 
idealism. Feuerbach then went on to suggest that the Hegelian Geist can only be an 
idealistic extrapolation of the essence of “man” himself.  (Barth, 1976, p. 55) Marx 
accepts the epistemological framework while dramatically turning the whole 
theoretical construct upside down. He and Engels used the metaphor of a “camera 
obsura” (Marx & Engels, 1953, p. 22) to point to the distortion in Hegelian theory as 
well as - here is the core of Marxian thought in this regard - in the commonplace 
acceptance of a class system with claims to universal validity. In a camera obsura 
everything is notably turned upside down and thus in Marxian theory the Geist is a 
reflection of material conditions and not vice versa2. In The German Ideology Marx and 
Engels call ideas, any abstract paradigms of apparent universal validity “nebulous 
constructs” (Nebelbildungen) and state,  
Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen 
entsprechenden Bewußtseinsformen behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein 
der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine Entwicklung, 
sondern die ihre materielle Produktion und ihren materiellen Verkehr 
entwickelnden Menschen ändern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr 
Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens. Nicht das Bewußtsein bestimmt 
das Leben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewußtsein.  (Marx & Engels, 
1953, p. 23) 
                                                
2 In Thesis on Feuerbach (1845), Marx states that Feuerbach geht von dem Faktum der religiösen Selbstenfremdung, 
der Verdoppelung der Welt in eine religiöse und eine weltliche aus. Seine Arbeit besteht darin, die religiöse Welt in ihre 
weltliche Grundlage aufzulösen. Aber daß die weltliche Grundlage sich von sich selbst erhebt und sich ein selbständiges 
Reich in den Wolken fixiert, ist nur aus der Selbstzerrissenheit und Sichselbstwidersprechen dieser weltlichen Grundlage 
zu erklären. Diese selbst muß also in sich selbst sowohl in ihrem Widerspruch verstanden als praktisch revolutioniert 
werden. (Marx & Engels, 1953, p. 594) 
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Life, the objective circumstances, therefore shapes consciousness, the subjective 
ideas. The course of history determined by the material engine of the economy 
changes the objective circumstances and consequentially change the subjective ideas. 
Hawkes stresses that there is a logical error assuming Marx reduces ideas to mere 
reflections of material conditions, rather he points in dialectical tradition to the 
interpenetration of opposites. “The poles of the opposition create and define each 
other, and this fact is revealed in human life, which combines thought and material 
activity”.  (Hawkes, 2003, p. 90) This at first sight insignificant play of words will be 
crucial for the understanding of the causative function of the imaginary that is a 
crucial part of ideology in terms of policy.  
Furthermore, Marx solves the antecedent philosophical impasse between materialists, 
who simply condemn idealism as illusionary, and idealists, who claim the contrary, 
but uniting idea and action into a dialectical unity.  
Looking from the perspective of the dialectical unity of idea and action, ideology in 
Marxian terms must be something at the dialectical interplay between idea and action, 
consciousness and life. This something must be, according to Marx' statement above, 
self-reproductive, normative and self-legitimizing. Here Marx turns to the Hegelian 
concept of “representation”, i.e. the faculty that mediates between the dialectical 
poles of subjective ideas and objective circumstances. Representation, Marx argues in 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte can be deceptive is as much as it, while 
exerting real and determining influence on how people think and behave, 
reformulates class interest and economic interest into generally valid interest. Its 
deceptive symbolism gives evidence to the assumption that “representation is a 
product of the human brain, and humanity is under constant temptation to idolize 
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these representations, and treat them as though they were real”.  (Hawkes, 2003, p. 
94) Ideology therefore is a function within society to legitimize élite class interest by 
claiming a deceptive universal validity of the limited élite interest and achieving this 
goal on the level of the formation of consciousness, which in turn, according to 
Marx, is in dialectical unity with action (or rather “labour”). Therefore, this 
consciousness reproduces itself through action and action expresses itself through 
consciousness in a self-legitimising circle.3 It seems thus that Marx’ vision of ideology 
is essentially negative, ideology is but “a set of chimeras” which perpetuate a social 
order through this cycle distracting man from otherwise obvious inequality and 
injustice. Ideology in Marx is “an imaginary resolution of real contradiction”.  
(Eagleton, 2007, p. 77) Or, in Márkus’ words, it renders “the totality completely 
opaque, transforming it into a matter of unintelligible naturalness or technical 
necessity.”  (Markus, 1991, p. 92) 
Marx’s discovery of these contradictions stems from his early studies on human 
labour. He claims that whereas labour is the basic expression of human personality 
and essentially should be free, it has been limited and channelled by oppression and 
has led to alienation. This alienation is to be seen on four levels: Man is alienated 
from the activity of labour, the products of one’s labour, from society (as a collective 
of men alienated form their basic means of expression, i.e. labour) and from nature. 
Human existence in Marx is therefore alienated from the essence of being man, it is a 
condition of alienation, which has to be seen in relational terms as servitude. Thus 
history in Marx is but a history of oppression and continuous dialectics between an 
oppressive and an oppressed class. He coined this struggle Klassenkampf, class struggle. 
                                                
3 What is called here the symbolism of representation only serves as emphasis to highlight that, firstly, 
concepts are generally mediated through their relations to other concepts and, secondly, such relations 
eventually tend to be seen as concepts themselves. 
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Marx has developed an unbending determined evolution in history. History moves 
from one stage of societal development to the next, from the slave society until 
ultimately to communism. Where does ideology come in? Ideology in Marx serves 
the very purpose stated above, namely to conceal the real contradictions of class 
oppression by making the worker think that to work sixteen hours a day for a meagre 
wage is right and the world as it is, not a mere oppression that serves the interest of 
the oppressing class. This ideology is perpetuated in the collective acceptance of the 
alienation of labour and the very practice of production within the system of 
oppression.  
Marx therefore has gone far away from Destutt de Tracy’s vision of a ideology as a 
science aiming at liberate the human mind from false reasoning by “scientifically” 
looking at the truth in human conception to a vision of ideology as the veil of 
conception that allows for a system of oppression to perpetuate itself.  
This deterministic and materialistic view on history therefore is to be seen on two 
levels of analysis. One the one hand, there is the capitalist system which perpetuates 
oppression through an ideological veil. This veil can only be overcome by the 
oppressed class acknowledging the “false consciousness”4 it submitted to. On this 
level, history rolls in cyclic terms of oppression and rebellion within an unchanging 
class system. On the other hand, there is the big picture of the unfailing certainty of 
an eventual shift from the capitalist system to the socialist just as the feudalist system 
was replaced by the capitalist. This huge step in history can only be achieved, as said, 
by the vanquishing of “false consciousness”. This allows Márkus to interpret a 
distinction between two kinds of ideology into Marxian thought. Firstly, “ideologies 
                                                
4 Engels coined the term “false consciousness”, the situation in which the workers were unable to 
grasp the true nature of their interests or their historical role in a letter to Franz Mehring in 1893. The 
term was not used by Marx (Morrison, 2006, p. 62) 
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of the historical moment” provide the necessary apparatus of ideas to allow an 
oppressive system to perpetuate itself. Secondly, “ideologies that represent epochal 
cultural values” are transcendental and perpetual elements of culture that go beyond 
the class conflict of the moment.  (Markus, 1991, pp. 94, 100) This distinction allows 
for a further differentiation in “ideological actors5”. The ideological strata of the 
ruling class are attributed for the role of “mere transmitters and propagators of ideas”  
(Markus, 1991, p. 93) and this definition intuitively seems to suit for representatives 
of institutions that propose a moral societal system, for instance a religion’s clergy or 
equally cadres of a Communist Party. Now the distinction between “ideologies of the 
historical moment” and “ideologies that represent epochal cultural values” allows for 
personnel of ideological transmission to exist on two levels: the one of the élite 
legitimizing its specific elements oppression and the one of the broader cultural 
entity that allows for such a societal context to exist.  (Markus, 1991, pp. 92-95)   
Marx implicitly concedes - on both levels - a stabilizing function of ideology within 
society by, in Márkus terms, giving them credit for “[systematizing] the confused and 
chaotic conceptions of everyday thinking, to lend coherence to their fragmented 
structure, to explain away (and thereby apologize for) the most widely encountered 
experiences that contradict the seeming self-evidence of fetishistic categories”.  
(Markus, 1991, p. 93)6  
Marx’s concept of ideology, in synthesis, is composed of a philosophical-descriptive 
element, but equally of a normative element, combining factual propositions with 
value judgements. The accusation of the German ideology (Nebelbildung) eventually 
                                                
5 Destutt de Tracy would call them the complete contrary to his view of an idéologue, but Marx lucidly 
unmasks this apparent antithesis. 
6 This succinct analysis does not allow for a more elaborate analysis of Marxian thought and admits to 
neglecting the rich elaborations on representation, fetishism and alienation such as in ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’ et al. in order to grasp the essence of his understanding of “ideology”. 
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turned into an ideology itself, which “expresses an outlook on the world and a will 
orientated towards the future.”  (Aron, 2007, p. 236)  
Jorge Larrain identifies two orientations in the continuation of the Marxist concept 
of ideology. On the one hand, Friedrich Hegel originated an approach, which focuses 
on the identification of the material basis and its illusionary superstructure. Lenin, 
Plekhanov and Labriola also follow this line. This positivist approach seeks a correct 
understanding of the determination of knowledge by the economic base. On the 
other hand, a historicist approach led by Lukács and Gramsci pointed at the theory-
practice binary and its temporally dynamic interplay.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 68) While 
Engels follows Marx in arguing that the material processes are the ultimately 
determining factor in history, he condemns a reduction of all factors to this one 
single factor as a reductionist enterprise. He equally stresses the validity of dialectics 
as a framework for understanding the interplay and development of ideologies 
arguing that the “dialectics of concepts” are but a “conscious reflex of the dialectical 
motion of the real world”7  (Larrain, 1979, p. 70)  
 
4.3. The Ideological Vanguard in Lenin 
Vladimir Ilich Lenin brings about a major adjustment to Marxism in regards to 
ideology. In What is to be done?, published in 1902, he refuses the spontaneity of a 
change away from capitalism. The successful advent of communism has to be 
brought about by a revolutionary élite, which defines the interest of the proletariat 
and acts as a “vanguard” for it. While Marx and Engels see ideology as “false 
                                                
7 For an analysis of the dissimilarities between Marx and Engels see  (Oishi, 2001) 
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consciousness” which allows the oppression of the working class, Lenin calls for the 
very vanguard to lead the proletariat by “socialist ideology”. He states:  
Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being developed by the 
masses of the workers in the process of their movement the only choice is: either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology,  (Lenin, 1966, p. 82) 
and thereby established a dichotomy between the ideology of the previous stage of 
development and the next. The leadership of the Communist Party is to analyse the 
moment in the materialist vision of history and to guide the masses according to the 
scientifically graspable necessities. In terms of role of the agent of ideology, the 
ideologists, Lenin has almost returned to Destutt de Tracy’s vision, i.e. a élite corps 
liberating man from an inherited obscure veil. The crucial point is that the ideologist 
can now attribute his dominion in real-world policy decisions to the unquestionable 
determinism of the course of history according to the scientific theory of historical 
materialism. The transcendental thus returned to defining legitimacy through the 
back door. Lenin thus involuntarily provided an insight into the legitimizing 
mechanisms of ideology. 
4.4. The Interdependence between Consciousness and Reality in 
Lukács 
Györy Lukács provided two major inputs into the Marxist understanding of ideology 
with his work History and Class Consciousness published in 1923. In this work he 
elaborates on “reification” as a refinement of Marxian “alienation” and “fetishism” 
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as well as puts class consciousness to renewed scrutiny, thereby refining the whole 
Marxist perspective on ideology at the philosophical basis of the concept.  
For Lukács the materialist dialectics as outlined by Marx are but a scientific method 
with revolutionary potential. He looks into the interplay between consciousness and 
reality that allows for a union between theory and praxis  (Lukács, 1978, p. 60). The 
Marxist Lukács acknowledges that consciousness shapes reality “directly and 
adequately” as much as this shaping happens vice-versa.  (Lukács, 1978, p. 60) The 
Marxian view of ideology as the veil imposed on consciousness is replaced by a more 
subtle picture. He states:  
Diese ununterbrochene Veränderung der Gegenständlichkeitsformen aller 
gesellschaftlichen Phänomene in ihrer ununterbrochenen, dialektischen 
Wechselwirkung aufeinander, die Entstehung der Erkennbarkeit eines 
Gegenstandes aus seiner Funktion in der bestimmten Totalität, in der er 
fungiert, macht die dialektische Totalitätsbetrachtung - und sie allein! - fähig, 
die Wirklichkeit als gesellschaftliches Geschehen zu begreifen. (Lukács, 1978, 
p. 77)  
Lukács explicitly attributes the capacity of really grasping reality to consciousness, be 
that more or less accurate. Reification serves as a knitting device, which - by making 
relational definitions (even of the self) seem unrelated “things” - conceals the 
inconsistencies emerging from this imperfect grasping. Lukács succeeded in 
describing a sort of circular dynamics between consciousness and reality, allowing for 
a focus on the different kinds of class consciousness within this totality and, 
eventually, the identification of an ultimate consciousness able to grasp the totality. 
This task, not surprisingly, he assigns to the proletarian consciousness. Truth and 
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science are therefore only expressions of the one class consciousness, the worldview 
of the proletariat. While is instinctively tempting to resist such reasoning, in 
admitting the interdependence between consciousness and reality and thus giving 
whatever ideology its philosophically justified portion of truth, Lukács has 
contributed a fundamental sophistication in the Marxist concept of ideology. 
4.5. Gramsci’s Theory of Hegemony 
Antonio Gramsci, founding member of the Italian Communist Party and political 
prisoner until death, continued the line of thought of Engels and Lukács by turning 
away from a purely negative concept of ideology. For Gramsci every class not only 
the class in power at the respective historical stage has its own ideology. The latter is 
an expression of the contradictions in the social system and pertains to the societal 
superstructure. He acknowledges that Marxism is a superstructure like every other 
class ideology.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 80)  
In his Quaderni dal Carcere he states that the term ideology has undergone widespread 
misunderstanding because two different concepts are commonly intended by the 
same word both refer to “the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and 
to the arbitrary lucubrations of particular individuals”. He therefore distinguishes 
between “historically organic ideologies” with are “historically necessary” in as much 
as they “organize human masses, […] form the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness in their position, struggle etc.” and arbitrary, individual ideologies. 
These “function like an error, which by contrasting with the truth, demonstrate it.” 
(Gramsci, 1999, p. 199) He asserts that the “philosophy of praxis”, i.e. the 
assumptions following historical materialism, is, as any other ideology, a 
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superstructure. Its superiority lies in the fact that other ideologies are short-lived. The 
latter are “contradictory, because they aim at reconciling opposed and contradictory 
interests; their ‘historicity’ will be brief because contradiction emerges after each 
event of which they been the instrument.” The “philosophy of praxis” “is not an 
instrument of government of dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and 
exercise hegemony over subaltern classes; it is the expression of these subaltern 
classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an 
interest in knowing all truths, even unpleasant ones, and in avoiding deceptions 
(impossible) by the ruling class and even more by themselves”.  (Gramsci, 1999, pp. 
196-197) 
Gramsci’s contribution here lies in the recognition of admitting the “necessary and 
vital connection” between basis and superstructure and the inevitability of a 
conscious distortion by the latter of the real conditions and contradictions within the 
former. He continues to assert though that Marxism as a “science” is superior to any 
other, because of its conscious attempt to identify and eliminate all contradictions, be 
these material or conscious. 
In his Lettere dal Carcere, Gramsci traces the interrelation between ideology and the 
material relations to historical materialism, the determined evolution of society in 
stages shaped by their distinct relations of production. In good orthodoxy, he 
assumes that superior relations of production cannot replace older ones unless the 
material conditions for this change have matured within the framework of the old 
society. The distinction between “organic ideologies” and what he called “arbitrary” 
or “conjunctural” ideologies serves here for a distinction to be made between the 
ideology of the old and that of the replacing new society, for which material 
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conditions have matured, on the one hand and ideologies of brief existence, which 
may point to a contradiction but do not offer a cohesive alternative and, more 
importantly, for which the material conditions are not given, on the other. Gramsci  
warns however of that when trying to distinguish organic and conjunctural ideologies 
to excessively stress the mechanical causes, i.e. the material conditions, and commit 
the mistake of “excessive economism”, whereas “excessive ideologism” equally leads 
to wrong conclusions. “The dialectical nexus between the structure and 
superstructure”, he admits, “is hard to establish precisely.” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 202) 
The superstructure, thus, even though created by the structure autonomously 
influences the structure within the framework of historical materialism. Gramsci 
explains this in his theory of the “relation of forces”. He contends firstly, that every 
relation of social forces is closely linked to the structure and independence of human 
will and can be evaluated scientifically. Secondly, the relations of political forces 
depend on the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organization of the 
various social groups. Here, he suggests three stages: a first and most elementary of 
economic-corporate cohesion, a second of a “solidarity of interests” within a social 
group purely in the economic field and a third, which marks the passage of the 
nature of the relations from the sphere of the structure to the sphere of the 
superstructure. In Gramsci’s words, 
A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one’s own 
corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the 
corporate limits of the merely economic group, and can and must become the 
interests of other subordinate groups. […] it is the phase in which previously 
germinated ideologies become ‘party’, come into confrontation and conflict, 
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until one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, 
[…] to propagate itself over the whole social area - bringing about not only a 
unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, 
posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate 
but on a ‘universal’ plane, and this creating the hegemony of a fundamental 
social group over a series of subordinate groups.  (Gramsci, 1999, p. 205) 
Hegemony thus includes ideology, uses ideology, for the purpose of consent and 
coercion. Ideology just “refers to the way power-struggles are fought out at the level 
of signification; and though such signification is involved in all hegemonic processes, 
it is not in all cases the dominant level by which rule is sustained.”  (Eagleton, 2007, 
p. 113) Hegemony is attributed to civil society, the intermediary between the 
economy and the state, which, according to Gramsci, in fact is the state, because of 
its dominance over the latter. (Gramsci, 1999, p. 210) Gramsci calls state and civil 
society two parts of a total, both of which realize hegemony through their specific 
means: whereas the state recurs to coercion, civil society recurs to consent. This does 
not mean that no views may diverge from the hegemonic one. Gramsci points to a 
“performative contradiction”, in which a class or group may oppose in words the 
hegemonic ideology, but perpetuates it in its deeds, i.e. the ways opposition is 
expressed etc.  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 118) 
 
4.6. The Ideological State Apparatus and Ideology in Althusser 
Louis Althusser attempted to provide a general theory of ideology in For Marx and in 
the section Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus first published in Lenin and Philosophy. 
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Especially in the latter work he attempts to fill a void in Marxist philosophy: Ricoeur 
credits Althusser’s contribution with “[allowing] us to move from what we might call 
a geography of ideologies to a theory of ideology”.  (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 53) Althusser 
starts in this enterprise by arguing that “reproduction of labour power requires not 
only a reproduction of its skills, but also […] a reproduction of its submission to the 
rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling 
ideology.”  (Althusser, 1993, p. 6) This ruling ideology is part of the superstructure, 
which in the classical metaphor is depicted as two upper floors built on the societal 
edifice, one being the political-legal superstructure, the other being the ideological 
superstructure. This means that both levels of the superstructure could not exist 
without the base. Marxist tradition though acknowledges a relative autonomy of the 
superstructure as well as reciprocal action between superstructure and structure. The 
metaphor of the edifice does not provide a satisfactory dynamic explanation of the 
process of reproduction. Althusser therefore tries to unlock the rigid framework by 
asserting, “the State (and its existence in its apparatus) has no meaning except as a 
function of State power”  (Althusser, 1993, p. 14). All political class struggle is about 
the seizure and conservation of State power by a certain class. A distinction has to be 
drawn between this State power and the State apparatus, which may survive changes 
in State power.8 Classical Marxism, especially Lenin, already stresses this distinction 
and declares the proletariat’s eventual seizure of State power, to destroy the 
bourgeois State apparatus and its replacement with a proletarian one which 
eventually will lead to the destruction of both State power and apparatus. The 
refinement introduced by Althusser concerns the State apparatus. He distinguishes 
                                                
8 Althusser points to the bourgeois revolutions in Eighteenth century France, one may equally point to 
the bureaucratic system in Imperial China. 
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between “Ideological State Apparatuses” (ISA) and the “Repressive State Apparatus” 
(RSA).  (Althusser, 1993, p. 16) The latter includes the State administration, the 
police, the army etc. and assures the reproduction of the submission to the rules of 
the established order by force. As for the former, the ISA, Althusser lists a variety of 
them: the religious ISA (churches), the educational ISA (schools), the family ISA, the 
legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different political 
parties), the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA (the media) and the cultural 
ISA (the arts, literature etc.)  (Althusser, 1993, p. 17). Althusser states that both 
apparatuses do not stick to their imminent modi operandi, violence and ideology, but 
rather only predominantly do so. Indeed the Repressive State Apparatus has to recur 
to ideology as well in order to guarantee its inner coherence and the Ideological State 
Apparatuses do as well recur to violence. To the question on what keeps the diverse 
ISA unified, Althusser observes, 
Given the fact that the ‘ruling class’ in principle holds State power […], and 
therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State Apparatus, we can accept 
the fact that this same ruling class is active in the Ideological State 
Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in 
the Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely in its contradictions. […] No class 
can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising 
its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses.  (Althusser, 1993, 
p. 20) 
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 The ISA are therefore “not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle”9  
(Althusser, 1993, p. 21).  
Althusser looks into the relationship between ideology and history in two ways. At 
one time, he states, “the score of the Ideology of the current ruling class which 
integrates into its music the great themes [of the past]”  (Althusser, 1993, p. 28). At 
another, he claims “Ideology has no History”. Here he does not refer to the 
particular historical baggage of a specific ideology, but rather to ideology in general. 
Ideology, such as consciousness in Freud, is eternal, an omni-historical, unchanging 
reality.  (Althusser, 1993, pp. 34-36) 
Althusser in this general framework proposes two theses: Firstly, “Ideology 
represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence”. In other words 
What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real 
relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary 
relations of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.  
(Althusser, 1993, p. 39) 
The lived relation is thus reflected in ideology. Ricoeur notes that this relation “is the 
lived as imaginary. Therefore we have a real relation which is distorted in an 
imaginary relation.”  (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 55) There are however, he adds, two levels of 
imagination according to Althusser, one that is the distorting level and the other, 
which is the distorted.  (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 61) 
Secondly, “Ideology has a material existence” in as much as  
                                                
9 “The ideology of the ruling class does not become the ruling ideology by the grace of God, nor even 
by virtue of the seizure of State power alone. It is by the installation of the ISAs in which this ideology 
is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology” (Althusser, 1993, p. 59) 
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[an individual’s] ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices 
governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material 
ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.  (Althusser, 
1993, p. 43) 
Althusser thus moves ideology away from its conception as “false consciousness”, a 
mere “chimera” to a new conceptualization in the sphere of the real world. In fact, 
he pronounced man to be “an ideological animal” revising the Aristotelian term zoon 
politikon. The central assumption in Althusser’s general theory of ideology is thus that 
“ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” to assure the reproduction of the 
relations of production. He concludes 
The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which is necessarily 
ignored (méconnue) in the very forms of recognition (ideology = misrecognition 
/ ignorance) is indeed in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of 
production and of the relations deriving from them.  (Althusser, 1993, pp. 56-
57)  
 
4.7. Karl Mannheim’s Historicist Conceptualization of Ideology and 
Utopia 
 
Karl Mannheim attempted to set the ground for a “sociology of knowledge” by 
setting up a historicist framework of patterns in the development of worldviews 
Weltanschauungen. In this framework Mannheim builds on Hegelian, Marx’s and 
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
36 of 236 
Lukács’ elaborations on the historical dialectics, the role and position of 
consciousness in the course of history without accepting the epistemological 
precedents of the Marxist elaborations of his time. Thus Mannheim’s merit in terms 
of the conceptualization of ideology lies in, while building on the Marxist 
sophistications, inserting ideology into a rich historicist framework albeit with 
contradictions and imprecision. 
In his essay On the interpretation of Weltanschauung (1953) Mannheim asserts that cultural 
products cannot be scrutinized with the methods applied to natural phenomena. The 
challenge in the sociological analysis lies in looking at these cultural products and 
relate them to the cultural totality from which they descend and which constitute 
their meaning. This totality is the “Weltanschauung”10 of a particular epoch and is 
composed of its various “objectifications”, namely the relationalized meanings of the 
cultural products of that epoch.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 101) Mannheim points to the 
existence of elements of irrationality in the context of cultural production, which he 
wants to put into a theoretic discourse. What he is analysing is nothing but the 
phenomenological experience of the internal dynamics of a Weltanschauung tracing the 
structures of thought. Mannheim distinguishes between three meanings in the 
process of understanding cultural products: (1) the objective meaning, (2) the 
intentional meaning, (3) the documentary meaning. Interpretation is, according to 
                                                
10 Karl Mannheim provided an early definition of Weltanschauung in Structures of Social Thinking (1922-
24): “It is humanistic psychology which constructs a world intermediate between the social and the 
spiritual levels, initially so disparate. Psychology creates a common denominator to which we must 
reduce actors so different as are the social and the spiritual, if we are, in any way, to understand one in 
terms of the other. The factor which it inserts between these two extreme poles is worldview 
(Weltanschauung). A worldview (of an era, a group, etc.) is a structurally linked set of experiential 
contextures which makes up the common footing upon which a multiplicity of individuals together 
learn from life and enter into it. A worldview is then neither the totality of spiritual formations present 
in an age nor the sum of individuals then present, but the totality of the structurally interconnected 
experiential sets which can be derived from either side, from the spiritual creations or from the social 
group formations” (Mannheim, 1982, p. 91) 
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Mannheim, a synthesis of the three  (Namer, 2006, pp. 64-66). Relevant to the 
present elaboration is the third, the documentary meaning. Every historiographical 
effort has to make a choice in stressing certain aspects while neglecting other. This 
editorial choice provides the point of departure for the “sociology of knowledge”, 
because it is where the Weltanschauung reveals itself. Thus the method adopted by his 
“sociology of knowledge” is different from the method adopted by a historian. 
“History works out individual segments; the fundamental category of socio-genetic 
investigation is the ‘constellation’.“  (Mannheim, 1982, p. 95) This necessarily 
requires a reflection of the own Weltanschauung before any real scrutiny of cultural 
products can begin, the realization of the concrete position of the thinker 
(Standortsgebundenheit des Denkers)  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 70) 
Karl Mannheim’s most extensive work on ideology is Ideology and Empire first 
published in 1929. Mannheim outlines four historical ideal type periods in which 
competition among social groups provides four different worldviews: The first is 
based on consensus and spontaneous cooperation in completely homogenous 
societal strata. The second is based on monopoly in societies where a single group 
imposes its worldview. A third is based on atomistic competition after the decline of 
the previously monopoly. A fourth, last period, is characterized by by a 
concentration of worldviews around a few dominant alternatives. 11 (Larrain, 1979, p. 
105) 
The concept of ideology came into existence, according to Mannheim, when during 
the fourth historical period a worldview as the most basic system of ideas and 
discourse encountered alien forms of ideas and discourse.  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 106) 
                                                
11 The protagonists here are “free-floating intellectuals”, which cannot be understood by class-
oriented [read Marxist] sociology.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 116) 
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The historical process of conceptualization of ideology has undergone a 
transformation from a particular conception of ideology to a total one.  
The particular conception of “ideology” makes its analysis of ideas on a 
purely psychological level. If it is claimed for instance that an adversary is 
lying, or that he is concealing or distorting a given factual situation, it is sill 
nevertheless assumed that both parties share common criteria of validity. […] 
The suspicion that one’s opponent is the victim of an ideology does not go so 
far as to exclude him from discussion on the basis of a common theoretical 
frame of ideology.  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 51) 
The particular conception thus is, in other words, but judged a “phenomenon 
intermediate between a simple lie […] and an error”.  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 54) 
The total conception of ideology “calls into question the opponent’s total 
Weltanschauung including his conceptual apparatus, and attempts to understand these 
concepts as an outgrowth of the collective life of which he partakes.”  (Mannheim, 
1991, p. 50) It’s here that we have a sociological analysis of worldviews. It goes 
without saying, and Mannheim himself points to it, the individual members of such a 
group, he takes the example of the proletariat, do not experience all the elements of 
the own Weltanschauung. “Every individual participates only in certain fragments of 
this thought-system, the totality of which is not in the least a mere sum of these 
fragmentary individual experiences,”  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 52) hence the necessity of 
a sociology of knowledge to overcome this deficiency.  
Mannheim traces the development of the total conception of ideology to when 
philosophy starts to question consciousness in the era of European enlightenment 
and, as a second step, to the Historical School and Hegel, in a third step, to the 
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Marxist scrutiny of “false consciousness.” (Mannheim, 1991, pp. 57-67) The passage 
from the total conception of ideology to the sociology of knowledge lies, according 
to Mannheim, in the very passage from the special formulation, as in Marxism, of the 
total conception of ideology, to a general one. The special formulation of ideology in 
Mannheim is in essence a critique of the superiority of consciousness of the 
proletariat in Lukács and others. It means 
not [to] call his own position into question but regards it as absolute, while 
interpreting his opponents’ ideas as a mere function of the social positions 
they occupy.  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 68) 
To scrutinize the other without acknowledging the own distorting worldview is 
thereby a sanctimonious enterprise. Mannheim notes, “nothing was to prevent the 
opponents of Marxism from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to 
Marxism itself”.  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 67)  
The general total conception of ideology can be approached in two ways: The “non-
evaluative general conception” and the “evaluative general total conception”. 
Whereas the first is free from judgements of validity of ideas from within the 
framework of a worldview - and obviously an ideal type -, the latter adopts an 
epistemological-valuative approach. “The evaluative conception”, as summed up by 
Larrain, “has to separate the genuine from the ideologically distorted in norms and 
modes of thought”.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 110) Here we arrive at Mannheim’s sociology 
of knowledge. “At the most sophisticated level of development,” Mannheim states, 
“the concept of ideology is […] dissolved [and] supersedes the theory of ideology by 
a more general sociology of knowledge.”  (Larrain, 1979, p. 111) Here, he attempts to 
reconstruct an ideal type of Weltanschauung which eventually looks into the “genetic 
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process of sociological imputation”, namely in which class or group worldviews 
originate and the structural situation of word-views, be that internal or external.  
The second main contribution by Karl Mannheim is his elaboration of the 
dichotomous distinction between ideological thought and utopian thought in Ideology 
and Utopia: 
Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de 
facto in the realization of their projected contents. Though they often 
become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the 
individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are 
most frequently distorted. […] Utopias too transcend the social situation, for 
they too orient conduct towards elements which the situation, in so far as it is 
realized at the time, does not contain.  (Mannheim, 1991, pp. 175-176)  
A few difficulties arise from this distinction. Firstly, what is considered utopian is 
dependent “on the stage and degree of reality of which one applies this standard.”  
(Mannheim, 1991, p. 176) From a conservative worldview (in the sense of a 
worldview directed at preserving an existing order), utopian are ideas that can in 
principle never be realized, because they transcend the given social order. From an 
anarchist worldview, as in Landauer, utopia dialectically clashes with topia (the 
present existing order), whereas the existing order is only “an evil residue which 
remains from ebbing utopias and revolutions. Hence, the road of history leads from 
one topia over a utopia to the next topia.”  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 178) Mannheim 
observes that both conceptualizations of ideology, the conservative and the anarchist, 
blur the concept of utopia and, again, counts on the sociology of knowledge to 
provide a clear distinction between relative and absolute utopias.  
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Secondly, there might be a fusion of utopian and ideological thought in the 
worldview of a class or social group.12 Mannheim’s solution is limiting the scope of 
analysis to the past, where the realization of the ideology / utopia can be ascertained. 
Here, Larrain points out, Mannheim renounces any effort to understand present 
ideological and utopian thought.  (Larrain, 1979, p. 114) 
Mannheim conclusively traces changes in the configuration of utopias (the Utopian 
mentality) on whether these are projections in time (chiliasm) or in space (utopias).  
(Kupiec, 2006, p. 79) These, he notes, do not only affect the future, but also the 
recollection of the past. The “orgiastic Chiliasm of the Anabaptists” is how he calls 
the utopian mentality of a first period, which embodies the emergence of a 
spiritualization of politics13  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 191). The impetus of change did 
not come from “ideas”, but rooted, Mannheim states, “in much deeper-lying vital 
and elemental levels of the psyche”  (Mannheim, 1991, p. 192) The second form of 
Utopian mentality is the “Liberal-humanitarian Idea”, based on positivist 
theorization and its implicit rationality. The third form is “The Conservative Idea”, 
which has no predisposition to theorizing. Conservative Utopia is but a “counter-
utopia”. The fourth form is the “Socialist-Communist Utopia”.  (Mannheim, 1991, 
pp. 190-215) Eagleton observes that Mannheim in inflating the meaning of ideology 
did not succeed in providing a congruent and unambiguous key to the understanding 
of ideology.  (Eagleton, 2007, pp. 109-110) 
 
                                                
12 Mannheim illustrates this point with clarity with the example of the bourgeois idea of freedom.  
(Mannheim, 1991, p. 183) 
13 “It is at this point that politics in the modern sense of the term begins, if we here understand by 
politics a more or less conscious participation of all strata of society in the achievement of some 
mundane purpose, as contrasted with a fatalistic acceptance of events as they are” (Mannheim, 1991, p. 
191) 
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4.8. “The Tragic View” in Goldmann 
The Romanian-born French sociologist Lucien Goldmann provides a compelling 
and elegant study of ideology in Le Dieu Caché first published in 1955. He looks at 
“mental structures” which operate in common structures in politics, philosophy and 
literary productions taking the example of the “vision tragique” shared by declining the 
noblesse de robe, the Jansenist sect, the philosophy of Pascal and the drama of Racine in 
late 17th century France. What at first sight seems a forced attempt to explain 
phenomena of a period by excessive interpretation turns out to provide a major re-
elaboration of the Marxist view of ideology away from economic determinism to the 
concession of a sublime influence of social and economic conditions of a group and 
time to the groups’ thought structures and by shaping the content of thought.  
Mary Evans brings Goldmann’s accomplishment to the point by stating that he 
“shows how the needs of particular social groups for explanations of changes in their 
social world can result in the elaboration of ideologies which are then brought to the 
point of maximum coherence by individuals.”  (Evans, 1981, p. 75) 
Lucien Goldmann thus tries - at least to some extent - to reconcile the organic 
determinism of Marxism with the idealistic claims of individualism through his 
definition of Weltanschauung. He states: 
Si, donc, la plupart des elements essentiels qui composent la structure 
schématique des écrits de Kant, Pascal et Racine sont analogues malgré les 
différences qui séparent ces écrivains en tant qu'individus empiriques vivants, 
nous sommes obligés de conclure à l’existence d’une réalité que n’est plus 
purement individuelle et qui s’exprime à travers leurs œuvres. C’est 
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précisément la vision du monde, et, dans le cas précis des auteurs que nous 
venons de citer, la vision tragique […].  (Goldmann, 1976, pp. 24-25)  
Goldmann achieves this reconciliation in a contentious compromise. While the 
everyday consciousness reflects the worldview of time in a disordered fashion 
unintelligible for the social scientist, some individuals with privileged abilities14 can 
and do reflect the worldview, not in content but in structure. To look at their works 
thus enables the social scientist to look into the epistemological structure of a class 
or social group, which their exceptional abilities are able to present in its purest form. 
If one accepts this assumption, one would have to argue that these exceptional works 
thus do not reflect the totality of the worldview of the individual members of a class 
or social group, but rather the possible reach of their so structured thinking, if it were 
exceptional. A worldview is, according to Goldmann,  
cet ensemble d’aspirations, de sentiments et d’idées qui réunit les membres 
d’un groupe (le plus souvent, d’une classe sociale) et les oppose aux autres 
groupes.  (Goldmann, 1976, p. 26) 
The worldview has an identifying function of a social group, lays down its aims and 
the structures of its thinking and feeling. 15 To look at the worldview of a class or 
social group therefore means looking at the actual historical conditions of the very 
class or social group, because, and Goldmann here does build on the Marxist 
tradition, these structures of thinking and feeling are shaped by the material 
                                                
14 Il en résulte que les individus exceptionnels expriment  mieux et d'une manière plus précise la 
conscience collective que les autres membres du groupe.”  (Goldmann, 1976, p. 27)} 
15 “feeling” in the sense of moral conclusions resulting from subconscious determinants as in Sigmund 
Freud. 
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conditions members of the class or social group share.16 These structures are in a 
constant process of change, where old structures are dissembled and new structures 
created. To understand the structures of thinking that make a worldview, it is vital to 
look at the history of a structural fragment and look into the shared material 
conditions that led to its coming into existence.  
Goldmann does not offer a systematic elaborations of worldview, he establishes no 
clear distinction between worldview and ideology17 and the claim of intellectual 
eminence, even though probably not known by the very intellectual under scrutiny, 
of some (and therefore not others) are lacunae in the intriguing study of the 
worldview of a class in decline. For all that, Goldmann pointed to communalities in 
the structure of thinking of a class or a social group and the dynamics of their 
historical development.  
 
4.9. The Frankfurt School’s Ideologiekritik 
 
The Frankfurt School adapted Marxist social theory to economic and social 
conditions of their time, which Marx himself could not have foreseen in his own 
theory. Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Fromm ea. were confronted with the great 
crises of liberal capitalism in the interwar period, the rise of national-socialism, exile 
in the United States and, ultimately, the “Bourgeoisierung” of the working class in the 
post-war era. Ideology had to be redefined to a more universally valid notion yet 
                                                
16 One might substitute the latter part with “by the material conditions members of the class or social 
group believe to share” 
17 Some disagree:  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 111; Larrain, 1979, p. 127) 
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building on the Hegelian dialectical method and Marxist notions of capital and 
reification, while rejecting Marx’s objectivity claims.  
For Theodor Adorno in Negative Dialektik (1973) ideology is a mechanism of abstract 
thought exchange able to reduce the “other” to what fits into a closed worldview. 
Thus he writes, 
Identity is the primal form of ideology. We relish it as adequacy to the thing it 
suppresses; adequacy has always been subjection to dominant purposes and, 
in that sense, its own contradiction. After the unspeakable effort it must have 
cost our species to produce the primacy of identity even against itself, man 
rejoices and basks in his conquest by turning it into the definition of the 
conquering thing: what has happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as 
its “in-itself.” Ideology’s power of resistance to enlightenment is owned to its 
complicity with identifying thought, or indeed, thought at large. The 
ideological side of thinking shows in its permanent failure to make good on 
the claim that non-I is finally the I: the more the I thinks, the more perfectly 
will it find itself debased into an object. Identity becomes the authority for a 
doctrine of adjustment […]. The critique of ideology is thus not something 
peripheral and intra-scientifc, not something limited to the objective mind 
and the products of the subjective mind. Philosophically, it is central: it is a 
critique of the constitutive consciousness itself.  (Adorno, 1973, p. 148) 
His assumption that ideology is but “identity thinking” leads away from the 
dichotomy of ideology and truth to a new dichotomy between ideology and 
heterogeneity.  (Eagleton, 2007, p. 126) Adorno famously stated that if a lion had 
consciousness, then the rage against the antelope, which he wants to eat, would be 
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ideology.  (Adorno, 1973, p. 212) Ideology thus serves the function of attributing to 
the superstructure’s extrapolations of the structure the appearance (Schein) of the 
necessary, hypostasize them as natural givens. The difference to Marx lies in the idea 
that ideology serves to homogenize the world, far away from its Marxian function of 
mere subservience. 
In earlier Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944), Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
observe,  
Today, with the transformation of the world into industry, the perspective of 
the universal, the social realization of thought, is so fully open to view that 
thought is repudiated by the rulers themselves as mere ideology.  (Adorno, 
1973, p. 29) 
This work manages to reveal that reason, the attempted means to reveal objective 
truth, has been utilized for ideological domination and that, ultimately, enlightenment 
itself based on myths. If domination is achieved through the internalization of 
alienation, as stated above, then “objective truth” turns out to be the most striking 
legitimizing argument. Herbert Marcuse continues this line of thought in his One-
Dimensional Man published in 1964. Here he criticizes the “fusion of the levels of 
cultural critique and political economy […] as a direct outcome of the new 
requirements of total mobilization in late capitalism.”  (Agger, 1992, p. 133) Marcuse 
points to a change in domination mechanism in capitalist society. Whereas in early 
capitalism domination was guaranteed through a conception of dutiful behaviour, in 
late capitalism a culture that equates the necessity of work with freedom and leisure 
restricts the possibilities of possible action to within the structure of “rational” 
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domination. Ethics as part of the cultural sphere are rationalized and as for remnants 
of irrationality he writes: 
Outside this rationalization (a term adopted from Max Weber), one lives in a 
world of values, and values separated out from the objective reality become 
subjective. The only way to rescue some abstract and harmless validity for 
them seems to be a metaphysical sanction (divine and natural law). But such 
sanction is not verifiable and thus not really objective. Values […] are not real 
and thus count less in the real business of life - the less so the higher they are 
elevated above rationality.  (Marcuse, 2002, p. 151) 
This makes the individual ever more bound to a reified present, which ever more 
seems to be the only world possible. The only possible escape for the individual is 
the “Great Refusal”, rejecting the seductions of the consumer culture and its 
rationality.  (Agger, 1992, p. 149) 
Jürgen Habermas uses the term “ideology” differently to earlier members of the 
Frankfurt School and basically refers to the beliefs the agents in a society hold. 
According to Mannheim, one can distinguish ideologies in two ways: (1) in regards to 
what they are about: a set of beliefs about superhuman entities thus is a religious 
ideology. (2) by their functional properties: a set of beliefs of no matter what content 
which influences a certain set of practices. What in content would be called an 
economic ideology influences religious practice therefore should also be seen as a 
religious ideology.  (Geuss, 1981, pp. 7-8) 
This diversion as a corollary, Mannheim agrees with Marcuse in  
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the progressive ‘rationalization’ of society is linked to the institutionalization 
of scientific and technical development. To the extent that technology and 
science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, old 
legitimations are destroyed. The secularization and ‘disenchantment’ of 
action-orienting worldviews, of cultural tradition as a whole, it the obverse of 
the growing ‘rationality’ of social action.  (Habermas, 1970, p. 81) 
He distinguishes though between “purposive-rational action” (i.e. labour) and 
“interaction”. Whereas purposive-rational action is either instrumental action or 
rational choice or their conjunction, interaction is communicative, symbolic action. 
Interaction is governed by consensual norms, which allow for communication and 
define expectations. Incompetent behaviour violates valid technical rules and is 
condemned to failure. Deviant behaviour violates consensual norms connected to 
the rules only by conventional practice and therefore is not necessarily bound to 
failure.  In terms of this basic distinction Habermas distinguishes between social 
systems where purposive-rational action or interaction dominate. The institutional 
framework consists of norms guided by symbolic interaction, whereas in the 
economic system or the state apparatus purposive-rational action is institutionalized. 
In the analysis of rationalization one has therefore to keep in mind this distinction.  
(Habermas, 1970, pp. 91-94) 
He affirms Marcuse by stating that societal stability is secured as long the institutional 
framework legitimized by mythical, religious and metaphysical interpretations of 
reality keeps in check the subsystems of purposive-rational action (“superiority 
criterion”). The capitalist mode of production allows for the expansion of 
subsystems of purposive-rational action and overturns the superiority of the 
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institutional framework to the forces of production and calls into question the 
traditional legitimation to power. Traditional worldviews lose their cogency in 
process of secularization already described by Weber and are reshaped into 
subjective belief systems and ethics which ensure private abiding to them. Equally, 
new legitimations impose themselves on the old ones by criticizing the dogmatism of 
traditional interpretations and a claim for universal because scientific validity. 
Ideologies do not disappear, Habermas claims: 
Yet [ideologies] retain legitimating functions, thereby keeping actual power 
relations inaccessible to analysis and to public consciousness. It is in that 
ideologies in the restricted sense first came into being. They replace 
traditional legitimations of power by appearing in the mantle of modern 
science and by deriving their justification from the critique of ideology. 
Ideologies are coeval with the critique of ideology.18 In this sense there can be 
no pre-bourgeois ‘ideology’.  (Habermas, 1970, p. 99) 
Habermas thus restricts his definition of ideology to the result of the reduction from 
holistic to individual validity of worldviews. Ideologies are the legitimising remains of 
the institutional system of myths and symbols that work as a corollary stabilising 
force in addition to the stabilising logic of the now dominant systems of purposive-
rational action. This view of ideologies as a product of the capitalist society and the 
denial of existence of ideology in the pre-bourgeois society seems contentious, 
because it juxtaposes a modern “ideology” with a pre-modern “worldview” in terms 
                                                
18 See Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (1973): “Cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable, 
conditions of reproduction. They remain 'living' as long as they take shape in an unplanned, nature-
like manner, or are shaped with hermeneutic consciousness. […] The critical appropriation of 
tradition destroys this nature-like character in discourse.” (Habermas, 1976, p. 70) 
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of legitimising scope and calls the former mere remains of the latter. This 
simplification serves the point in Habermas analysis of a critique of late capitalism, 
but does not provide a satisfactory answer if one tries to go beyond the determinism 
imposed by historical materialism. 
Technology and science, according to Habermas, can become a “background 
ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticized masses […], 
where it can take on legitimating power.”  (Habermas, 1970, p. 105) Because of this 
epochal change, Habermas continues, “class struggle” and “ideology” are terms to be 
redefined. Class antagonisms persist not in their obvious former state of being, but 
rather in a latent form between the dominant group culture and underprivileged 
groups. The change lies in the fact that the dominant group does not live anymore 
from the exploitation of the marginal groups. Revolutionary action by the 
underprivileged, according to Habermas, is not possible through the simple 
withdrawal of cooperation.  
The technocratic consciousness is, on the one hand, ‘less ideological’ than all 
previous ideologies. For it does not have the opaque force of a delusion that 
only transfigures the implementation of interests. On the hand, today’s 
dominant […] background ideology, which makes a fetish of science, is more 
irresistible and farther-reaching that ideologies of the old type. For with the 
veiling of practical problems it not only justifies a particular class’ interest in 
domination and represses another class’ partial need for emancipation, but 
affects the human race’s emancipatory interest as such. 
 (Habermas, 1970, p. 111) 
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For Habermas, the advantage of this new ideology lies in its failure to project a 
“good life”, an enterprise easily to be de disillusioned, and, more importantly, that 
loyalty is created “through the creation of “privatized needs”  (Habermas, 1970, p. 
112). The gloomy view of a change late capitalism apparently imposes on human 
consciousness is, as argued above, reductive, but offers insight into the legitimizing 
mechanisms of a worldview based on claims of rationality.    
4.10. Symbolic Capital in Bourdieu 
Pierre Bourdieu published a study of gift exchange among the Kabyles in Algeria in 
1972 and underlined this study with a major contribution to the study of ideology in 
Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique: 
The effect of legitimation of the established order is thus not solely the work 
of the mechanisms traditionally regarded as belonging to the order of 
ideology, such as law. The system of cultural goods production and the 
system producing the producers also fulfil ideological functions, as a by-
product, through the very logic of their functioning, owing to the fact that the 
mechanisms through which they contribute to the reproduction of the social 
order and the permanence of the relations of domination remain hidden.  
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 133) 
Bourdieu modifies the previous concepts of consciousness to explain why a system 
of cultural goods production works perpetuating itself while in itself not being an 
inescapable prison of the mind of the oppressed. As Marxism looses its policy-
orientation, false consciousness and the actions it causes loose their specific character 
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and allow for a less restricted analysis. Bourdieu in fact, by looking into the gift 
exchanges in Kabylia, builds on the structuralist findings in linguistics, psychology 
and sociology to establish a theory of a vaguely binding cultural system, which not 
only produces a social stratification deemed to be just, but embeds the very social 
system in every aspect of cultural expression, every word uttered and gesture made 
by a member of that social system.19 Ideology is not anymore the means of subjecting 
a oppressing class to unconscious serfdom, but rather the vital content reproduced in 
the practice of members of a social system. He calls this practice the “performative 
magic of the social”. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 57) While he maintains domination to be a 
principal element of every social system, he distinguishes between symbolic and 
material capital, the former being “misrecognized” material capital.  Material wealth, 
on the other hand, “can function as capital only in relationship with a specifically 
economic field”  (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 122-123) where it’s value is recognized. 
Cognition in its forms misrecognition and recognition creates “socially constituted 
subjectivity” and therefore has to be the point of departure for the study of ideology 
as the mechanisms of reproduction of a system of cultural goods production. 
Social practice and cultural reproduction proceeds within a temporally dialectic 
process between “objectified products” and “incorporated goods of historical 
practice” to achieve the “production of a common-sense world”  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 
58), the “objectified products” being the fortified structures, the “incorporated goods 
of historical practice” being what he defines the “habitus”, which is 
 a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
                                                
19 This leads Bourdieu too a similar conclusion with Althusser in regards to the importance of the 
school system as an ideological institution.  (Thompson, 1984, p. 57) 
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generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at the 
ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. 
Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of 
obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the organizing action of a conductor.  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) 
Judith Butler rephrases that definition to “embodied rituals of everdayness by which 
a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own “obviousness”.  (Butler, 1999, 
pp. 113-114) The habitus therefore does not determine social practice but rather 
motivates the reproduction of practices through the belief of the very obviousness of 
an action.  
Social actions do not arise solely from the motivation impetus of the habitus, but 
rather are the product of another dialectic moment, the interaction between the 
habitus, i.e. dispositions, and the “field”, a social arena for the actions of the 
individual. These reciprocally influence each other in a historic process.  (Bourdieu, 
1990, pp. 66-68) 
It is thus the habitus, which allows the institution to be considered as valid, necessary 
and obvious. “An institution”, Bourdieu declares, ”is fully viable only if its is durably 
objectified not only in things, […] but also […] in durable dispositions to recognize 
and comply with the demands immanent in the field.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 58)  
The question arises if Bourdieu limits individuality to the capacity to defy in one's 
actions the reproduction of a dominant group habitus. Bourdieu admits a difference 
between a “class habitus” and an “individual habitus”, but states that the “singular 
habitus of members of the same class are united in a relationship of homology, that 
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
54 of 236 
is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within homogeneity 
characteristic of their social conditions of production.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 60) Here 
and in his visual of fields, one of which is the market, Bourdieu sticks to Marxist 
historic materialism, even though in a very innovative way. He argues that in the pre-
capitalist society symbolic violence maintained relations of domination through 
strategies, which “if they are not to destroy themselves by revealing their true nature, 
must be disguised, […] euphemized.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 126) The pre-capitalist 
economy -read society-, contrary to the capitalist economy, “cannot count on the 
implacable, hidden violence of objective mechanisms which enable the dominant to 
limit themselves to reproduction strategies.”  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 126) There is thus 
no end of ideology in the thought of Bourdieu, but only a the perception in line with 
Marcuse that capitalist society has established a dominant ideology which manages to 
hide its oppressive character behind a veil of objective mechanisms. 
The group habitus is not necessarily able to adapt to changes in the material 
conditions of production. This comes, Bourdieu argues, from the tendency of 
individuals, members of these groups, to stick to durable dispositions that can outlive 
economic and social conditions.  (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 52) The ramifications of this 
statement in terms of our study of ideologies is substantial, because Bourdieu 
succeeds in explaining how marginalised ideologies and ideologies incoherent with 
social and economic conditions can subsist.  
 
 
4.11. The Social Imaginary in Castoriadis 
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Cornelius Castoriadis is not to be found in the usual references to the study of 
ideology. Yet, the concept of “social imaginary” he elaborated with Claude Lefort in 
the 1950ies as co-editors of the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie is a vital for the 
understanding of ideology within Post-Marxist theory.  
Castoriadis criticizes Marx to extrapolate the whole process of historical change from 
the phase of bourgeois revolution. His schema is - here Castoriadis agrees with 
Bourdieu - thus not applicable to pre-feudal and non-industrialized countries. The 
fundamental reason of this “mistake” is an epistemological one. Marx follows 
Western rationalism in the assumption that laws govern the process of historical 
change, reducing action into categories with inevitable ends. This action can be 
studied through scientific inquiry. Ideology is just one phenomenon that makes sure 
conduct of the many remain within the bounds of oppression by the few in a 
capitalist society. Ideology can, as said, be studied by that very scientific inquiry. 
Castoriadis accuses Marx of relativizing his discovery of the creative capacity of 
classes by forcing it into the bounds of action already pre-determined by the course 
of history. Castoriadis declares the whole Western study of the nature of society and 
history, including Marx, to have been tainted by the very ontology of determinacy.  
(Thompson, 1984, pp. 17-21) “Different modes of historicity” in societies point to 
different ways of “instituting their own particular temporality.”  (Castoriadis, 1997b, 
p. 215) The constant alteration at different paces seems to be concealed from view 
from within a society. 
Thus everything happens as if the time of social doing, essentially irregular, 
accidental, altering, must always be imaginarily reabsorbed through a denial of 
time by means of the eternal return of the same, its representations as pure 
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usury and corruption, its levelling out in the indifference of the merely 
quantitative difference, its annulment before Eternity. Everything happens as 
if the terrain where the creativity of society is manifested in the most tangible 
manner, the terrain where it makes, makes be and makes itself be in making 
be, must be covered over by an imaginary creation ordered in such a way that 
the society can conceal from itself what it is. Everything happens as if the 
society must negate itself as society, hide its social being in negating the 
temporality which is first and above all its own temporality, the time of 
alterations-alterity which it makes be and which makes it be as society. 
Another way of saying the same thing: everything happens as if society could 
not recognize itself as making itself, as institution of itself, as self-institution. 
(Castoriadis cited in  (Thompson, 1984, p. 22)) 
Castoriadis reformulates Marx’ assumption that ideology is the instrument of the 
ruling class to a mere misrecognition by society in its entirety of its temporal being. 
Castoriadis therefore attributes that illusion existing in and fundamental to cohesion 
in every society. The binding link is the “social imaginary”. The Imaginary, as a 
product of the vis formandi of human collectives, is composed of the language, 
customs, norms  
once created, both imaginary social significations and institutions crystallize, 
or solidify, and that is what I call the instituted social imaginary. It provides 
continuity within society, the reproduction and repetition of the same forms, 
which henceforth regulate people's lives and persist as long as no gradual 
historical change or massive new creation occurs, modifying them or radically 
replacing them with others.  (Castoriadis, 2007, pp. 73-74) 
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Here we are at the basis of the concept of ideology adopted in this thesis: ideology as 
the active but unconsciously referred to parts of the social imaginary that serve to 
reproduce the same form of social imaginary and thus the society it represents.  
Society is thus a “self-creation” in a constant process of “self-alteration”. Some 
constraints shape the alteration of the social imaginary. Firstly, external constraints 
account for biological constraints and respond to the functionality of institutions. 
Secondly, internal constraints tie the imaginary with the psyche supplying the latter 
with meaning of existence of the self, the particular society and the world. Thirdly, 
there are historical constraints. Castoriadis argues, “the relation to this past is itself a 
part of the institution of society […] Re-creation of the past is done according to the 
imaginary significations of the present.” Fourthly, there are two fundamental intrinsic 
constraints: coherence20 and “closure of meaning”. The latter means “any ‘question’ 
which can be formulated at all in the language of this society must fin its answer 
within the magma of the social imaginary significations of the society.”21  (Castoriadis, 
1997a, pp. 333 - 336) 
He distinguishes furthermore between primal institution and second-order 
institutions of society. The former is the reproduction of society through the social 
imaginary, the latter are the articulations and implementations of the primal 
institution of society. Some may be transhistorical such as language, i.e. there is no 
society without language, some may be specific to one society.  (Castoriadis, 2007, p. 
101) 
                                                
20 “Pyramid building with starving peasants is coherent when referred to the whole organization and 
social imaginary significations of the Pharaonic or Mayan societies.” (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 335) 
21 This explains the classifying of defining European Great Powers in the light of the tianxia concept 
of international relations in ancient China and eventually dealing with them. 
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Castoriadis’ reflection provokes a look into the dynamics of the creation, 
reproduction and eventual breakdown of a social imaginary. He himself states 
however, that there are “no ‘laws’ commanding the radical imagination, when it 
flourishes and when it fades away.”  (Castoriadis, 2007, p. 76) The acknowledgement 
of that process allows for a totally different look e.g. at the disintegration of body 
politics. Castoriadis points to the collapse of the Roman Empire, where the 
“breakdown of the social imaginary significations underlying the institutions, was 
simply facilitated by the Germanic invasions. […] Similar major facts are visible in 
every society whose evolution is documented: in Egypt, the Middle East, India, 
China, and even in Mesoamerica.”  (Castoriadis, 2007, p. 76) In terms of 
International Relations Theory, Castoriadis’ theory sustains constructivism in its 
criticism of preceding mainstream schools of thought.  
In final analysis, Castoriadiss follows the way of the Frankfurt School in asserting in 
warning of “a path that leads to the loss of meaning, […] the growing takeover of the 
capitalist imaginary of the unlimited expansion of ‘rational mastery’ […] of the 
unlimited expansion of consumption for consumption’s sake, […] and of 
technoscience […], a party to dominations by that capitalist imaginary.”  (Castoriadis, 
2007, p. 86) 
4.12. The End of Ideology and the End of History 
Western social sciences since the end of the Second World World have come to an 
“orthodox consenus” (Giddens) that modernity eventually extinguishes “ideological” 
alienation from self-regulating, natural progress towards modernity. This was Daniel 
Bell’s thesis in his The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties first 
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published in 1960. A classless society was to emerge and eventually prevail which 
would progress not through ideological imagining of better societies and the political 
struggle to achieve these, but rather through steady technical advances.  (Bell, 
1960/1965) For Bell, Shils, Lipset and their contemporaries the American 
comparative affluence was evidence to the superiority of Western individualism, 
legalism and liberalism. Thus, according to Lemert, “the ideology of the end of 
ideology was a pre-emptory strike in the Cold War, in which Western intellectuals 
declared victory”.  (Lemert, 1991, p. 170) With the radicalisation of the American 
and European publics in the 1960ies, the questioning of the goodness of Burnham’s 
“managerial revolution” led to a reappraisal of “ideology” as a political concept.  
(Zhao, 1993, p. 70) With the “End of History” thesis, first put forward by the 
American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in a 1989 essay and in his 1992 book, 
again Western liberal, individual modernity has come to be seen as the ultimate 
“ideology” eventually, and soon, eclipsing the ideologies of contrasting views of 
modernity.  (Fukuyama, 1992/1992) Again, “Modernity’s foundational ideology was 
that Truth undistorted could produce Power uncorrupted.”  (Lemert, 1991, p. 168)  
Post-modern social theorists have come to question the existence of ideology per se. 
Michel Foucault argues for an eclipse of the relevance of ideology in social sciences 
by going beyond the domains of consciousness and cognition central to the 
traditional analyses of ideology. For him, the biopower’s social cohesion stems from 
social practises rather than through social beliefs.  (Zhao, 1993, p. 72) Post-
structuralism emphasises the instability of meaning and disavow the idea of 
representation. Jacques Derrida’s questioning of linguistic meaning to be linked to 
determinable particular set of signifiers erodes the feasibility of grasping ideologies 
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on a theoretical level.  (Zhao, 1993, p. 76) Jean Baudrillard’s work eliminates the 
distinction between the real and the imaginary by relegating all human experience to 
be “simulacra”.  (Baudrillard, 1981) Althusser’s conception of ideology as an 
imaginary set of relations to real economic conditions loses meaning in a world 
where even the latter are simulacra.  
While humbling social analysis by its constant questioning of the questioning, post-
modern theory runs the danger of relegating analytical thought to continuous self-
criticism. As Fukuyama wittingly in a 1995 article defending his End of History thesis,   
The postmodernist professor who asserts that there is no coherent direction 
to history would most likely never contemplate leaving his comfortable 
surroundings in Paris, New Haven or Irvine, and move to Somalia, or raise 
his children under the hygienic conditions prevailing in Burundi.  (Fukuyama, 
1995, p. 34) 
Fukuyama in this article, calling for a reappraisal of modernity theories, also admits 
several conditions, which would falsify the modernity universalism he inherited from 
Hegel and Kojève: (1) if liberal democracy collapses as a viable state system; (2) “if a 
society based on genuinely different principles arose somewhere in the world and 
looked like it was a going concern over a long period of time (my candidate is an 
Asian ‘soft authoritarian’ state)”; (3) if principles preceding Western liberalism 
returned and gained wide-spread legitimacy. He admits that his proclaimed end of 
history theory is not based on empirical facts, but “all it can do is give us a certain 
basis for hope”.  (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 35) 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published Empire in 2000. Their best-selling 
approach of the development of the political and economic world order built on 
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both Fukuyama’s understanding of a prevailing ahistorical modernity and the post-
modern relativities of truth. They attribute “Empire” not to a particular state or 
group of states, but rather to a “decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that 
progressively incorporates the entire global real within its open, expanding frontiers”.  
(Hardt & Negri, 2000/2001, p. xii) Empire becomes the word of their choosing 
because of the universalistic/global aspirations of imperial (not imperialist) discourse 
historically associated to the understanding of the word. For Hardt and Negri 
globalisation has reached a moment of paradigmatic change in economic relations 
and thus, in Marxist tradition, social, legal and cultural relations. The 
“informationalisation” and the very globality of economic relations lead them to 
observe the – undisputed - erosion of the Westphalian “inter-national” state system 
and proclaim a – disputed – end to modernisation per se towards “postmodernisation” 
characterised by a dominance of immaterial labour in a post-Westphalian truly 
“global” world order.  (Hardt & Negri, 2000/2001, p. 289) This global word order is 
what they call Empire and what has been previously proclaimed to be the “end of 
history”. In orthodox Marxist fashion, they negate this stage to be the final stage of 
human development, by forecasting an end to capitalist global Empire through their 
redefinition of the proletariat, the “multitude”.  (Hardt & Negri, 2000/2001, p. 367) 
With Hardt and Negri updating Marxist theory for the 21st century, the 
understanding of ideology implicit in this update has returned to Marx’ vision of 
“nebulous constructs” and left the present diversity of world views to be once again 
channelled into Western dialectical uniformities. The scientific goal of elucidating the 
ideologies of different worldviews that continue to exist and evolve succumbs to 
ideological discussions.   
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5. Empires and their Imaginaries 
5.1. Terminology and Literature Review 
The history of the study about “Empire” is as old as the term itself and as manifold 
as the meanings the term has assumed to fit into the respective frameworks of 
explanation. This has led to a myriad of different partly conflicting understandings, 
to which historical processes are given a selective reading in order to fit into the 
theoretical framework. In particular, Marxist theory, so profound in its analysis of the 
interrelation of classes and the unconscious factors binding society, shaped the 
present-day understanding of ‘empire’ by defining it as the mere exploitation of the 
peripheries as an the uttermost expression of late capitalism.  
Thus, the understanding of Empire and Imperialism as its policy has not much 
evolved from its 19th century understanding of Western Great Powers seeking 
exploitable colonies to spread a superior culture. Non-western Imperial political 
frameworks and their inherent worldviews have been shelved as a objects of 
antiquity, lacking relevance in an apparently absolute Westphalian community of 
states. The Constructivist School in International Relations Theory provided the 
groundbreaking theoretical basis to challenge the Westphalian sovereignty paradigm 
which served a departure point for the classic schools of Realism, Neo-Realism and 
Institutionalism. This breakthrough has reverberated into the study of world history 
in the last two decades and its studies are steadily de-mystifying International 
Relations Theory from the myth of Westphalian universality.  (Osiander, 2001),  
(Krasner, 1993),  (Krasner, 1999),  (Krasner, 2001)  
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For the scope of this thesis, Empire is looked at not from an anthropological view, 
but rather from a holistic sociological. The attempt is made to explain how Empire 
as an idea, a vision of a universal hierarchy governing the totality of the “world”, 
however fictitious, has served a legitimising purpose to perpetuate the founding 
ideology of a state and its vision of the state system, even without a “real” empire 
(economic, territorial, cultural impact on a global scale) at hand. It will be shown that 
this legitimising function is not exercised as a conscious practice (such as taxation, 
war..), but rather works on a subconscious level, shaping the discourse of whoever 
has to claim legitimacy over the monopoly of power. It is therefore attempted to 
reveal the ideological function of empire while freeing both terms from the 
deforming usage applied by the traditional scholars of imperialism such as Hobson, 
Lenin and Schumpeter and subsequent mainstream imperialism critique. Indeed, little 
could be added to Lenin's definition as “parasitic or decaying capitalism”  (Lenin, 
1973, p. 150) or Schumpeter's view that imperialism is an “objectiveless disposition 
on the part of the state to unlimited forcible expansion” or a “purely instinctual 
inclination towards war and conquest.”  (Schumpeter, 1951, p. 7) 
According to Colomer, Empire-wide political and institutional processes disappeared 
from the field of academic political studies after World War II. He notes that 
between 1950 and 1967 not a single work has been published at the American 
Political Science Review with “empire” or “imperial” in the title.  (Colomer, 2008, p. 
50) W. Ullmann made one rare contribution on the legitimacy of the European 
medieval empires.  (Ullmann, 1964) In 1967, Israeli sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
published a collection of short essays in The Decline of Empires.  (The Decline of Empires, 
1967) 
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In the 1980ies, in unison with the Constructivist critique at traditional IR theory, the 
concept of Empire received a burst of interest.  
The Estonian-American political scientist Rein Taagepera published three articles in 
1978 - 79 on Size and Duration of Empires in the journal Social Science Research.  
(Taagepera, 1978b)  (Taagepera, 1978a),  (Taagepera, 1979) Taagepera relativizes the 
commonly assumed cyclical life-process of empires in a painstaking empirical analysis. 
A standard work on empires in global history remains Le Concept d’Empire edited by 
Maurice Duverger and published in 1980.  (Le Concept D'empire, 1980) Benedict 
Anderson's 1983 Imagined Communities traces Asian nationalisms to imperial pasts.  
(Anderson, 1983) Michael W. Doyle published Empires in 1986, a thorough critique 
of previous analyses of the concept and delineating a “Historical Sociology of 
Empires”. Unfortunately, his critique does not provide a consistent theoretical 
framework itself and fails, for instance, in explaining the Ottoman Empire’s 
durability when giving a historical account of imperial formations.  (Doyle, 1986) 
Geoffrey Parker’s Geopolitics of Domination, published in 1988, went into the same 
direction, lacks Doyle’s analytical depth.  (Parker, 1988)  
Since publishing an essay in The City and the Empire in 1986,  (Porter, 1986) professor 
Andrew Porter from King’s College in London has been a prolific writer on empire 
theory, most notably drawing from European imperialism  (Porter, 1994) and the 
role of religion.  (Porter, 2004) 
The Age of Empire. 1875 – 1914 by Eric J. E. Hobsbawm, published in 1989, while 
cited considerably, remains within the limits of Western traditional analysis of 
Empire.  (Hobsbawm, 1987) The same is true for Jack L. Snyder’s 1991 Myths of 
Empire.  (Snyder, 1991) 
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In 1998, David Armitage from Harvard published a collection of studies on Empire 
in Theories of Empire, 1450 – 1800, setting the scope to a historical analysis of the term 
in Europe and the early United States.  (Armitage, 1998) In 2000, he published The 
Ideological Origins of the British Empire  (The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 2000). 
The British Atlantic World, 1500 – 1800 edited by Armitage and Michael Braddick, 
published in 2002, made an effort into extracting a theoretical understanding on the 
super-state in terms of connections (migratory, economic, religious, scientific) and 
identities (authority, gender, race ) from this historical analysis.  (The British Atlantic 
World, 1500-1800, 2002) 
In 1998 Thomas Sowell’s Conquests and Cultures looks into the interplay between the 
two and thus provides a valuable insight into the function cultures perform to secure 
domination after conquest.  (Sowell, 1998) Alexander J. Motyl provides the so far 
most coherent theoretical framework for the life-process of empires in a January 
1999 article in the journal Comparative Politics, focussing on Russia and later the 
same year in Revolutions, Nations, Empires. A previous contribution has been his 
contribution Thinking about Empire in After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-
Building edited by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen in 1997.  (Motyl, 1977) He 
refined his thesis in Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires, published 
in 2001.  (Motyl, 1999b),  (Motyl, 1999a),  (Motyl, 2001)  
In 2001, Susan E. Alcock, Terence N. D’Altroy, Kathleen D. Morrison and Carla M. 
Sinopoli jointly published Empires. Perspectives from Archaeology and History. This 
collection of papers on “imperial designs” dates from a conference held in 1997 and 
covers a range of imperial enterprises and making away with the Euro-centrism so 
far predominant. The collection is the only to explicitly attribute a legitimising 
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function to imperial discourse, in particular thanks to Thomas J. Barfield’s 
contribution.  (Empires: Perspectives From Archaeology and History, 2001)  
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published their much-discussed globalised 
reconsideration of the Marxist notion of Empire in their seminal Empire first 
published in 2000. They continued to elaborate on their worldview construct in 
Multitude, published in 2004  (Hardt & Negri, 2004/2005), and Commonwealth, 
published in 2009.  (Hardt & Negri, 2009) 
Deepak Lal’s 2004 In Praise of Empires, while overcoming the old dichotomy between 
ancient and modern empires, provides a limited theoretical framework for the 
understanding of the term.  (Lal, 2004)  
In the same year, Alexei Miller and Alfred Rieber from the Central European 
University in Budapest published a collection of essays on “Imperial Rule”. This 
collection includes a particularly relevant article by Miller on The empire and the Nation 
in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism. Miller explains present-day Russian 
nationalism looking at the Russian imperial “imaginary geography”.  (Miller, 2004) 
Rieber looks at the understandings of frontiers in the different Eurasian world orders.  
(Rieber, 2004) 
A recent scholar on empire has been Mark R. Beissinger, Professor of Politics at 
Princeton University.  (Beissinger, 2005) He is currently working at two further 
publications on empire: Imperial Reputations:  The Politics of Empire in a World of Nation-
States and Empire by Reputation, jointly written with Sarah Bush. The journal Ab Imperio. 
Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space, first published in 
June 2000, has been delivering quarterly discussions on empire theory.  
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Professor Josep Maria Colomer from Barcelona has collected his thoughts on empire 
in a recent short publication on the end of the nation-state  (Colomer, 2007) and 
lectures in Georgetown University.  (Colomer, 2008) 
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5.2. Definitions and Ideal-type Empires 
The word, empire, conveys an idea of a vast territory, composed of various 
people; whereas that of kingdom, implies, one more bounded; and imitates 
the unity of that nation, of which it is formed. 
John Trusler: The Difference, Between Word, Esteemed Synonymous, in the English 
Language, London 1766  (Osterhammel, 2002, p. 386) 
Josep Colomer juxtaposes empires and states in terms of territorial elements: 
1. Very large size vs. large or mid size 
2. Absence of fixed or permanent boundaries vs. fixed territory and formal 
boundaries 
3. A compound of diverse groups and territorial units vs. sovereignty 
4. A set of multilevel, often overlapping jurisdictions vs. monopoly and 
homogenization  (Colomer, 2008, pp. 52-53) 
While this juxtaposition provides a rough idea of what empire is not, it is 
unsatisfactory in terms what empire actually is, how it is structured and perpetuated. 
There is scholarly consensus on the three ideal-type characteristics of all empires.   
Firstly, empires consist of a “core” and a “periphery”. Secondly, the core is the home 
of the ruling élite whereas the peripheries are governed by local élites dependent on 
the support of the core élite. Thirdly, the peripheries entertain relations with the 
outside and among themselves only through the core. 
Doyle distinguished between three schools of theory on the driving forces behind 
empires. The first school uses a metropolitan, dispositional model. According to 
exponents of this school, i.e. Hobson, Lenin, Schumpeter, “empire is imperialism”. 
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Empire is a product of forces at the core, “metropolitan drives”, for external 
expansion.  (Doyle, 1986, pp. 20-24) John A. Hobson’s 1902 Imperialism. A Study 
portrayed British imperialism as emanating from metropolitan Britain. Special 
interests encouraged aggressive foreign policy and the media and the educational 
institutions provided the imperialistic propaganda. Hobson argues that the root idea 
of empire in the ancient and medieval world as a federation of states covering the 
entire known world and its latter-day version of internationalism have been defeated 
by the rise of nationalisms. Imperialism for Hobson is a policy as an expression of 
nationalism.  (Hobson, 1988, pp. 8-11) Imperialism therefore implies militarism, 
tendencies which “[involve] in their recoil a degradation of Western States and a 
possible débâcle of Western civilization”.22 (Hobson, 1988, p. 138) This nationalism 
serves as a veil for “selfish interests of certain industrial, financial, and professional 
classes, seeking private advantages out of a policy of imperial expansion”  (Hobson, 
1988, p. 196) 
Lenin defined imperialism as the “monopoly stage of capitalism”.  (Lenin, 1973, p. 
105) Imperialism is not a policy, as in Hobson, but an inevitable stage in history. 
According to Lenin, monopolies have been the consequence of a high stage of 
development of the concentration of production. These monopolies have stimulated 
the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, thus enormously 
increasing the power of big capital. Financial oligarchies control these monopolies, 
thus the creation of “finance capital”. The excess in finance capital brings about an 
export of capital. Imperialism is nothing but the struggle for spheres for the export 
                                                
22 “Imperialism - whether it consists in a further policy of expansion or in the rigorous maintenance of 
all those vast tropical lands which have been ear-marked as British spheres of influence - implies 
militarism now and ruinous wars in the future. […] The kingdoms of the earth are to be ours on 
condition that we fall down and worship Moloch.”  (Hobson, 1988, p. 130) 
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of capital and for the sources of raw materials and inevitably intensifies the 
contradictions within capitalism. The accumulation of finance capital leads to the 
distinctive characteristic of imperialism, the emergence of “rentier states” living from 
the exploitation of the peripheries.  (Lenin, 1973, pp. 148-150) 
Schumpeter sees imperialism as the “objectless disposition of a state to unlimited 
forcible expansion”  (Schumpeter, 1951, p. 7), a disposition originating in the historic 
residue of the corruption of true capitalism by an atavistic war machine. Imperialism 
is thus not a phenomenon of modernity, but as a residue persists from antiquity. 
Schumpeter adopts a historicist approach in identifying “warrior nations” and depicts  
how internal struggles gave rise to a unified war organization behind which 
rallied all the popular forces - including those in the ideological sphere - a war 
machine that, once in motion, continued so long as there was steam behind it 
and it did not run up against a stone wall.  (Schumpeter, 1951, p. 49) 
In closing, for Schumpeter as for Hobson, imperialism is a formal imperialism, i.e. 
territorial conquest. Lenin’s vision of imperialism is of informal character, implying 
economic dependency rather than political control of the peripheries. All three share 
the view that “the roots of empire [are] in imperialism, a force emanating from the 
metropole like radio waves from a transmitter”.  (Doyle, 1986, p. 24)  
The second school sees the peripheries as impetus for imperialism. Gallagher and 
Robinson first raise this point in The Imperialism of Free Trade published in 1953. 
According to Robinson   
at every stage […] the working of imperialism was determined by the 
indigenous collaborative systems. […] It should be emphasised that the Afro-
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Asian crises which evoked [European] imperialism were often not essentially 
the products of European forces but of autonomous changes in African and 
Asian domestic politics. […] [Its] European directors and agents, no less than 
its victims, looked on imperialism as an inevitable but random process 
receding out of control.  (Robinson, 1976, pp. 147-148) 
Others look at the so-called “frontier problem”, i.e. the core, while defensive in 
character, has to be expansive in effect in order to secure orderly interaction.  
The third school is represented by mainstream realist IR theory adopting a systemic 
model. Kenneth Waltz argues that empire is only made possible by opportunities 
given within an international system. The three surpluses of people, of goods and of 
capital lead to imperialisms of swarming, of free trade and of monopoly capitalism, 
respectively.  (Waltz, 2004, p. 26) 
Doyle argues that the balance of power-theory provides a key to understanding the 
dynamics of imperialism stating that the anarchic structure of international politics 
induce states to maximise their relative power in order to be able to compete with 
other states.  (Doyle, 1986, p. 27) Balance of power has been meticulously described 
by Stephen M. Walt in The Origins of Alliances (1987). He also describes the 
phenomenon of bandwagoning. The latter states that “States facing an eternal threat 
will ally with the most threatening power”.  (Walt, 2005, p. 102) Whereas in the 
balance of power theory states aim at equal status - the famous comparison with 
billiard balls -, the bandwagoning theory implies the recognition of weaker states of 
their inferiority in power resources and their recognition of the necessity to subject 
itself to the dominion of a stronger state to guarantee subsistence. In these terms, 
imperial domination is a necessary result of relations between powerful and weak   
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Realist IR Theory allows for empire to exist only as informal empire. Formal empire 
is not seen as matter of IR theory as the latter is a question of domestic politics. 
Empire as a concept oscillates between the categories of international and domestic 
politics. Doyle provides five dimensions for these oscillations. (1) domain: the 
population affected; (2) scope: the type of behaviour influenced; (3) range of rewards 
and punishments; (4) weight, effectiveness; (5) duration.  (Doyle, 1986, p. 35) 
Even so, the question arises on how empire can be distinguished from mere 
hegemony. In Doyle’s words 
“the scope of imperial control involves both the process of control and its 
outcomes. Control is achieved either formally (directly or indirectly) or 
informally through influence over the periphery’s environment, political 
articulation, aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and implementation, 
and usually with the collaboration of local peripheral elites. The scope of the 
outcomes covers both internal and external issues - who rules and what rules. 
Hegemony, by contrast, denotes control over external policy alone.”  (Doyle, 
1986, p. 40) 
Alexander J. Motyl has provided a definition of empire that transcends Doyle’s 
analysis. Motyl calls arrives at following definition: 
Empires […] are structurally centralized political systems within which core 
elites dominate peripheral societies, serve as intermediaries for their 
significant interactions, and channel resource and information flows from the 
periphery to the core and back to the periphery.  (Motyl, 1999b, p. 128) 
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In describing the peculiarity of imperial formations, he adopts the metaphor of an 
“incomplete wheel” with hub and spokes, but no rim. The hubs and spokes are 
aspects common to any political system. The absence of a rim represents the absence 
of relations between the peripheral units. This interaction is subject to four rules laid 
down by Johan Galtung in his “structural theory of imperialism”. Firstly, the vertical 
interaction between core and periphery; secondly, missing interaction between 
periphery and periphery; thirdly, missing multilateral interaction between the three; 
fourthly, monopolization of interaction with the outside world by the core. The latter 
implies that the periphery units do not interact with other cores and that both core 
and peripheries do not interact with other peripheries in terms of another core’s 
peripheries.  (Motyl, 1999a, p. 122) (Motyl, 2001, p. 16)  
For the German historian Jürgen Osterhammel, pre-modern empires are defined by 
five structural principles: (1) the ability of an urban imperial centre to extract 
sufficient resources from an agrarian periphery to upkeep administration, priests and 
an imperial military force; (2) military and transport technologies allowing for distant 
projections of central power; (3) an imperial ideology arguing for the civilisation 
superiority of the centre; (4) voluntary co-optation by the periphery’s elite of the 
centre’s ideological symbols; (5) flexible frontiers.  (Osterhammel, 2000, p. 226) 
Thomas J. Barfield provides a deeper insight in arguing that empires share the 
following five internal characteristics23: 
Firstly, “empires are organized both to administer and exploit diversity, whether 
economic, political, religious, or ethnic.”  (Barfield, 2001, p. 29) This explains why 
                                                
23 The past tense used in citations of Barfield and the present tense used in this thesis' elaboration of 
the former point to the assumption of this thesis that empires are not a thing of the past, neither relics 
of atavistic militarism in Schumpeter's terms nor phenomena reflecting the decay of capitalism in 
Lenin's, but a form of polity different from the Westphalian cognition of State. 
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élites can be replaced without the collapse of the imperial structure. Successful 
empires are thus able to exploit the diversity within them in terms of abstracting the 
attachment of the monopoly of power from the identification of a specific ruling 
élite (ethnicity, religious caste, economically dominant group..) to the élite able to 
perpetuate the system as a whole.  
Secondly, “empires established transportation systems designed to serve the imperial 
center militarily end economically.” (Barfield, 2001, p. 30) 
Transportation systems allowed for the establishment of stable trade contacts within 
the political stability of a pax imperii, therefore further economic ties between the core 
and the periphery and ultimately provide an economic interest both of the core and 
the periphery to perpetuate an imperial structure. 
Thirdly, “empires had sophisticated systems of communication that allowed them to 
administer all subject areas from the center directly.”  (Barfield, 2001, p. 31) 
Communication is the essential requirement to ascertain the recognition of the core 
by the peripheries and the adaption of the peripheries to changes in the core. 
Communication requires a common code of understanding, such as, for instance, a 
lingua franca, a standardized record-keeping system, standardized measures and 
common numeral systems. 
Fourth, “empires proclaimed a monopoly of force within the territories they rules 
and projected their military force outward.”  (Barfield, 2001, p. 32) 
Empires cannot afford to maintain control of the peripheries through military power. 
The key to stability among the spokes is an effective and efficient administration. 
Barfield lists three possibilities of limits to imperial expansions. Firstly, an empire 
reached the frontiers of another empire or a force not to be subdued. Secondly, an 
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empire reaches an ecological frontier. Thirdly, an advance is forgone as part of a 
policy to create a defensible frontier. After this frontier, the costs exceed the benefit 
of administration.  (Barfield, 2001, p. 32) 
Fifth, “empires had an ‘imperial project’ that imposed some type of unity throughout 
the system.”  (Barfield, 2001, p. 32) 
Two strategies are at work here to reduce the costs of imperial administration and, 
more importantly, reducing the risks of “loosing a spoke”. Firstly, Empires with a 
common core of values, a civilizing project, tend to go through a process going from 
coercion of the peripheries through co-optation through cooperation finally to 
identification with the core.24 Secondly, the “imperial project” involves relating it to 
“a series of cosmological and natural ‘constants’ against which [imperial] power 
might be stabilized, justified, explained, and understood.”  (Woolf, 2001, p. 317)  
5.3. Typologies of Empire 
Alexander J. Motyl continues his metaphor of a wheel with hub and spokes but no 
rim in creating a basic distinction of empires. A first distinction is to be drawn at the 
length of the spokes. The wheel can have long spokes, far-flung overseas possession 
or short spokes, in vicinity to the core. A second distinction can be drawn according 
to the number of spokes. He calls empires with few short spokes “dense” or 
“continuous” and those with many long spokes “loose” or “discontinuous”. He 
follows David Lake in a third distinction, already mentioned, of type of authority 
between “formal” and “informal” empires. This produces following four possibilities: 
                                                
24 Woolf points to the important role of education in the “development of a consciousness of empire” 
(Woolf, 2001, p. 315) and one cannot but be reminded of Althusser's insight into the legitimising 
power of education. 
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(1) Formal authority - dense core-periphery relations 
(2) Formal authority - loose core-periphery relations 
(3) Informal authority - dense corse-periphery relations 
(4) Informal authority - loose core-periphery relations 
 (Motyl, 1999a, pp. 128-129),  (Motyl, 2001, pp. 18-20) 
Barnfield provides a more practical distinction between empires. He distinguishes 
between primary empires and “shadow” or secondary empires. The former share the 
five characteristics enumerated above of (1) an organization to administer and exploit 
diversity, (2) a transport system and large-scale economic integration, (3) unitary 
system of communication, (4) monopoly of force and outward projection of military 
force, (5) an “imperial project”.  (Barfield, 2001, pp. 29-32) Shadow empires are 
secondary phenomena, “a response to imperial state formation some place else.” 
(Barfield, 2001, p. 33) These polities in their interaction with primary empires imitate 
the latter in policy and discourse without or only in part accounting for the five 
essential characteristics of primary empires. Barfield distinguishes between four types 
of secondary empires: “mirror empires”, “maritime trade empires”, “vulture empires” 
and “empires of nostalgia”. 
Mirror empires echo an imperial state formation of their neighbours. The political 
structures of these polities at the margins of primary empires are more determined by 
their interaction with the primary empire than by any internal dynamics. Because of 
this “parasitic” dependency on the primary empire, mirror empires rarely were able 
to transform themselves into primary empires25 and usually disappeared with the 
collapse of their adjacent primary empire. 
                                                
25 On example would be the Mongol empire in the 13th and 14th century AD. 
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Maritime trade empires actually control very little territory at the margins to extract 
economic benefits through trade. Their aim laid in achieving a monopoly over the 
means of transport. Their collapse was a consequence of the cutting off of their 
source of wealth. 
Vulture empires were formed after the collapse of a primary empire. Peripheral 
leaders seize the core and form a new empire using the tools of the old primary 
empires. This phenomenon, it will be argued, has been a constant in Chinese history. 
With the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, for instance, the Manchu from the north-
eastern periphery established the new Qing dynasty at the old primary core and 
undergoing gradual Sinification. 
Empires of nostalgia claim an imperial tradition and carries the symbolism of an 
extinct empire without accounting for the five characteristics of primary empires 
stated above. The importance of clinging to the old discourse lies in the ability to 
command customary loyalty relying on an established worldview.  (Barfield, 2001, pp. 
33-39)  
A rare non-Marxist Chinese scholar on “empire” is professor Zhao Tingyang from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He differentiates between four patterns of 
empire: (1) The pattern of the Roman Empire corresponds to the typical ancient 
empire. It is a military superpower continually expanding until it eventually would 
encompass the world. Therefore its boundaries are but temporary frontiers. (2) The 
pattern of the British Empire corresponds to the typical modern empire. It is a 
nation/state led by a blend of nationalism, imperialism and colonialism. Boundaries 
do not indicate self-restraint, they rather safeguard its imperial interests against others.  
(3) The pattern of the American Empire is a new form of the modern empire. It 
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transformed direct control into a hidden, subtler control in political, economical 
terms, but also in terms of scientific knowledge. (4) The pattern of All-under-Heaven 
(Ĕ), in Zhao’s view, transcends the modern empire through globalisation and 
could also be called “globalism”, i.e. an “institutionally ordered world or a world 
institution responsible to confirm the political legitimacy of world governance as well 
as local governance, and to allow the justification of system”.  It is less a political 
system than a “world view of world-ness”, e.g. different from the internationality 
approach of the United Nations still focussed on nation-states.  (Zhao, 2006, pp. 38-
39) 
For Zhao, tianxia “world governance” includes three elements: (1) “the earth”, (2) 
“the hearts of the people”, (3) “the world institution”.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 39)  
5.4. Motyl’s Cyclical Return of Imperial Discourse 
“Historical continuity [is] a product of self-conscious construction.”  
Wang Hui  (Wang, 2011a, p. 87) 
Motyl looks into how empires end. For Motyl, empires evolve in response to forces 
such as modernization. Attrition is the end of empire through a growing incapacity 
of the core to mobilize sufficient peripheral resources for the maintenance of the 
whole system. Collapse is the end of empire through a rapid and comprehensive 
breakdown of the linkage binding peripheries and the core. Whereas attrition 
involves intra-systemic decay, collapse can be traced to extra-systemic shocks. Motyl 
lists five factors, which might cause a “re-imperialization” of where once was an 
imperial system. The first factor is regional instability, which seems quite intuitive. 
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The second factor is the multitude of revolutionary élites.  “In pursuing revolution in 
the aftermath of imperial collapse leads revolutionaries to embrace state power and 
imperial revival”.  (Motyl, 1999b, p. 132) In other words, revolutionaries adopt the 
policy of imperial revival because of its established attractiveness even more because 
universalistic aspirations of revolutionary ideologies tend to fit with the universalist 
claims pre-existent in the collapsed imperial formations. The third factor is the 
multitude of “imperial ideologies”, a dominant belief system with different degrees of 
“embeddedness” in the linguistic and institutional practices of the former core.26 A 
fourth factor are the “abandoned brethren” no more included in one structured 
political entity, pointing at associative identities transcending the new cluster-states. 
A fifth factor, the only necessary condition among the five for successful re-
imperialization is State capacity. State capacity entails both a coherent bureaucratic 
and coercive apparatus as well as sufficient material resources at disposal of the - 
probably new - state élite. The State capacity of the former core has to be seen in 
relation to the State capacities of the former periphery. The stronger the former 
peripheries, the harder will the re-imperialization by the former turn out to be.  
(Motyl, 1999b, pp. 129-136) 
Collapse, according to Motyl, can occur at three different points of time within the 
lifeline of an empire: collapse of ascendant empires, collapse of empires at their 
height and collapse of empires in decay. The return to imperial aspirations is, 
according to Motyl, but a legitimisation strategy of post-imperial collapse élites 
appealing to cultural centrality without brute domination. Professor Zhao Tingyang, 
a present-day proponent of the tianxia imperial world order in China can indeed be 
                                                
26 One has to add the former peripheries here, especially when looking at “vulture empires” as 
described by Barfield. 
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seen representative of such a post-imperial collapse élite. In his article “Debating 
China’s Future”, he explains the collapse of the Zhou dynasty (1046 – 256 B.C.) as it 
becoming “a victim of its own idealism. And who is to underwrite tianxia – a system 
that rejects the very notion of a ‘chosen state’? Though originally a Chinese concept, 
China itself would seek no more than to be a part of any such system that might 
spring from it.”  (Zhao, 2008)  
5.5. Imperial Imaginary and Nation-State Identity 
Although the logic of the modern bureaucratic state may be incompatible 
with that of empire, it does not follow that state elites actually have the 
capacity, wherewithal, or skills either to eliminate empire or to do so in a 
manner that will not aggravate core-periphery relations.  (Motyl, 1977, p. 27) 
Prasenjit Duara in his essay “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: 
China, 1900 – 1945” provides a cohesive understanding of the role of “transnational 
imaginings” in domestic politics. For Duara, “transnationalisms” are “lived realities 
or ideological constructions that transgress, though they do not always subvert, the 
territorial boundaries of the nation-state.”  (Duara, 1997, p. 1030).  
Duara distinguishes between two types of transnationalisms:  
1. Modern, radical utopian ideologies tending to move away from 
transnationalism to internationalism (communism, anarchism) 
2. “Redemptive transnationalisms” in search of the ultimate moral and spiritual 
community (Sun Yatsenism, Kang Youwei’s Morality Society)  (Duara, 1997, 
pp. 1033-1034) 
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The distinction drawn by Duara basis itself on the form of the communicated 
message rather than the ends of the framework, i.e. to “domesticate transnationality”: 
“When nationalists deployed their narratives to nationalize transnationals, 
they revealed the constructedness of nationalist ideology that had to be taken 
apart in order to separate out the narratives of race, culture, and native place 
from their “natural” belonging in the territorial nation-state.  (Duara, 1997, p. 
1049) 
Nationalists first have to engage transnational discourses to establish a bond. Then 
they have to turn the loyalties of “sojourners” back to the geobody by appropriating 
or inflecting older cultural discourses to create sentiments of rootedness in the new 
territorial entity.  
These nationalists have to use the cultural discourses with an unfaltering 
understanding of their relative superiority and the vital moral necessity to spread that 
superior culture in order to appeal to their core target group(s). This cultural 
superiority thus serves as the cohesive bond of unity, eventually necessitating 
political unity. But this cultural superiority also necessitates its continued 
promulgation to avoid the disintegration of the basic assumptions of this culturally 
founded political unity.  In other words, this transnational cultural mission cannot be 
abandoned without abandoning the cultural argument for the “national” unity.  
In terms of élite rhetoric Osterhammel provides eight distinctive differences between 
imperial and nation-state identity  (Osterhammel, 2002, pp. 382-384), which lead to 
eight ideal-type distinctions between nation-state and imperial legitimising discourse: 
(1) The nation-state has defined borders, whereas the empire does not. The frontier 
mentality means that the ‘wilderness’ or barbarians’ outside imperial domain are not 
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to be seen as equals in terms of their evolutionary stage towards “culture”, “socialism” 
or “democracy”.27 (2) The nation-state cherishes its homogeneity, whereas the empire 
cherishes its “tolerant” diversity. (3) Whereas nation-states as homogenous 
communities tend to legitimise the state structure through the common will of its 
members (i.e. from below), empires tend to legitimise the state structure through 
their élite cultural progress and their civilising mission (i.e. from above). (4) Nation-
states tend to praise the commonality and equality of all “citizens”, whereas empires 
have a hierarchical understanding of belonging in accordance to ethnical and cultural 
distance to the “pure” centre. (5) Whereas nation-states cherish the emphasis of 
national tradition, empires distinguish between central (“great”) traditions and 
peripheral (“little”) traditions. The tolerance towards the plurality of “little traditions” 
thus reflects the magnanimity of the centre. Empires thus have to give the allure of 
tolerance. (6) Whereas nation-states emphasise the equality between nation-states in 
disregard of any cultural, ethnical aspects, the sense of civilizational superiority of the 
imperial central élite is expressed by a sense of duty to spread that civilizational 
superiority beyond the frontiers, denying the recognition equality to international 
relations. (7) Whereas the nation-state recalls ancient common roots as the origin of 
its existence, imperial historiography often emphasises either imperial continuity 
from older ideal imperial designs (Arcadia, the age of Yao and Shun) or from a 
moment of spiritual foundation (the American Revolution, the October Revolution). 
(8) Whereas the nation-state is intimately linked to a certain territory (French “soil”), 
the empire sees territory as a mere surface for its mission civlisatrice. Territory can turn 
                                                
27 Medieval European geographers commonly marked the white spots on their maps with the slogans 
hic sunt leones („here are lions“) 
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barbarian, antidemocratic or into dar-al-harb not by its own essence, but rather 
through the civilizational changes of the population inhabiting it.  
In his article “Debating China’s Future”, he states in regards to China: 
According to Chinese philosopher Tsinghua professor Wang Hui “the dominance of 
the nation-state in Asian imaginaries arose from the empire/nation-state binary 
created in modern Europe.”  (Wang, 2011a, p. 60) This binary saw modernity, 
whether in Iceland, in the Chad or in Laos defined by the Westphalian system of 
pretended assumption of global acceptance of the nation-state as the basis for any 
inter-state-structure discourse. This modernity was opposed and supposed to 
substitute pre-modernity defined by imperial designs and indeed has become the 
dominant political structure. In terms of discourse, élite legitimacy still very much 
clings to their missions civilisatrices of old and looks into pre-modern imperial discursive 
repertoires of cultural superiority to legitimise present-day state structures through 
these. The repudiation of pre-modern imperial designs within a non-moral world 
order of sovereign nation-states has obscured their very relevance to the identity of 
21st century élite legitimacy and their need for “moral” justness. In terms of the Asian 
post-colonial experience, Wang Hui is optimistic in terms of the reappraisal of pre-
modern state-structures:  
“The question is: in an era in which the nation-state has become the 
dominant political structure, will the traditional Asian experiences of various 
types of communication, coexistence, and institutions provide possibilities 
with which to overcome internal and external dilemmas brought about by the 
nation-state system?  (Wang, 2011a, p. 60) 
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While Wang Hui sees good things at the end of a continuous erosion of the nation-
state in the future, he ignores the role the reappraisal of “traditional [political] 
experiences” plays within legitimising discourse right now. In his study on India’s 
role in the Victorian concept of empire, John MacKenzie concludes, that the imperial 
notion existed “in an elaborate sham of outward show”.  (MacKenzie, 1999, p. 132) I 
would argue that it is rather “an elaborate sham of inward show”. Imperial, i.e. moral 
(cultural, ethical) discourses beyond the nation-state are and continue to be a 
necessary part of nation-state legitimacy, because these discourses touch the very 
identity of the members of the nation-state communities28. They are all the more 
imperative more multi-ethnic states such as China and cannot be abandoned without 
negating the very core worldviews of the communities they embrace. 
 
                                                
28 Armitage quotes Hegel on the question of British identity: “fragt am einen Engländer, so wird jeder von 
sich und seinen Mitbürgern sagen, sie seien die, die Ostindien und das Weltmeer beherrschen, den Welthandel besitzen, 
Parlament und Geschworenengerichte haben usf. Diese Taten machen das Selbstgefühl des Volkes aus.“ (Armitage, 
1999, p. 91) 
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6. The Origins of the Confucian Political Imaginary 
6.1. Literature Review 
The literature on the history of Chinese foreign relations conventionally distinguish 
between “traditional”, “ancient”, “old” history and “modern”, “new” history, the 
latter starting either at the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911/12 or the founding of the 
new China in 1949. Traditional foreign relations, because of their universalist nature, 
are not necessarily only studied in the fields of world or Chinese history, but also 
from a political science perspective e.g. looking at a period’s political thought. There 
are also different designations and understandings for the international system of 
which China deemed itself to be the centre: “tributary system” (ǵͅ^£ ), 
“tributary state system” (ǵͅø£Ŵ), “imperial feudal system” (Ňǵ£Ŵ), “feudal 
system” (Ň^£), “the heavenly dynasty’s system of rule through rites” (Ĕǵʠ
ȶ^˄), “the order between China and the barbarians” (ºęʪŮ), “the order of 
all under heaven (tianxia)” (ĔʪŮ).  
John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng  (Fairbank, 1942) published a first systemic 
analysis of the tianxia-system in Qing dynasty in 1941. They extended their research 
to the first years of the Chinese republic in a further publication in 1954  (Teng & 
Fairbank, 1954) and a more specific chapter on the Qing dynasty tributary system in 
a publication in 1960 (Fairbank & Teng, 1960). In 1968 John K. Fairbank edited a 
major work collection on essays on the Chinese world order.  (Fairbank, 1974). 
In China, many publications have appeared in regards to the history of political 
thought in China and the history of foreign relations in China, the first probably 
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being Ding Qian’s series of analyses of foreign relations in his Collection of geographical 
studies from the study room of the abode of the Immortals published in 1915 by Zhejiang 
Publishing House.  (Chen, 2007, p. 2) The amount of studies published covering one 
or the other aspect of the tianxia world order as a pre-modern system of oppression 
is substantial. In regards to the influence of the old imperial ideology on present-day 
China, the studies in have been few and all foreign. It is interesting to note how 
Marxist historiography saw the “theory of the mandate of heaven” (Ĕç̰) as an 
“ideological weapon” (ɲ̰Ȝñ) part of the ideological superstructure of the feudal 
society.  (Zhou, 2007, p. 27) There is consensus until recently that after the xinhai-
revolution of 1911/12 and the Communist takeover 1949 this “ideological weapon” 
only has historical relevance, a point disputed only by contemporary Chinese 
philosophers such as Zhao Tingyang (͓ȬΔ)  (Zhao, 2005) and Wang Hui  (Wang, 
2011a), IR scholars such as Yan Xuetong (Γį͵)  (Yan, 2011) and their foreign 
observers such as William Callahan  (Callahan, 2008) and Daniel Bell  (Bell, 2010). 
6.2. The Beginnings of a Moral World Order Nostalgia 
The Mystical Origins 
The mystical origins of the tianxia world order are documented in the classical 
foundations of Chinese philosophy dating from the Spring and Autumn period (771 
– 453 B.C.) and the Warring States period (475 – 221 B.C.) covering the about the 
500 years preceding the “unification of all under heaven” under the First Emperor of 
Qin (ʩĤʉ).  
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The concept of tian (Ĕ), heaven, according to Arthur Waley 
“corresponds to our word Heaven and to the German Himmel in the sense of 
Providence, Nature, God. Heaven is the dispenser of life and death, wealth 
and rank. The chün-tzu [ÝĨ] learn to know the will (ming) of Heaven and 
submit to it patiently.”  (Waley, 1949, pp. 41-42)  
The different schools of thought emerging in the Warring States period (475 – 221 
B.C.), Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism share the belief that the state of all under 
heaven is in disarray and thus created an imaginary nostalgic memory of a period 
prior to the chaos and war of their time. The nostalgia rests on the mythological tale 
of “unity and harmony at the beginning of time”.  (Yates, 2001, p. 358)  
The story below is thus a story created and mutated in the 7th to 2nd centuries B.C. 
and is permeated with vocabulary, geographical knowledge and attitudes toward 
society of that time. 
The origins are traced back to three huang (ʉ), here inadequately translated as 
mythological god-like rulers, and the five di (Ť), mythological ancestor-rulers of 
tribes in the Yellow River valley, two of which were to be the founders of the 
Chinese culture: Yandi (ɔŤ) and Huangdi (ρŤ).  
Yandi is also known as Shennong (ʣ), the mythological founder of agriculture 
and pottery. Huangdi conquered the tribes of Yandi, this unification of the two tribal 
alliances is regarded as the founding of the Chinese or huaxia (ºĐ) culture  (Fan, 
2006, p. 10). The story of the very creation of the Chinese culture is thus a story of 
unified diversity.  
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The rulers of the huaxia alliance of tribes apparently exercised 
political/administrative power in a very limited sense, whereas the single tribes 
enjoyed wide-ranging autonomy. The ruler’s concerns were the administration of the 
land, an educational function, the rites, and punishment. The rites are to be 
understood as the consistent practise of a ritualistic conversation with Heaven, in 
which Heaven is to be pleased and its will to be communicated. The ruler of the 
huaxia alliance of tribes, seen as the tianzi (ĔĨ), or Son of Heaven, had a monopoly 
on communicating with Heaven.  (Fan, 2006, p. 12)  
The etymological roots of the term huaxia (ºĐ) can be traced to Zhou dynasty 
relics, where the term had a geographical connotation as well as an ethnic-cultural 
one. It firstly denoted the area of settlement of the Zhou and secondly juxtaposed 
the cultured (º , hua) people of Xia to the “barbarians”. The latter were 
distinguished according to their geographical position relative to the huaxia: dongyi (
ę) in the East, xirong (̠Ƭ) in the West, nanman (¼̕) in the South and beidi (¶ɧ) 
in the North.  (Liu & Huang, 2006, p. 529) Cultures outside the huaxia alliance of 
tribes were seen as barbarians as they were not deemed to reach the cultural 
standards of the huaxia.  (Chen, 2004, p. 186) 
The mythological story continues with the reigns of Yao (Ŏ) and Shun (˽) as rulers 
of the huaxia alliance of tribes. They were revered in later times, partly because they 
each voluntarily passed on their power to another able man or man elected by the 
alliance of tribes.  (Liu & Huang, 2006, p. 523) After a great flood in the last years of 
the reign of Shun, his servant Yu (ʤ) tamed the rivers and was rewarded with the 
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stewardship of the huaxia alliance of tribes, because his success in taming the rivers 
showed Heaven’s goodwill.  
The shangshu (ō.), also called the Book of Documents, a classical collection of 
documentary records related to ancient history, in the chapter yugong (ʤͅ) states 
that Yu received his right to rule from Heaven (or at least assumed it with Heaven’s 
assent):  
ʉĔʒçĚǱòɀ$ĔÝ 
Heaven favoured you [Yu] with this appointment; you command the four 
seas and become the ruler of all under heaven. 
Yu due to his virtue becomes the “son of Heaven” (ĔĨ, tianzi) who has a “mandate 
from Heaven” (Ĕç, tianming) to rule all under Heaven.  
According of the yugong, Yu divided the central lands under his rule into nine 
administrative areas or zhou (Ȼ) , the lands outside the immediate domain of the 
ruler’s capital were also divided into five circular domains or fu (ǲ) each five 
hundred distance units li further away from his immediate domain. These peripheral 
domains constitute a hierarchy reflecting the intensity of cultural radiation from the 
centre as well as the intensity of interaction with the centre in terms of tribute. The 
farther away a place is, the less cultured it is.  (Ge, 2008, pp. 7-8) It was assumed that 
all under Heaven is subordinated to the tianzi’s mandate, yet the existence of 
barbarian cultures on the outer edges of the “world” less exposed to the cultural 
superiority of the huaxia is recognized. The shiji (Ó̭), the Records of the Great 
Historian, written in around 100 B.C. by the Han dynasty historian Sima Qian as well 
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as the yugong mention tribute being brought by these barbarians to the tianzi. They 
“confirm” the legitimacy of Yu’s mandate, as Yu is able to unite all under Heaven: 
practise the rites and receive tribute symbolising submission of the peripheral 
barbarians confirming their recognition huaxia supremacy. Of course, as will be 
shown below, this is but part of the discourse of the Warren States period and later 
and does not have any historical documentary value.  (Zeng, 2008, p. 54) 
Yu recommended his son to succeed him, who eventually stopped the tradition of 
handing over power to the most able successor and instead established China’s first 
hereditary dynasty, the Xia dynasty.  
Archaeologists have not yet been able to conclusively prove the existence of the Xia 
dynasty except in mythology, where its founding is of fundamental importance as a 
symbolic moment of transition from one archetype of society to another. The period 
before the establishment of the Xia dynasty is known as the “state of the Great Unity” 
(ē×*).  (Fan, 2006, p. 14) The liji (ʠ̭), Book of Rites, a collection of texts 
from ancient times to the Zhou dynasty said to be collected by Confucius, in the 
chapter liyun (ʠͦ), on the Conveyance of Rites, describes the state of Great Unity as 
follows: 
ē͹*̖,Ĕ$~Ͳ͇˵̮jkʕǏBɨAA
ɨĨĨb˧ǱƲːċǱƲɸŬǱƲ΍ʘŃĮɨųʃ˩
ʈǱƲɼǱğǱƄ͉ƟŻ5ü,Ǝ̒5š;§Ɵ
5͛,Ǝ$šǦǏ̿Ώ˪ʋʴ/͎˪aǏđƱ˪
ΏǦ́ē× 
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When the great dao [i.e.: the ultimate principle, the grand course] was pursued, 
a communal spirit ruled tianxia, men of talents and ability were chosen, the 
words were sincere, harmony was cultivated. Men did not only treat relatives 
as relatives and their sons only as their sons. The aged were cured until death, 
the able-bodied had proper employment, the young were allowed to grow up 
properly. Kindness was shown to widows, orphans, disabled and the sick. 
Men had their duties and women had theirs. They disliked goods to be wasted, 
but they did not stockpile them. They disliked when labour could not be 
exerted, but they exerted it not only to their own advantage.   Schemes were 
prevented and could not succeed. Thiefs and rebels were not seen and the 
doors were kept open. This is what is called the datong.   
The establishment of the Xia dynasty as the first (mythological) hereditary dynasty  
marked the passage from tianxia wei gong (Ĕ$~), where “all under heaven is 
ruled by a communal spirit” or else put “all under heaven is for the public good” to 
tianxia wei jia (Ĕ$Ł), where „all under heaven is ruled by kinfolk spirit“ or else 
put „all under heaven is for the kinfolk’s good“. The liji describes the passage as a 
fundamental societal change: 
ē͹ǞΝĔ$ŁÕAAÕĨĨ͉§$Ţ 
The great dao has now been obscured, all under Heaven is ruled by kinfolk 
spirit. Everyone loves his own relatives, everyone loves his own children, 
wealth and power are used for one’s own good.  
According to the liyun chapter the Great Unity has thus been abandoned and a new 
era, called the „well off society“ or the „society of small tranquillity“ (ŊŶ): 
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LșÝ˷LʹɟĨLʕvƀLèĖģḺ£ŴLʵɹ΃
L͇°ʚL©$š[…] ǸǱ͂5ʠ˩,Lʔ)L˨j
ʔǱͥD̮̫ʟȩǱŦĢǱɺȚ˩û®˩ÅTL$Ȟ
Ǧ́ŊŶ 
Justice defines the relationship between ruler and minister, sincerity between 
father and son, harmony between siblings, community between husband and 
wife, in accordance to this the system is established, the fields are laid out, 
superiority is given to men of courage and wisdom, to secure achievement for 
the own. […] None was not observant to the rites, to secure the display of 
righteousness, the realisation of sincerity, the exhibition of errors, the 
exemplification of benevolence, and the discussion of courtesy, showing the 
people all the regular virtues. Any rulers who did not follow this course were 
driven away by the powerful, and the people regarded them as pests. This is 
what is called the xiaokang. 
It is noteworthy that the discourse already implies a perception universal centrality of 
the huaxia tribal alliance, for the change from a meritocratic to a dynastic body politic 
leads to societal changes in “all under Heaven” (tianxia). Li Yunquan notes that there 
are two levels of consciousness of the huaxia alliance of tribes seen in the historical 
texts, which happened to be compiled much later: geographical and cultural centrality.  
(Li, 2005, p. 111)  (Fan, 2006, p. 14) 
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The Historical Origins 
The mythological Xia dynasty was succeeded by the archeologically documented 
Shang dynasty, originally a Western barbarian tribe, which after occupying the central 
lands of the Xia adopted the legitimatising discourse of the mandate of heaven. The 
Book of Documents claims to have preserved a speech by Shang Tang (îȱ), the ruler 
of Shang who defeated the last “despot” of the Xia: 
 ɬǫȌŌTŵƠßǳ̨ΦÒŊĨǒ̖ʬ/ǱĐĒˣĔ
çȡ*FŌǱTȯǫƮÙƝƮT˻Ʈʯ3˪¦șĐ1Ƥ
ΒȯT̨ĐȨǱˣ1ɿŤǒșFȯǫĐˣĢÒ
Đɬɪ͸T§ɪ¦ĐͻǱTɪƘž»ǫǡǟǭ 1Çȯʈ
:Đƌ̅FǳƎƉ 
The king said, “Come people, listen to my words. It is not I, the little child, 
who dare to bring chaos; but for the many crimes of the [ruler of] Xia, heaven 
has given the charge to destroy him.” Now you say, “Our ruler does not 
compassionate us, but takes us away from husbandry to attack and rectify 
Xia.” I have heard the words of you; [but] the sovereign of Xia is guilty, and I 
fear the gods, I dare not but rectify [the Xia]. Now you are saying, “What are 
the crimes of Xia to us?” The ruler of Xia exhausts the strength of the people, 
and oppresses in the cities of Xia. The people become entirely indifferent and 
feel no bond of union and say, “When will this the sun expire? We will perish 
with you.” Such is the moral behaviour of the Xia, now I must go [and 
rectify]. 
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Again, the story of the replacement of the Xia by the Shang is probably not one that 
was created at that point in time, but rather a product of later, Warren States’ 
thought. Shang Tang, humbly referring to himself as “the little child”, apparently had 
no choice but to follow the orders of Heaven without actually having any aspirations 
to power. The reason behind the loss of the mandate of Heaven (tianming) is narrated 
as the oppressive behaviour of the Xia in regards to their people.  (Li, 2005, p. 11)  
The Shang themselves did not see their rulers as qualified to communicate directly 
with the High God (shangdi, Ť), but rather through the good offices of their 
ancestors, hence the vital importance of ancestor worship rituals in the search for 
cosmic harmony.  (Loewe, 2002, p. 343) The ruler’s monopoly on communications 
with the High God was strengthened in the succeeding Zhou dynasty.  
When the Zhou (1056 – 256 B.C.) replaced the Shang, the Zhou claimed to share 
ancestral identity with the Xia. According to Chen Zhi, “aside from the religious 
belief in Heaven as the supreme moral will, the Zhou people’s ancestral identity with 
the Xia provided them with another proof, non-theological but related to their 
theological purpose, to illustrate their legitimate access to Heaven and power.  (Chen, 
2004, p. 190). The term huaxia first appears in the Zhou dynasty text wucheng in shujing. 
Kong Anguo explains in his 2nd century A.D. commentary, that hua denotes official 
caps and robes in a flowery style and xia a vast state.  (Chen, 2004, p. 190) The Qing 
dynasty scholar Wang Yinzhi notes a phonetic connection in the etymology of xia 
and ya (Π), i.e. elegant.  (Chen, 2004, p. 193) The Zhou, in their territorial expansion 
created a first historically documented “culturally oriented ethnic identity” as a basis 
to their claims to rule.  
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The Zhou could not preserve their political power in the later half of their rule, 
known as the Warring States period, and eventually merely held a ritual supreme role 
among several other states. The Zhou ruler symbolically held on to the tianming and 
the Warring States accepted this role until the state of Qin conquered the Zhou and 
established the so-called first Chinese empire in 221 B.C.  (Fairbank & Reischauer, 
1960, p. 87) 
It was in the period of the Warring States prior to Qin unification 221 B.C. when 
transmitted knowledge about the past rulers of the huaxia, from the mythological 
origins to the symbolic rule of the Zhou, was adopted and merged into a systematic 
cosmic order, which legitimised struggles for supremacy among states in the Warring 
Staes and made dynastic change a cosmic necessity. The Zhou could not preserve the 
harmony of tianxia and thus the aspirants to the tianming were to put themselves into 
the same position Shang Tang was in when he brought down the Xia.  
The philosophers of the so-called “hundred schools of thought” at the various local 
courts of the pre-Qin period provided the ideological frameworks to justify the 
imperial aspirations and the state of Qin eventually was to prevail in 221 B.C. Some 
scholars such as Ge Jianxiong think the yugong text originated in the very state of Qin 
prior to 221 B.C.  (Ge, 2008, p. 8)  
Even if the yugong had not been a Qin text, its content reflects a shared wish for 
peace expressed in the nostalgia for an imaginary past of harmony and ritual unity. 
As Ge Jianxiong notes, “the system of the nine zhou was but a plan for the future, the 
system of the five fu was but the idealisation of the past”.  (Ge, 2008, p. 9) 
The legitimising role of the creational mythology was already well established when 
the Qin unification was completed in 221 B.C. as the principal different schools of 
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thought built on it from the very beginning. Taoists like Laozi and Zhuangzi 
opposed all human institutions and societal order as they preached the transcendence 
of distinctions to reach ultimate harmony with nature. Their concept of tian was thus 
while omnipresent linked to spontaneity and primordial simplicity. The ideal ruler 
should reflect this primordial state.  
The Moists like Mozi saw society organised in a hierarchical order, with the most 
virtuous man chosen to carry out the will of Heaven. Moists denied the importance 
of rites and saw pragmatic self-sacrifice as a virute. The Legalists, the students of 
Xunzi, such as Han Feizi and Su Si, saw the human essence as essentially evil. The 
rites are the only means to rectify human behaviour. The rulers role is to keep order 
in tianxia. Adherents to the the Yin-Yang school, such as Zou Yan (ι̗) was an 
eclectic blend of Confucian, Taoist teachings with an elaborate system of cosmology, 
which while eventually losing its independent status, survived in popular beliefs and 
influenced greatly later understandings of Confucianism.  (Liu, 1998, pp. 11-12) 
Confucianism itself was moulded by the creational mythology, but its pillars of values 
(virtue, righteousness, filial piety) prevailed above the other schools in the shaping of 
the Chinese cultural and political history. 
Liu distinguished between three meanings of Confucianism: 
1. Spiritual Confucianism: the philosophy of Confucius, Mencius, Cheng Zhu, 
Lu Wang untainted by popular amalgamations and political adaptions 
2. Politicized Confucianism: the fundamental ideological framework to imperial 
China as defined in the Western Han dynasty.  
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3. Popular Confucianism: Confucian values and beliefs at the grassroots level, 
hardly to be separated from other sets of values and beliefs originating in 
Buddhism or Taoism  (Liu, 1998, p. 14) and arguably Christianity. 
The politicized Confucianism was shaped by a later conscious choice of Confucian 
wisdoms suitable to the legitimising needs of the power. The Neo-Confucian scholar 
Du Weiming (Ȁ˙ǣ) refers to the politicized Confucianism as rujiao zhongguo, 
defining it as „the mentality of politicised Confucian ethics as the dominating 
thought in Chinese traditional feudal society as well as all kinds of its contemporary 
distorted expressions.  (Bresciani, 2001, p. 410) 
Thanks to Shang Yang’s legalist administrative reforms and its favourable 
geographical position in the Wei river valley, the state of Qin was able to defeat the 
united forces of the five northern states and soon later defeated the southern state of 
Chu. By 256 B.C. the central state of Zhou was conquered by Qin. By 221 B.C. the 
ruler of Qin has succeeded in conquering the remaining warring states and adopted 
the title Shi Huangdi (ĤʉŤ), often translated as the “First Emperor”. He united the 
characters for the three huang (ʉ), the mythological god-like rulers, and the five di 
(Ť), mythological ancestor-rulers of tribes in the Yellow River valley, to give 
legitimacy to his new role tracing back his role to ancient times and lay the 
foundations for a “universal and ever-lasting empire”.  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, p. 87)  
He reformed the land ownership, combined the northern defensive walls to what 
eventually became known as the “Great Wall of China” and incorporated southern 
“barbarian” peoples outside the Yellow River valley as far as present-day northern 
Vietnam. “China” or the radiating “Middle Kingdom” (zhongguo) “for the first time 
began to approximate its present borders”  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, pp. 88-90) 
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Inscriptions on relics document Qin Shihuang boasting of being the first to have 
held sway over the world ever since the reigns of the five di.  (Loewe, 1994, p. 15) 
But the dynasty was to crumble under the lack of loyalty by the local aristocracies, 
the lack of sympathy for the harsh legalist system of rule and discontent caused by 
the heavy burdens of taxation and corvée imposed on the overall population within a 
few years after the death of the “First Emperor”.  
6.1. The Origin of Confucian State Ideology 
A power struggle between southern rebel leader Xiang Yu (232 – 202 B.C.) and the 
general Liu Bang (256 – 195 B.C.) ended in favour of the latter and had him found 
the Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D., interrupted by the Xin interregnum 9-23 A.D.) 
Liu Bang, also known under his posthumous title Han Gaozu (Ȯμʢ) or the 
Venerable Ancestor,  was a peasant and low-level official before joining Xiang Yu as 
a rebel and eventually turning against him. He was unconnected to any of the ruling 
clans of the Warring States. His humble background allowed him to be more 
pragmatic and consolidate the Han power within his lifetime after a short period of 
tactical retreat. He claimed that the world formed a single family thus arguing that his 
rule was not that of a temporary despot but rather the natural course of development.  
Gaozu, restored the centralised administration the First Emperor had created.  This 
required a vast bureaucracy in the capital as well as a rudimentary system of 
provincial supervising officials. In order to keep in check the old local aristocratic 
élites, Gaozu recruited his officials from all those with enough social and financial 
capital to be able to attain a position of power and had regional inspectors travel 
through the Han-Empire. According to Fairbank and Reischauer “we already see the 
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old distinction between hereditary aristocrat and commoner transformed into a 
cleavage between officialdom and the common taxpayer.”  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, 
p. 97)  
Gaozu in terms of foreign policy secured the gains of the Qin in the South. In the 
North the Han were confronted by the xiongnu (´Ġ) Turkish nomads repeatedly 
raiding Northern China. The Han confronted the xiongnu with the so-called heqin-
policy (èA): entertaining the chieftains, giving gifts as well as Han princesses in 
marriage. According to Fairbank and Goldman,  
„Nomad warriors learned that if they performed a ritual at Chang’an [the Han 
capital] in which they accepted Han suzerainty, they could profit 
substantially“  (Fairbank & Goldman, 1991/2006, p. 61) 
The Han, instead of engaging the xiongnu in costly military expeditions, had their 
leaders come to their courts, appease them with (less costly but lavish) gifts and at 
the same time have the xiongnu publicly practise the Han worship rituals, which to the 
Han equalled cultural submission. The imaginary submission not only had a foreign 
policy agenda, but also an internal one. The tianzi maintains his mandate by 
successfully extending the reach of the huaxia culture to most brute barbarians.  
As for this rituals Sima Qian’s shiji documents a conversation between Gaozu and his 
emissary to the courts in now Northern Vietnam, in which reaction upon Lu Jia’s 
continuous praise of the shijing and the shujing, Gaozu says: “When I conquered 
tianxia on horse [i.e. militarily], I have never seen the shijing and the shujing!” Lu Jia 
replies: “tianxia can be conquered on horse, but can it be governed on horse? This 
was the reason for the downfall of the Qin.” Gaozu had his officials create a set of 
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
100 of 236 
rituals adopted from Zhou and Qin times, where Heaven and the Liu clan ancestors 
were revered.  (Fan, 2007, p. 52) Gaozu and his immediate successors saw their role 
as tianzi according to the so-called Huanglao-school (ρ˧), following the example of 
three huang of antiquity and Taoist thought of the Warring States’ philosopher Laozi. 
According to the contemporary classic huainanzi (Ʌ¼Ĩ) the modus of government 
is to wu wei  (ǝ$no action) or wei wu wei ($ǝ$, action without action) and its 
objective is to let the populace live an undisturbed, simple live.  (Fan, 2007, p. 53) 
Gaozu and his successor saw a “correlative cosmology”  (Fairbank & Goldman, 
1991/2006, p. 64) of mutual influence between the tian, the world of nature and 
human society. Correlative thought is not unique to China but it continued to 
exercise its high degree of influence because of the centripetal, hierarchical view of 
society with the tianzi at its peak communicating with the tian through rituals.  
The seventh emperor of the Han dynasty remembered by his posthumous name Han 
Wudi (ȮȜŤ, the Martial Emperor) reigned from 141 to 87 B.C. Under the reign 
the Han reach their peak in terms of geographical expansion: Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, northern Vietnam were brought under 
Chinese suzerainty. To the Northwest, Wudi drove the xiongnu tribes out of the 
Ordos regions as far as to the Gobi. Chinese armies crossed the Tarim Bassin to 
subdue the region of Ferghana. As a result, the former Greek kingdom of Sogdiana 
was conquered in 42 B.C.. In Korea, Wudi - in order to outflank the xiongnu - 
subdued the Choson, a semi-sinicized Korean state in northern Korean and southern 
Manchuria and founded a military garrison, which eventually became present-day 
Pyongyang. In terms of actual governance, Wudi was a legalist ruler just like the First 
Emperor of Qin, but in terms of political theory his rule was a milestone in the 
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evolution of political Confucianism. Wudi had his scholars look into the old schools 
of thought of the Warring States period to legitimize his rule over tianxia and 
dutifully performed the transmitted rites of sacrifice to Heaven and Earth at Mount 
Tai. The wuwei ideal of the tianzi did not fit well with his massive expansion and the 
great resettlements. What was needed was a portrayal of the tianzi’s conquests as 
“conscious and purposeful activity as a moral agent”  (Loewe, 2002, p. 345). The 
taixue (ĕį), imperial academy, was established in the capital Chang’an and smaller 
educational institutions were set up in regional districts to study the “five classics” 
(The Classic of Poetry, the Classic of History, the Classic of Rites, the Classic of 
Changes and the Spring and Autumn Annals) of pre-Qin thought to be collected and 
compiled by Confucius. This is the first time court scholars became exclusively 
identified with Confucianism. Scholarly conferences were held to determine the true 
interpretation of the five classics and in 175 A.D. the imperial administration of the 
Eastern Han had approved versions of the classics carved on large stone tables 
erected in the then capital Luoyang.  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, pp. 106-107) Within 
this context, the work chunqiu fanlu (ǥʦˇΣ) or Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and 
Autumn Annals, an interpretation of the gongyangzhuan (~ˤX) commentary of the 
Spring and Autumn Annals attributed the Confucian scholar Dong Zhongshu (̌O
˼, 179 – 104 B.C.) the theory of dayitong (ē˗), the Great Unification, was once 
again suggested as an ideal state of the world, but this unification is to be based on 
the moral standards of the Confucian classics: 
ǥʦē˗˩Ĕü*Ŧ˒ÏF*͵̾, 
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The great unification of the Spring and Autumn period, heaven and earth 
were in order, is suitable both to the past and the present times.  
̺û̂*ʨĩĨ*Ǻ˩ʈ˖͹²būͪ 
Everything that follow the wisdom of the six arts and the teachings of 
Confucius should be denied dissemination and practise.  
Dong Zhongshu, sometime between 136 and 134 B.C., was invited to pronounce 
‘the essentials of the Great Way’ of kingly rule at the court of Han Wudi. Dong’s 
responses to questions by Wudi are recorded in three memorials in his biography in 
the hanshu (“History of the Han dynasty”). Dong elaborated on the tianzi’s role in 
sustaining the cosmic order.  (Nylan, 2008, pp. 50-51) 
While the study of the Confucian classics was thus officially sanctioned, the other 
schools of thought continued to develop in a non-political context. As for the 
question why Confucianism prevailed over Legalism in an environment of effective 
centralisation and military expansion, Fairbank argues, “the Confucian tradition was 
the chief intellectual force among the educated classes”  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, p. 
107), from which the imperial aristocracy was recruited. They probably saw the 
position of the Confucian ideal ruler, the jun (Ý), guided by righteousness above 
them and a hierarchical society among and below them as advantageous to their own 
position. According to Liu Junping and Huang Deyuan,  
“the meaning of heaven is Confucianism, Confucianism is the will of heaven. 
Saying the heavenly order limits the powers of the emperor actually means 
that the Confucian order limits the powers of the emperor.”  (Liu & Huang, 
2006, p. 37) 
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The later Western Han emperor Chengdi (ƭŤ, 51 B.C. – 7 B.C.) stressed that while 
Heaven had given birth the human race, its members were not intuitively capable of 
maintaining order, this is why Heaven mandated rulers to keep the human race under 
control.  (Loewe, 1994, p. 16) Shortly thereafter Wang Mang (ɬ̋, 45 B.C. – 23 
A.D.) overthrew the Western Han dynasty and founded the Xin dynasty (9 – 23 
A.D.). Wang Mang had to explain why the Han had lost the tianming and he could 
assume it according to the Confucian orthodoxy. According to Michael Loewe, 
“Wang Mang was the first of China’s emperors to claim that his legitimacy derived 
from the Mandate”.  (Loewe, 2002, p. 347)  
Of course the philosophers of the Warring States period had already argued in their 
creational myths that the mandate of Heaven can be lost and given to a more suitable 
clan. Arbuckle traced back the confirmation of this view in political Confucian 
orthodoxy to Dong Zhongshu. The qianhanshu (¥Ȯ.), “History of the Former 
Han Dynasty”, documents the story of one Sui Hong (ʑſ), who saw the loss of the 
tianming announced in an omen, sent a messenger to the Han court to announce the 
big news and was executed along with the later.  
Sui Hong according to the hanshu is recorded to have said: 
xţ̌O˼Ǳ̨̔Ǳ˘^ıǖ*ÝŀúB*ÌçȮŁŎÙÙ
ǱXø*ͦȮŤĹ̽ŠĔȭ˅͇B̝LŤ]˪Ͱ˸Ňʆ΃
ĢȢå4ɬ 
There was a saying of former teacher Dong Zhongshu that although there 
be a prince who inherited form and held to refinement, he could not hinder a 
sage from receiving the Mandate. The House of Han is heir to Yao, and it has 
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the cyclical destiny of passing on the state [peacefully]. It would be proper for 
the Han emperor to make a searching inquiry throughout all-under Heaven, 
to discover a worthy and wise man to whom he can abdicate the imperial 
throne and retire, enfeoffing himself with a [a state of] hundred li [square], 
like the heirs of the two kings of Yin [i.e. Shang] and Zhou, thereby to accept 
and comply with the Mandate of Heaven.“  (Arbuckle, 1995, p. 589) 
Dong Zhongshu had been less naive and had argued that the while the three 
dynasties Xia, Shang and Zhou had had their imperfections, these imperfections 
were only there to repair deficiencies in the order of tianxia. While thus implicitly 
acknowledging a necessary dynastic succession, he did not commit the high treason 
like Sui Hong.  (Arbuckle, 1995, p. 591) 
Even if this anecdotal story documented in the hanshu, compiled in the 1st century 
A.D., does not give a correct historical representation of intellectual discussions at 
the time, it mirrors the beginning of discussions about the cyclical essence of the 
tianming in China.  
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7. The Structure of the Confucian Political Imaginary 
7.1. Characteristics of the mythological creational tradition 
Liu Shu-hsien lists characteristics of the mythological creational tradition which 
originate in pre-Confucian times, shaped Confucian thought and later developments 
Confucian thought: 
1. Orthodoxy-conscious tradition: ethnic and geographical origin of the ruler is 
not an issue as long as his rule over the “Middle Kingdom” ("ø, zhongguo) 
is considered legitimate.  (Liu, 1998, p. 6) 
2. Culture-conscious tradition: “China has never been a nation in the modern 
sense of the term. China shows only a cultural unity that supersedes racial as 
well as geographical differences.”  (Liu, 1998, p. 7) 
3. Morally-conscious tradition: there are strong moral obligations between the 
ruler and the ruled.  (Liu, 1998, p. 7) 
4. Socially-conscious tradition: “the common people, left to their own devices, 
do not know how to create better living conditions. The rulers are supposed 
to fill this function”  (Liu, 1998, p. 7) 
5. This worldly-conscious tradition: “Since Heaven sees according to what 
people see, and hears according to what people hear, the will of Heaven is 
know as the will of the people is known. Emphasis is put on how to achieve 
harmony in nature as well as in the human world”  (Liu, 1998, p. 8) 
Liu points out that while the basis for the Confucian, Taoist and Moist schools of 
thought were just in the process of being created in the Warring States period, the 
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five characteristics of the mythological creational tradition have been generally 
accepted. The different schools chose mythological figures as embodiments of their 
philosophical ideals and thus later shaped what we know of these figures. The 
Taoists revered Huangdi, the Moists revered Yu, the Confucians revered Yao and 
Shun. Only the Legalists, like Han Feizi, who did not doubt their existence, doubted 
whether it is possible to have authentic knowledge about these creational myth 
figures.  (Liu, 1998, p. 8) Yet the fact that legalist Shi Huangdi chose to base his very 
title on the three huang and five di reflects the general acceptance of the mythological 
creational tradition.  (Fairbank & Teng, 1960, p. 87)  
7.2. The Tasks of the Son of Heaven 
According to Mancall, the Chinese emperor “was possessed of two distinct but 
related personalities”. One the one hand he was the man on the apex of organized 
civilisation, i.e. the huangdi (). One the other as the “Son of Heaven”, i.e. tianzi 
(), „the embodiment of virtue who by his very nature carried out the rites 
required for the continuing harmony of the universe, in both its natural and its social 
aspects“.  (Mancall, 1968, p. 64) 
Gao Mingtu attempts to provide a theoretical framework on the tasks of the tianzi 
from the Warring States period onwards. He identifies four key “tools” in the 
exercise of the mandate of heaven, which are of different degrees of importance to 
the mandate: 
1. de (ƌ): exercise of virtue  
2. li (ʠ): practise of the rites 
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3. zheng (ǎ): exercise of political power 
4. xing (): punishment, i.e. exercise of legal power  
 (Gao, 2008, p. 4) 
On the more abstract level of government in general, which is also valid for the 
supreme government of the tianzi, the Book of Rites, in chapter Record on the Subject of 
Music (+̭), provides a list of tasks necessary for the exercise of government: 
ʠ+ǎȄ,ƲL×ȩƍ˪ȶ͹, 
The purpose of [the exercise of] rites, [the cultivation of] music, [the exercise 
of] legal power and [the exercise of] political power is one: to bring together 
the minds of the people and bring forth government in accordance with the 
dao.  
In chapter Black Robes (˛̙) it exemplifies the particular tasks in regards to the role 
they play in maintaining the mandate: 
ĖȩǑ*Lƌτ*LʠȩǱȌƍǑ*Lǎτ*Lȩ
ǱͷƍÏÝȩ˩ĨLɞ* ȩA*jL˓*ȩl  
If the people are taught with virtue, the rites will give them uniformity, the 
people’s minds will be of good character, if they are taught through the 
exercise of political power, the exercise of legal power will give them 
uniformity and their minds will be directed at escaping [the punishments of 
the law] Thus, when the ruler of the people loves them like his children, 
they will regard him as a parent, trust binds them and the people will turn 
away.  (Gao, 2008, p. 4) 
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The understanding of the basis of sovereignty is thus very different to e.g. the 
understanding in slightly later Rome, where the exercise of virtue was only a mere 
assumed result of the imperium being handed over by the populus romanus to the ruler. 
The practise of de, virtue, is the seen as the most vital task in the exercise of the 
mandate of heaven and thus constituent element of it or, from an orthodox point of 
view, the cosmic reflection of the tenure of the mandate.  
Compared to the practise of virtue, the practise of li, rites, is but building on the 
precondition of the tianzi’s supreme virtue, because it puts the tianzi in a position of 
the ultimate nexus between heaven and earth. This, though, seems to be common 
phenomenon of universalistic orders, e.g. the pope in Christendom or the caliph 
during the early expansion of Islam.  
This loss of virtue, a truly subjective verdict of historians, has served as reasoning for 
revolution throughout the Chinese history. Zhou notes that the etymologic origin of 
the modern Chinese word for revolution geming (Ψç) is “to change the mandate of 
heaven” (ǌΨĔç).  (Zhou, 2006, p. 26) 
As the Book of Rites points out the exercise of political and legal powers are mere 
secondary tools of governance. Ideally, the exercise of virtue and the practise of 
rituals should make “the people love [the ruler] like a parent”. Exercise of political 
and the exercise of legal powers are nonetheless tasks of the mandate of heaven. 
Gao Mingshi identifies four principles of the mandate upheld by the exercise of the 
four “tools” 
1. Principle of unification 
2. Principle of governance 
3. Principle of kinsfolk preference 
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4. Principle of moralisation 
The principle of unification states that the position of the tianzi in society is 
analogous to the Confucian position of the father in a family. The shangshu in its 
book on the Zhou, chapter Regulation of the Floods (Ⱥ̇), states: 
ĔĨaȩɟȥL$Ĕɬ 
The son of heaven is the parent of the people and so becomes the sovereign 
of tianxia.  
The principle of governance reflects the position of the tianzi as the enforcer of the 
“order of all under heaven”, the tianxiafa (Ĕȷ). If the order (i.e. the observation 
of the rites, the submission of tribute) is not upheld by any tributary states, then it is 
the tianzi’s task to restore that order militarily. Gao Mingshi notes that  
“the use of force is not the what the West understands as imperialism, but 
rather the construction and maintenance of the order of all under heaven. 
The use of force serves but to achieve an end to the hostilities. Once the 
order is (re-) established, the use of force has achieved its aim and the 
enforcer actively retreats.”  (Gao, 2008, p. 11) 
He sees such military intervention as part of fourth task of the mandate, i.e. 
punishment. Ancient China thus lacks understanding of an “international” world 
order, all under heaven has to obey the tianxiafa, it is the tianzi’s task to enforce it 
militarily if his exemplary practice of virtue does not suffice to secure adherence to it. 
Mencius quotes the Book of Odes,  
ǨĔ*̊ΦɬùɪĊ*Ɏ̊Φɬ˷ 
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All under heaven there is no land not ruled by the sovereign, no person on 
the borders to the sea not his servant.  (Chen, 2007, p. 111) 
The principle of kinsfolk preference for lack of a better word is not to be understood 
in ethnical terms, it is rather to be seen in a cultural distinction being drawn between 
those who uphold the huaxia culture and those who do not.  Cultures are seen in a 
hierarchical order, where the huaxia culture is considered the supreme and most 
advanced. Cultural submission is thus seen as an expression of the cultural 
radiance/power of the tianzi.  (Gao, 2008, p. 11) 
The principle of moralisation is considered the quintessential aspect of the mandate: 
to spread the tianxia culture and thus the cultural submission continuously.  
According to the Analects, Confucius supposedly said  
ÏͫBǲkǖƌLȂ* 
If the remote peoples are not submissive, civil culture and virtue have to be 
cultivated to attract them.  
Gao summarizes the complex tenets of the mandate of heaven in the following 
graph:  
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According to mainstream historiography this understanding of the Mandate of 
Heaven with its listing of tools at hand to enforce the four tenets of supreme power 
ceased to be valid with the abolition of the Qing dynasty in 1911/12 and was 
substituted by the Western concepts of statehood and international relations. 
Conventional historiography, while successively documenting the political upheavals 
within this new context cannot at least rule out the continuing validity of the 
understanding of supreme power based on the four tenets of the mandate of heaven 
for the political actors in the so-called New China and thus provide a “native” 
explanation for the roles of unification, kinsfolk preference and moralisation have 
played in the political policy making processes. 
Jiang Nannan and Fan Zhongxin in looking for native ideas for constitutional law 
very recently identified the following constitutional principles. These principles, 
according to the authors, “continue to have an extremely important meaning in our 
handling of present-day national and international political and economic matters.”  
Figure 1 after  (Gao, 2008, p. 17) 
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(Jiang, 2011, p. 53) For Jiang and Fan political legitimacy still oscillates within the 
following “purposes” of power: 
1. Unity through the ruler’s virtue, unity of the centre and the periphery (ɬ͹
˗ºę^) 
2. Peaceful administration of China, autonomy of the periphery (ȶĲ"ø
òę˸ǲ ) 
3. Preparation to defend [the unity], combination of what is separate and 
contends (Ď˪ı*ΞǊ˓Ö) 
4. The spreading of virtue in the world, benevolence to far away places 	ƌº
ĔƞjƓͫ) 
5. The cultivation of teachings and the preservation of traditions, the 
proclamation of fair political order (kǑĪhτǎËļ) 
6. Carry out fair judgements, determine the differences and put an end to 
disputes (͞ǘũĸȘ2)  (Jiang, 2011, pp. 50-52) 
7.3. The Dynastic Cycle 
The theory of the cyclical development of history goes beyond the mere succession 
of dynasties. Usher distinguished between a “moral” version and an “economic” 
version of the dynastic cycle, valid in unison  (Usher, 1989, p. 1033). The moral 
version explains the substitution of one dynasty by another in the moral degeneration 
of the first. Despotic, immoral government not mired at maintaining harmony 
through the rights is seen as the cause for the decline and fall of a dynasty and the 
rise of a vigorous, morally devout new dynasty.  
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
113 of 236 
Mencius said in chapter lianghuiwang xia, 
͎D˩́*͎͎)˩́*ȠȠ͎*B́*ĖΒ̴Ėˈʙ
ǸΒŽÝ, 
Men of corrupted benevolence (ren) are called thiefs; men of corrupted justice 
(yi) are called barbarians. Thiefs and barbarians are all called autocrats. I have 
heard people say that the autocrat Zhou was killed, I have not heard the 
souveregin (jun) Zhou was killed. 
The economic version explains the substitution in economic terms. The 
cosmological order of tianxia with the Son of Heaven at its apex does not distinguish 
between social and natural phenomena as they are all part of the same world order. 
Droughts, earthquakes announce dynastic decline just as much as excessive taxation 
and any decline in agricultural productivity do.  
Dong Zhongshu expounded a first systematic analysis of the dynastic cycle allowing 
for an analysis of the Mandate of Heaven in natural phenomena (wuxing). One of his 
disciples, Sui Hong, went so far as to announce the end of the Han dynasty to the 
Han emperor, and being executed for the heresy of doctrinal purity.  (Arbuckle, 1995, 
p. 591) More relevant was that the “wuxing could impose a scheme of the eternal 
existence of change on the seemingly uncontrollable events of a volatile world.”  
(Loewe, 2002, p. 348)  
Wang Hui also notes that the dynastic cycle served a (albeit short-sighted) 
legitimising purpose of new dynasties. “Historical continuity was a product s of self-
conscious construction”.  (Wang, 2011a, p. 87) 
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Another theory also credited to Dong Zhongshu is seemly completely contrary to the 
frustrating alteration of idealism, despotism, frustration, anarchy and idealism the 
dynastical cycle theory suggests. Dong Zhongshu, society will eventually work 
towards the Great Unity, the original age of perfection fondly upheld by Confucius. 
The theory of “Three Worlds” () will repeat again and again in Chinese history 
as a justificatory discourse for political power, from the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 
in the 19th century to the Hu-Wen administration of the People’s Republic of China. 
For Dong Zhongshu, the world develops from an “Age of Confusion” towards an 
“Age of Advancing Peace” characterised by moderate wealth (), to the final and 
primordial perfection of  the “Age of Universal Peace” characterized by Great Unity 
(datong).  
(1) 
Age of Confusion 
(2) 
Age of Advancing Peace 
(3) 
Age of Universal Peace 
/ luanshi 
¹ũ shengpingshi 
ŊŶ xiaokang, i.e. society 
of moderate wealth 
ĕũ taipingshi 
ē× datong, i.e. society of 
the Great Unity 
 (Kwong, 2000, p. 680) 
Thus two conflicting discourses shaped Chinese understanding of historical 
development: the dynastic cycle theory explained the eventual “power corrupts” 
paradigm within Confucian orthodoxy, the three worlds theory again and again 
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provided an ideological basis for the assumption of power of “unorthodox” forces, 
such as the pseudo-Christian beliefs of the Taiping, the reformist thoughts of Kang 
Youwei (ŶǱ$ ), the Communist struggle towards socialism and, eventually 
communism. Its use in today’s pragmatist CCP discourse is but a return to old 
pattern.  
7.4. The World, the Polity and the Family 
The Family 
The Confucian world is structured through the sangang (ˌ) theory or “three bonds” 
theory: ruler and servant, father and son, husband and wife. The three bonds 
determine the social hierarchy both with the polity and the family. Political 
Confucianism based its judgement of the state of the world order on the deference 
to the three bonds or lack thereof. The interconnectedness of the private and the 
public thus necessitates a moral order and entails the strong emotional connection 
between world, polity and family. The Book of Rites states 
Ǐȗǣƌ5Ĕ˩xȶøȗø˩xτŁȗτŁ˩
xșƍ͛k˪ÙŁτŁτ˪Ùøȶøȶ˪ÙĔũ 
The Ancients who wished to illustrate virtue all under Heaven, first had to 
rightly govern their lands. Wishing to rightly govern will their lands, they first 
regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first rectified 
their characters. ... after their characters were cultivated, their families were 
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
116 of 236 
regulated. Their families being regulates, their lands were rightly governed. 
The lands being rightly governed, all under Heaven was at peace. 
For Confucius, ren (D “benevolence”) was key to guarantee harmony within a 
hierarchically structured family. Mencius combines ren repeatedly with yi () ) 
„justice“ and extends its scope from the family to tianxia.  (Zhang, 2005, p. 295) 
The State 
The term guo (ø) originated as the “immediate domain of the Shang [ruler]” the 
bastion yin (Ȣ) or the immediate domains of other rulers. It originally referred to 
settlements and the immediately adjacent lands.  (Chen, 2004, p. 198) 
Yu Fengchun notes that the present-day Chinese word for nation, guojia (øŁ), is 
richer than the Western word, because it incorporates jia, ie. clan/family and thus 
carries connotation of genealogical linkage.  (Yu, 2010, p. 13) This linkage is very 
important in regards to the understanding of statehood and the hierarchical order 
(the three bonds theory) in it in political Confucianism. 
The present-day Chinese word for China, zhongguo ("ø) is translated by Kalgren as 
“Central Kingdom”, in Legge and Waley as “Middle Kingdom” and in Creel as 
“Central States”.  (Chen, 2004, p. 198) 
According to Yao Dali, zhongguo can be seen to carry three distinctive meanings in the 
Classics: (1) the lands of initial settlement of the huaxia culture (2) the territory under 
direct control of the central government/imperial court, (3) the Han (huaxia) 
ethnicity.  (Yu, 2010, p. 10) The term zhongguo has thus seen its geographical reach 
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expand massively. In the Warring States period the original states of Qin, Chu, Wu, 
Yue, now in the heartlands of the People’s Republic were not seen as part of zhongguo.  
States other than the Zhou referred to themselves as zhongguo during the Warring 
States period to distinguish themselves from states/tribes that refused to adopt Zhou 
rituals and institutions. From the Zhou to the Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644 A.D.) 
zhongguo was a term mostly used in foreign affairs, whereas in domestic context the 
distinctive dynastic name, e.g. the Great Yuan, or terms like benchao (ǹǵ, our 
dynasty) or guochao (øǵ, state dynasty) were used. According to Zhao Gang’s study 
on the origins of modern Chinese national identity, the dynastic name for the first 
time became interchangeable with the term zhongguo, i.e. “China”. The publicly 
embracing of the term zhongguo served to win support of the Han élite and aimed at 
demonstrating the continuity of the Chinese body politic.  (Zhao, 2006, pp. 5-7) 
Zhao notes that if zhongguo was understood in ethnic terms, the Qing as well as the 
previous non-Han dynasties Yuan, Jin, Liao.., would have made their own rule 
illegitimate. If zhongguo was seen in cultural terms, then expansion of zhongguo could 
only imply that the incorporated populations submit themselves to the worldview of 
political Confucianism. The Qing court thus adopted on a new definition of zhongguo 
based on Qing administration and based on a multi-ethnic identity. This change in 
the understanding of zhongguo gave a theoretical framework for the conquest of 
Xinjiang, the border treaties with Russia and the definition of Mongols as “Chinese” 
(zhongguo zhi ren) in the latter treaties.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 14) In the edict of abdication 
of the Xuantong emperor, the last Qing emperor, the multi-ethnic identity of 
zhongguo was reaffirmed:  
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“[we] welcome the establishment of a great Chinese republic that integrates all 
of the territories where dwell the five ethnic groups, that is Manchus, Han, 
Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans”  (Zhao, 2006, p. 16) 
The Qing thus reaffirmed their Mandate of Heaven within the worldview of political 
Confucianism. The Mandate’s civilizing mission is upheld, its discourse in regards to 
territory changed, the suzerain territories of Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang were now seen 
as integral parts of the zhongguo and the civilizing mission also became internal to 
zhonggguo.  
The World 
Tianxia (Ĕ) appeared in the texts of the Warring States period and solidified its 
meaning in the end of the Western Han dynasty.  The exact meaning at the time is 
still object of discussion, there two Japanese schools of thought on the meaning of 
tianxia.  
A first school of thought, represented by Jingi Tasaki Masayoshi, Hiraoka Takeo, 
Nishijima Sadao and Hori Toshikazu, sees tianxia as a “world order” and equates 
aspirations expressed in dimensions of tianxia as “imperialism” in the Marxist sense 
of the word.  (Yu, 2010, p. 11) A second school of thought represented by Yamada 
Sumeru and Abe Takeo equates aspirations expressed in dimensions of tianxia as 
aspirations to control “guomin guojia”, i.e. the population and the territory of the 
original jiuzhou.  (Yu, 2010, p. 11) 
The two terms are neither synonymous nor do they contradict each other, i.e. the 
rule over a guo, or in particular zhongguo does not equal rule over tianxia, and the 
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existence of several guo outside of the domain of the tianzi is not an obstacle to the 
recognition of the latter’s mandate.  
The Ming dynasty philosopher Gu Yanwu (ίɔȜ) differentiated guo and tianxia in 
regards to their subjugation: 
Ǳ:ø,Ǳ:Ĕ:ø:Ĕĝ͡? ǫ,ǤĥǌÔ,́*:ø;D)w
ć,˪˹5ɪγB,Bňʏγ,́*:Ĕiø˩,Ý˷,˯γ˩
̿*iĔ˩,·Ė*͋, Ǳ͆əˬʙ (Yu, 2010, p. 10) 
There is a difference between the subjugation of a state and that of tianxia. 
Then how to tell the difference? When a dynasty is replaced by another, it is a 
change of family name and we say it is the subjugation of a state; and when 
the benevolence and righteousness are overridden so much so that even 
animals are directed to eat people and that even human beings become 
cannibals, we call it the subjugation of tianxia. Therefore, if one knew how to 
safeguard tianxia, he then knew how to safeguard a state. It is upon the duty 
of a monarch and those who enjoy wealth and power to safeguard a state, 
while as with the security of tianxia, even a person as humble as an unlearned 
commoner should shoulder the responsibility. (liberal but apt translation by  
(Liu & Huang, 2006, pp. 534-535)) 
Except from the disputed geographical difference, tianxia can be seen as in a moral 
dimension and guo in a geographical dimension. The guo is seen here as a 
geographically limited polity, where the monopoly on violence over a certain area and 
a certain population in the classical sense is maintained. Tianxia, however, is the 
entirety of worldly expressions of the dao, the Ultimate Principle. The cosmic order 
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carries moral implications and while guo can be ruled by simple men, tianxia can only 
be ruled through the tianming given to sages whose personality is “the embodiment of 
brilliant moral will”  (Liu & Huang, 2006, p. 527) and ensure a harmonious society in 
respect of the three bonds theory.  
The presentation of tribute to the tianzi equalled a ritual demonstration of 
acknowledging the Chinese world order. Of course, this was the interpretation on the 
Chinese side of the tribute, whereas the other side might interpret the very tribute as 
a strangely concocted taxation for trading rights or technological exchange. For the 
Chinese, the presentation of tribute, according to Mancall’s study on the Qing 
dynasty tribute system, was not the acknowledgment of China’s superior civilisation, 
but rather of civilisation itself, the Son of Heaven being at its apex.  (Mancall, 1968, p. 
64) This explains how the tributary relationships of China could only be bilateral and 
not multilateral. The tributary system of the Qing dynasty reflected a cultural 
distinction between Confucian and non-Confucian tributary states in the imperial 
government’s organisational structure. Tributary relations with other Confucian 
states, such as Vietnam or Korea, were handled through the Board of Rites, whereas 
tributary relations with non-Confucian states were handles by the “Barbarian Control 
Office” (ɲʁΚ).  (Mancall, 1968, pp. 72-73) 
The existence of states not acknowledging the tianzi’s supremacy has been 
recognized ever since political Confucianism developed its moral world order in the 
early Han dynasty. The Han dynasty heqin (èA) policy with the xiongnu tribes of 
present-day Mongolia, the Tang dynasty’s heqin policy with the tubo empire of 
present-day Tibet, the border treaty between the Jin and the Southern Song in 1141 
A.D. and Zhu Yuanzhang’s (ǻuɴ) admission that there were fifteen bu chen zhi guo 
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(˷*ø), i.e. political entities not subject to Chinese suzerainty, are exemplary 
episodes of the recognition of the non-universality of the Chinese world order.  (Yu, 
2010, p. 19) Universal application of the tianming is thus rather to be seen as an 
ultimate goal, whose most able asserter is the tianzi.  
7.5. The “Self” and the “Other” 
Professor Xu Jilin from East China Normal University asked in a recent essay 
"øΧ#ʔ×^̩×ʇ¿ǼŸʵ!̠̓ǚøŁͽȊʇɯKȩǜ
øŁͩǦē΀"øʚ̳Ĩʇ̳ […] ʐșʇΐαû5ͩȩ
ǜøŁʰʷǦ!ǎȶ×^ͨǦÁÓǖµ×^[…]  a$ɯK
"øBĢ_ȅƭ!ƮM ǦǎȶʇƮMͨǦǖµʇ
ƮM (Xu, 2006, p. 1) 
China is facing a crisis of community legitimacy. The [development towards 
the] establishment of a modern nation-state similar to those in the West is the 
consensus among the majority of Chinese intellectuals. […] The real question 
is: is this nation-state a political community or rather a historical, cultural 
community? […] As modern Chinese, how do we construct a “we”? Is it a 
political “we”, or is it a cultural “we”?  
Professor Xu does not answer his question in his paper. To understand the native 
understanding who is “Chinese” not in terms of administrative reach of the Chinese 
State, but, much more importantly, in terms of an emotionally felt cultural sense of 
community, that albeit being mono-directional in the eyes of Uighur and Tibetan 
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separatists, one needs to look at the sense of community in the traditional Chinese 
worldview.  
The yantielun (ʊΉ̰), Discourses on Salt and Iron, a debate on state policy in the 
late Western Han period (81 B.C.), include a speech, which brings out the idea of the 
concentric zones:  
“while the Son of Heaven stands at the centre, the intensity of imperial 
authority decreases, and the demands on the population are reduced as the 
far-lying areas succeed one another”  (Loewe, 1994, p. 21) 
To explain the radiating force to the Mandate of Heaven, Chinese scholars 
consistently refer to the theory of wufu as documented in the yugong:  
 
Figure 2 after  (Gao, 2008, p. 23) 
The farther away a suzerain state is, the less the tributary duties to the tianzi were. It 
remained the orthodox vision for “international” relations until the Qing dynasty 
confrontation with the Westphalian system. The tianxia geography in its unipolarity is 
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incompatible with the unwillingness to adopt political Confucianism by Western 
powers and the rethinking of the “Chinese nation” in the early 20th century. It will be 
argued that the tianxia system survived in terms of the understanding of the “purpose” 
rather than the territory (or territorial aspirations) of the Chinese body politic within 
the Westphalian system. 
The uniqueness in traditional Chinese understanding of “the other” in tianxia is that 
the “foreigner”, “barbarian” or “non-subjects” has been predominantly understood 
in cultural terms, not primarily in terms of ethnic grounds. The passage from the 
distinction between xia and yi changes from an ethnically and socially oriented 
distinction to a geographical and cultural distinction in the passage from Western to 
Eastern Zhou dynasty. Xia, according to Chen Zhi’s study on the concept, “was a 
concept created by the early Zhou élites to seek ethnic integrity, historical legitimacy 
and cultural dignity in their confrontation.  (Chen, 2004, p. 202)  
The distinction between the “self” and the “other” has never been seen as an 
insuperable racial barrier. Indeed, as shown in the previous chapters, political 
Confucianism sees the civilizing task, i.e. spreading of li and de, of the tianzi as 
pontificating his world order and thus making the “other” gradually become part of 
the “self”. Chinese sources regularly quote Mencius (chapter tengwen gong shang) in this 
regard: 
âΒɸĐÍę˩ǸΒÍ5ę˩, 
I have heard that men have changed barbarians by means of our great culture, 
but I have never heard of any who have been changed by barbarians.   
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Late Qing scholars such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao tried to justify zhonghua 
unity through common ancestry and a common cultural mission. The memoirs of 
their contemporary Dong Fangsan express the same line of thought:  
“the Manchus, Mongols and Han are different branches of a single tree. 
Originally, they came from the same ancestor and they will develop into a 
unity.”  (Zhao, 2006, p. 22) 
This view continued to be the orthodox understanding of Chineseness of the later 
nationalists such as, most prominently, president Sun Yatsen (ī"ŗ ) and 
generalissimo Jiang Kaishek (̎Gʛ) in his “China’s Destiny” ("ø*çͦ), 
published in 1943. For Sun the so-called five races of the republic (Han, Manchus, 
Mongols, Hui, Tibetans) formed a single national entity, which he termed the 
“Chinese race” (zhonghua minzu).  
In his Proclamation of the Provisional President dated January 1st, 1912 he said:  
ÖȮɍ̏ó̺̒ü$øÀÖȮɍ̏ó̺̒ǜ$BǦǫȩǜ*
˗  (Di, 2010, p. 6) 
To unite the lands of the Han, the Manchus, the Mongols, the Hui, the 
Tibetans into one State, means to unite the races of the Han, the Manchus, 
the Mongols, the Hui, the Tibetans into one people, this is what is called the 
unification of [our] race. 
The issue of contention was what binds these five races of the republic together.  
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Communist and Nationalist anthropologists contended to identify that link zhonghua 
minzu and define themselves as the worthy inheritor of the mythological heritage 
dating back to Yao and Shun.  
Mao Zedong (ȧȹ) requested historiographers around Fan Wenlan (̇ǖɒ) to 
write a history of the zhongghua minzu in 1940 in order to counter Japanese 
propaganda campaigns for arguing for a Greater Asia under Japanese leadership. Fan 
in one year’s time compiled the textbook A Concise General History of China ("ø͵Ó
ʾ˞) and created a shared past in which the individual histories of the ethnic 
minorities folded into the linear evolution of the Han ethnicity.  (Leibold, 2007, p. 
157) 
Fan published an article entitled The Development of the zhonghua minzu ("ºȩǜʇÊ
ŕ) in the October 1950 edition of the CCP Party journal Xuexi (į-). In this article 
he propagated the theory that all ethnicities of the People’s Republic originated from 
a group of unique, indigenous proto-Chinese in the Stone Age. The “Peking Man”, 
homo erectus bone remains, discovered in Zhoukoudian near Beijing in 1923, and much 
younger homo sapiens bone remains nearby in 1933 served as the “scientific” basis for 
this reasoning. Fan explained the dominance of the Han ethnicity in two ways. Firstly, 
in economic terms the Han expanded because of the advantageous development of 
the production forces in the fertile Yellow River valley. Secondly, in cultural terms, 
the Han expanded through the continuous gradual assimilation of minority nationals 
at its fringes through a continuous gradual expansion of cultural influence. According 
to Leibold “the Han nationality thereby transformed itself into a microcosm of the 
zhonghua minzu’s collective diversity”.  (Leibold, 2007, p. 173)  
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PRC sociologists, most prominently Fei Xiaotong (͌Ĭ͵), supported a vision of 
the zhonghua minzu originating from different sources but now being one cultural 
unity ("øȩǜĒu^).  
In the preamble of the 1982 constitution, the PRC defines itself as a “unitary 
multinational-national state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities” (}
øÕǜBȩ×˝Ͷʇ˗ʇĒȩǜøŁ). A quick look at census data shows 
the importance of this issue. According to the census of the year 2000 (the data for 
the 2010 census in to this day not yet publicly available), 8,41 % of China’s 
population (106 million people) belong to 55 state-recognized “minority nationalities” 
(ŋǔȩǜ). While these 106 million people are only a small fraction of the entire 
population, they take up five-eights of Chinese territory.  (Mackerras, 2004, pp. 216-
217) Finding a definition of the “self” in China that includes those “minority 
nationalities” is of vital importance in maintaining the territorial integrity of China.  
The Korean scholar Ryu Yong-Tae argues that every discourse on defying the 
Chinese nation is rests on the premise that the majority (Han) gradually absorbs 
other, minority, nationalities. He qualifies this as the “internalized imperial nature” of 
Chinese nationalism. (quoted in  (Wang, 2011a, p. 178)). Tsinghua university 
professor Wang Hui adds three valid observations to this qualification.  
Firstly, the emphasis on the principle of “one China” is “a response to the crisis of 
disintegration brought about by imperialist aggression” therefore making “national 
amalgamation and sovereign independence common objects of the entire 20th 
century national liberation movement”  (Wang, 2011a, p. 179).  
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Secondly, the assimilation process is a process of extending the traditional system of 
centralized bureaucracy of the heartlands to the periphery (from tribute relations to 
administration).  
Thirdly, the propositions of viewing the population as an organic whole are not 
compatible with the discriminatory ethnic policies of the PRC.  (Wang, 2011a, p. 179) 
The PRC does indeed uphold its multi-ethnic character in as the photo-ops of the 
Party leadership at every larger ceremonial event. The PRC also enforces positive 
discrimination for minorities in terms of access to higher education, birth control 
and access to social welfare.  
The “unity in diversity” understanding of the Chinese nation as put forward since 
reform and opening up accentuates, according to Wang Hui, the “unification of 
diversity and hybridity” as the essence of Chineseness.  (Wang, 2011a, p. 187) 
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8. Decay and Response of the Confucian Political 
Imaginary 
8.1. Two Explanatory Models for Decay 
Fairbank’s Framework 
The great Sinologist John K. Fairbank provided a first framework to understand the 
“Chinese world order” in his homonymous conference volume published in 1968. 
For Fairbank and his students, representing the so-called Harvard School of Chinese 
studies, the framework is no longer valid, the confrontation with the West has 
changed China from its core. They analyse  
structure and functioning of an international order composed of China and 
states or peoples in contact with China. This international order flourished 
until the Western powers intruded into East Asia in the mid-nineteenth 
century; thereafter it survived vestigially down to 1911.  (Fairbank, 1968, p. 5) 
He expounds a set of fifteen assumptions, which have been most influential on how 
pre-modern China is seen abroad and in China today. The assumptions below, 
Fairbank emphasises, are only valid on a normative level as an ideal pattern and only 
from a Chinese point of view.  (Fairbank, 1968, p. 12) 
1. “The Chinese world originated as an agrarian-based culture island”, 
expanding through gradual absorption of territories, remaining the centre of 
its own world. 
2. The Chinese world maintained a sense of unity. 
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3. The Chinese world was hierarchic and anti-egalitarian. 
4. At the apex of the Chinese world was the Son of Heaven (ĔĨ). 
5. The Chinese world order was „sustained by a heavy stress on ideological 
orthodoxy“. 
6. Education in the Classics sustained this ideological orthodoxy. 
7. Leadership was manifested in the application of rites (ʠ) and, alternatively, 
of regulations (ȷ), to prevent deviations from harmony. The leadership role 
of the Son of Heaven was personal, not abstract (in the name of the state). 
8. Two administrative structures existed side-by-side: the more ancient structure 
based on personal relations between emperor and subject (subject clans, 
subject states) and the less ancient bureaucracy. 
9. The bureaucratic structure began with the unification of the Qin Empire in 
221 B.C. 
10. The reach of the Son of Heaven was vast but extremely superficial. The 
ideological commitment of the local élites guaranteed their own legitimacy 
and thus also secured adherence to the world order. 
11. This ideological commitment was expected from rulers (representatives) of 
states outside China.  
12. The expansion of the Chinese world order worked through the integration of 
exterior vassals of an earlier period to become interior vassals of a later 
period. 
13. Non-Chinese rulers could become Sons of Heaven. 
14. The Chinese world order also replicated itself linguistically.  
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15. Non-Chinese rulers, i.e. “outer vassals” participated in the Chinese world 
order by observing the rites. The tribute system linked them with to the Son 
of Heaven.  (Fairbank, 1968, pp. 5-10) 
In the understanding of Fairbank all these fundamental characteristics of the Chinese 
worldview from the Warring States period to the Qing dynasty lost their political 
validity with the imperialist aggression of the West. They developed an “impact-
response” explanation, which has also been adopted by Chinese native 
historiography.  
The Impact-Response Explanation for Decay 
Chinese orthodox historiography tend to frame the second half of the 19th century 
and the first of the 20th as the “century of humiliation” (ʆɼ˭ͣ), the period from 
the Opium Wars to the proclamation of the People’s Republic, in which 
unprecedented changes caused by imperialist intrusion “humiliated” the great 
culture-nation of China. A standard undergraduate textbook for contemporary 
Chinese history from People’s University Beijing begins with this very story: 
4¸ˋǦ"ºȩǜŚ͔ʇˋK"øB¥EÙ˘ήƃĜǗ
ȳǱ̞̠ǚƃʇeʀŇ΋èμÂǎʼƲÛm"ºȩǜěͯ˿ü
IȄŴ̛ƂĎÌœͣʇöĈ"΄Ǚʶʵ͔Ȃē͚țü͒Úˇ̉ł
ƃː5ƺǁ"ºʇ×ɲƦÍ$ɯĻ (Jin, 2001, p. 2) 
The 20th century is the century of the rise of the Chinese nation. Several 
generations of Chinese advanced fearlessly, through tenacious struggle, not 
intimidated by Western imperialist aggression, blockage and hardliner 
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pressure, made the Chinese nation from an extremely weak predicament of 
humiliation miraculously stood up again, with great strides towards prosperity 
finally turning the vision of „reviving China“ into reality. 
Early Western historians adopted the same approach to explaining the century before 
Communist takeover in China. John K. Fairbank and his Harvard school and Joseph 
R. Levenson also from Harvard proposed an “impact-response” model, according to 
which the reason for the decay of Qing dynasty China lied in the failure of the old 
tianxia system to adapt to the first intruder not willing to adopt the Chinese 
worldview, the Western barbarians.  
Levenson published three major works on the intellectual debate in China during 
that century between 1958 and 1965 (The Problem of Intellectual Continuity, The Problem of 
Monarchical Decay, The Problem of Historical Significance), which were based on 
discussions in two conferences 1952, 1954. He tried to explain to an American 
audience in the early years of Communist government in China how the Chinese 
civilisation had disintegrated and the new China persistently condemning its own 
intellectual heritage was to be understood. 
For Levenson, “the breakdown of traditional Chinese society is the result of the 
western impact, the same western incursion that ruffled and finally ruined Chinese 
confidence in China’s intellectual self-sufficiency.”  (Levenson, 1958/1972, p. 145) 
For Fairbank, the Qing government’s response to the West was the reason for a 
complete collapse of the traditional Chinese worldview. The Qing did not westernize 
their traditions, but rather tried to explain the “treaty system” after the Opium Wars 
in terms of its tributary system of international relations, upholding a myth of ritual, 
thus moral centrality.  (Fairbank, 1968, p. 259) Within this framework, for instance, 
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foreign diplomats posted to China only represented the traditional principle that 
foreign merchants in China be superintended by one of their countrymen and the 
most-favoured nation status granted in various treaties only reflected imperial benign 
impartiality. Foreign emissaries were allowed under duress to take residence in the 
capital after the Second Opium War. Only by 1873, they were granted an audience 
with the Tongzhi emperor. According to the Qing record, the envoys “looked up at 
the emperor in audience”. A Beijing newspaper account recalls that the envoys were 
so overwhelmed by the emperor’s presence that they dropped their letters of 
credence “overcome with trembling”.  (Fairbank, 1968, p. 262) For Fairbank, the 
widening gap “between the synarchic power structure and a sinocentric culture” 
undermined the assumption “that traditional China could be ruled only as a 
combined state-and-culture”.  (Fairbank, 1968, p. 273) 
On an ideational level, Benjamin Schwartz agrees: “both the internal and external 
bases of [the tianxia world order] have decidedly crumbled. Although it is quite 
conceivable that many elements of Confucianism as a total philosophy may live on 
into the twentieth century, the specific cosmology on the basis of which the Chinese 
universal kinship occupied a unique ontological status has […] irrevocably collapsed.”  
(Schwartz, 1968, p. 285) 
Fairbank in his later works, while continuing to see a complete rupture with the past 
in the Qing inability to adapt to foreign aggression on an ideational level, used the 
traditional Chinese worldview to explain contemporary Chinese policy. In explaining 
the centrality of the One China policy in the PRC foreign policy discourse, he refers 
to the tianxia world order. “It cannot be expunged from the Chinese language or 
from the minds of the Chinese people. This is not only an idea, but a sentiment, a 
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feeling habituated by millennia of conduct. It attaches the highest importance to 
Chinese civilization, which consists of all those people who live in a Chinese way […] 
and springs from a sense of culturalism, something a good deal stronger than a mere 
Western-style nationalism.”  (Fairbank, 1948/1983, p. 425) 
The changes in the Chinese understanding of “China” during 20th century have to be 
understood, according to Fairbank and Schwartz, in terms of complete substitution 
of the traditional worldview by a Westphalian worldview, because the collapse of the 
Qing dynasty was caused by the ideational inadequacy of the traditional worldview to 
deal with the other, “modern” worldview. In Albert Feuerwerker’s words “in its 
place arose [...] modern Chinese nationalism whose memory of the trauma of the 
cataclysmic impact of foreign imperialism on traditional China is the principal, but 
not exclusive force which operates now to shape the actions of the P.R.C. in the 
world arena.  (Feuerwerker, 1972, p. 5) Nathan and Ross observe, “in contrast to the 
self-evident American nationalism of manifest destiny, Chinese nationalism is 
powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride (Nathan, Ross (1997), quoted 
in  (Guang, 2005, p. 494)) 
Cohen’s Critique and Its Consequences to Contemporary China 
Paul Cohen, a student of Fairbank and Schwartz at Harvard, questioned this 
approach arguing that the internal changes of Chinese society itself and the internal 
different reactions to Western invasion led to the monumental changes at beginning 
of the 20th century.  
In the eyes of Cohen Fairbank commits three errors of judgement. Firstly, he pays a 
disproportionate amount of attention to Western-related aspects of 19th century 
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Chinese history. Secondly, because of the limiting prism of the impact-response 
provides only a narrow, insufficiently complex narrative to 19th century Chinese 
history and its 20th century consequences. Thirdly, Fairbank’s argument for failure to 
adapt frames all non-Western related aspects of 19th century Chinese political 
developments “in terms of their ‘remarkable inertia’” and uniformity.  (Cohen, 
1984/2010, pp. 11-15) For Cohen, impact-response theory is not “wrong”; its 
intellectual reach is rather delimited.  
Previous explanations of the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) focussed on the 
ideological imports from Christianity, its founder and paramount leader Hong 
Xiuquan (Ⱥʥ}) portraying himself as the younger brother to Jesus Christ. For 
Cohen, it was but „a Western-influenced variation on a theme that was played in 
widely scattered parts of China […] in response to conditions that by and large 
predated the impact of the West.“  (Cohen, 1984/2010, p. 20) Cohen explains the 
slowness of the Qing response to Western aggression not in its ideological blindness, 
but in its deliberate choice to deal with much more urgent internal matters, such as 
the Taiping rebellion, first.  (Cohen, 1984/2010, p. 22) 
Coherently on an ideological level, Cohen denies that the reason for failure of the 
restoration and reform efforts parallel to the Meiji restoration in Japan was due to 
the fundamental incompatibility of the Chinese worldview and (economic, 
administrative, etc.) modernization. In his eyes, the Qing government and even the 
reformers refused or failed “to see the relevance of modernization to what in their 
eyes were essentially old and familiar problems”.  (Cohen, 1984/2010, p. 25) 
Cohen argues for an end to the classical rupture between modern and traditional 
Chinese history with the end of Qing dynasty. On the one hand, this breaks with the 
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tradition of stressing the changelessness of Chinese political culture before the 
rupture. On the other, this allows for a more native, non-Western perspective on the 
consequences of the inclusion of Western thought into Chinese political discourse 
after the Qing dynasty and a rebuttal to the assumption that the only kind of 
“development” in China is “leading toward modernity, as defined by the Western 
historical experience”.  (Cohen, 1984/2010, p. 70) Chinese scholars only recently 
have embraced Cohen’s critique of the impact-response model in regards to its 
influence on the present-day understanding of the Chinese nation (its “humiliating” 
creation myth) and Chinese nationalism. Guang Lei sees two shortcomings. Firstly, 
the limited narrative of the China-West encounter excludes China’s non-Western 
relationships. Secondly, focussing on the struggle against overcoming weakness and 
humiliation neglects other sources of claims around which the state is able to 
mobilise sentiment.  (Guang, 2005, pp. 495-496) 
8.2. Kang Youwei’s Great Unity 
Kang Youwei (ŶǱ$) is mainly remembered as the major exponent of a failed last 
attempt to save the Qing dynasty, the so-called wuxu bianfa (ƪƫÍȷ), or “Hundred 
Day’s Reform”, under the auspices of the Guangxu emperor from June 11th to 
September 21st 1898. While Kang’s actual influence on the events has been 
questioned  (Wong, 1992), Chinese and Western historiography see in him and his 
student Liang Qichao (Ȑà͕ ) the two protagonists in rethinking the basic 
foundations of political Confucianism to provide renewed ideological legitimacy to 
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the imperial system of the Qing as it struggled to survive foreign aggression and 
internal fatigue.  
Kang Youwei was born in 1858 in Nanhai, Guangdong province. He was compelled 
to study the Confucian Classics from early age. In his early twenties he read Chinese 
travel reports to foreign countries and visited the British colony Hong Kong in 1879. 
In 1882 he travelled to Beijing for the first time to participate the imperial 
examinations and failed. The following year he first engaged in reform politics by 
participating in the founding a society against the women foot binding (˟V) and 
started reading translations of foreign books, especially on evolutionary theory.  
(Thompson, 1984, pp. 26-28) In the following years he wrote a first draft of his 
major work Book on the Great Unity (datongshu, ē×.) He oriented himself to the 
chapter liyun (ʠͦ) in the Book of Rites: 
ē͹*̖,Ĕ$~Ͳ͇˵̮jkʕ 
When the great dao [i.e.: the ultimate principle, the grand course] was pursued, 
a communal spirit ruled tianxia, men of talents and ability were chosen, the 
words were sincere, harmony was cultivated [/ was spread].  (Fan, 2006, p. 14) 
Unlike his contemporaries he does not see the dao of Heaven as “a dynamic variation 
on the practise of the perfect, golden age from the distant past, but rather it was a 
dynamic that drove history towards a perfect world in the future.”  (Goto-Jones, 
2005, p. 805)   
In the course of working on the datongshu for the rest of his life, he worked on 
reinterpreting political Confucianism in a way that it fitted with his utopian ideal and 
societal changes of his lifetime.  
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In 1888 he unsuccessfully submitted his first reform proposals to the Qing court, a 
year later he passed the second-degree imperial exams. The following years he 
dedicated himself to teaching the Classics, Buddhism in at the wanmuzaotang (Ƿ̈
Ć) in Guangzhou.  Liang Qichao, who he had met while taking the imperial exam, 
joined him there.  
In his first major work xinxue weijing kao (ǙįY˒˨), Study of the Forged Classics 
of the Xin Period, published in 1891, he famously stated that the Classics as they 
have been transmitted since the Xin dynasty fei kongzi zhi jing (ΦĩĨ*˒), i.e. are 
not the Classics of Confucius, but rather forged documents to serve the ideological 
needs of the short-lived Xin dynasty. His study on Confucius was less a 
historiographical contribution than a political statement to the contemporary Qing 
court. The fact that he had started sending petitions to the court before having read 
the study on the “forged” Classics by Liao Ping (ŷũ) he plagiarized into his own 
study, shows that Kang used the historical argument to provide “theoretical 
foundation” to his reform agenda.  (Kwong, 2000, p. 687) In xinxue weijing kao Kang 
tried to demonstrate that the so-called “old-text version” of the Classics had been 
forged toward the end of the Western Han dynasty and tried to prove the 
authenticity of the older so-called “new-text version” of the Classics, which was the 
basis of Dong Zhongshu’s thought and the gongyang school. According to Kang, the 
old-text versions served to distort Confucius “great principles” hidden in the esoteric 
language of the new-text school. One of these great principles of Confucius was the 
“unfolding of the three epochs”: Kang refutes the standing theory of the cyclical 
development of history and lays down an evolution of (political) world history in 
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three stages to the ultimate goal of Great Unity following the sanshi (, “Three 
Ages”) understanding of the Han dynasty gongyang school of Dong Zhongshu.  
(1) 
Age of Confusion 
(2) 
Age of Advancing Peace 
(3) 
Age of Universal Peace 
/ luanshi 
¹ũ shengpingshi 
ŊŶ xiaokang, i.e. society 
of moderate wealth 
ĕũ taipingshi 
ē× datong, i.e. society of 
great unity 
Federation of former 
states 
Construction of a new 
Public Space 
Extinction of the State in 
a world society 
Inequality of personal 
rights within several 
countries 
Gradual equalization of 
rights within countries, 
but inequality between the 
races 
Equality of all people, 
distinction between the 
states and the races being 
extinguished 
The people owning 
private property, and the 
Government paying the 
price for its expropriation 
from the people 
The people’s private 
property not to be 
expropriated without great 
reason 
Private property 
extinguished 
Every country protecting 
its own trade 
The International 
Government protecting 
the trade of the several 
countries 
The distinction of States 
being extinguished, there 
is no protection needed. 
shortened after Tsuchida  (Hummel, 1935, p. 349),  (Kwong, 2000, p. 680) 
Kang’s theory on the historical development is striking in at least two aspects.  
Firstly, the overall similarity between his understanding of a linear evolution towards 
the datong and the Marxist understanding of the historical evolution towards true 
Communism is striking and, as will be shown in later chapters, is fundamental to the 
positive reception of communist thought in China.  
Secondly, it is striking that his thoughts on the reform of Qing dynasty China focus 
on the evolution of the international system, rather than industrialization, 
administrative reform etc. of China proper.  
In work kongzi gaizhi kao (ĩĨǌ£˨, Study on Confucius as an Institutional 
Reformer), written around 1886 and published in 1897, Kang portrays Confucius not 
as the mere collector and transmitter of ancient principles, but rather as the very 
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author of the Classics. Kang argued that Confucius attempted to bring about 
institutional changes in his time “by appealing to antiquity”.  (Chi, 1986, p. 19)  
His contribution was not revolutionary (geming, i.e. change the Mandate), he termed it 
bianfa (Íȷ, i.e. change the ways). The term can be traced back to the reforms of 
Shang Yang (îΩ), which transformed the Qin state before it unified China in 221 
B.C., and the reforms of Wang Anshi (ɬĲʛ), the Northern Song dynasty reformer 
and resonate moments of great successful political changes in Chinese history.  
Representatives of the ziqiang yundong (˸ƃͦ¬), Self-Strengthening Movement, the 
statesmen Li Hongzhang (Ǿνʸ) and Zuo Zongtang (ŞĶȒ), tried to change 
China proper according to Zhang Zhidong’s zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong principle 
("į$^̠į$ɸ), i.e. „Chinese learning for fundamental principles and the 
Western learning for practical application”, they did not question the fundamental 
political conditions of China. Kang Youwei provided an ideological middle way 
between sticking to the native political ideology, upon which Qing legitimacy rested 
but which at the same time contradicted the Qing Mandate, or refuting political 
Confucianism and thus accepting a then perceived bitter Darwinian inferiority to 
Western worldviews. According to Kang the Classics, the tenets of Chinese 
statehood, have been interpreted faultily. Kang’s call for the study of the gongyang 
tradition two millennia earlier is very relevant to his talk about the struggle for the 
Great Unity in the beginning of the 20th century in the middle of what Chinese 
historians now call the bainian guochi (ʆŪø˭), “century of humiliation”. China, in 
Kang’s eyes, could only escape from its unfortunate position by reassuming its 
central position as a moral power, which it lost because of wrong interpretation of its 
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proper ideological foundation. Only as the prime advocate of the Great Unity within 
the rectified interpretation of the Classics and the inclusion of some Western fortes, 
China could re-exert its cultural appeal and thus reassert its territorial integrity. 
The military weakness of Qing government was exposed in the defeat in the First 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki, also 
known as the Treaty of Maguan (ηȁˉ). China had to pay a substantial 
indemnity to Japan, to cede Taiwan as well as its suzerainty claim over Korea to 
Japan and de facto lost the Liaodong peninsula to Russia. Kang Youwei and Liang 
Qichao were among the organisers of the gongche shangshu (~͜.) movement, in 
which thousands of the imperial exam candidates signed a petition to the Court 
opposing the Treaty of Shimonoseki and advocated administrative and military 
reforms. The court’s refusal to discuss reform led to protests and radicalized many of 
the good-willed young candidates. The petition, while refused at court, was pubslihed 
lithographically in Shanghai. Several thousand copies were distributed in six months 
marking a starting point for public debate on political reform in China  (Kwong, 
2000, p. 681). Kang understood the growing importance of public debate and 
founded the newspaper zhongwaijiwen ("đ̭Β), roughly translated as „News 
Records from China and Abroad“, in Beijing, the journal qiangxuebao (ƃįƼ) or 
“Journal of Self-strengthening Studies” in Shanghai and later the journal zhixinbao (ʚ
ǙƼ) or “New Knowledge Journal” in Macao.  (Kwong, 2000, pp. 681-682) 
In April 1898, after the German annexation of the Jiaozhou peninsula in Shandong, 
Kang and Liang set up the guobaohui (øiV), Society for the Protection of the 
Nation, with the three goals of baoguo, baozhong, baojiao (iøiʧiǑ), i.e. the 
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protection of the guo (here meant as territorial sovereignty in the Qing empire), the 
protection of the ethnical autonomies and the protection of the teachings.  (Kwong, 
2000, p. 685)  
On June 11, 1898 the Guangxu emperor started issuing a series of edicts in which he 
outlined administrative reforms as had been urged ever more pressingly by the 
intelligentsia inside and outside the Qing state and thus set of a very short-lived 
reform period known as The Hundred Days’ Reform. Kang Youwei later 
successfully portrayed himself as one of the protagonists of the reform effort and is 
remembered as such in mainstream historiography, but his actual influence on the 
events was marginal.  (Kwong, 2000, p. 677) 
Guangxu announced a wide-ranging set of educational, military, economic and 
administrative reform measures too vast to succeed at once. The emperor also 
allowed low-ranking officials and commoners to directly petition the throne on 
reform proposals for the first time in Chinese history. While the Empress Dowager 
Cixi had been detached to any involvement for or against the reforms of her nephew 
the emperor at first, a secret petition to her by the censor Yang Chongyi (ȃřS) 
sin September 1898 lamenting chaos after the dismissal of thousands of bureaucrats 
and the apparent negative influence of Kang Youwei, Sun Yatsen and others on the 
emperor led to her “palace coup” re-assuming tutelage over the emperor and ending 
the reforms.  (Kwong, 2000, pp. 670-675) 
Kang fled to Canada in 1898, where founded the baohuanghui (iʉV), the Society 
for the Protection of the Emperor, in 1899 and then for more than a decade roamed 
foreign countries to form public opinion on the necessity of a reformed Qing China 
and gathering financial support. In 1902 he finalised the datongshu in Darjeeling, India.  
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One recurring theme of his speeches and writings abroad was the importance of the 
unity of China.  (Thompson, 1984, pp. 40-41) In a 1902 article, Kang described the 
lands brought under Qing administration in the previous two centuries as the 
“greater China” (ē"ø), this expansion laid the groundwork for a „new China“ (Ǚ
"ø). A strong national identity should be created in this new China: 
[The Qing government] should establish as permanent national name the 
Chinese state ("ºø, zhonghua guo). Because the Manchus, Han-Chinese, 
Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans all belong to a single state, they are all 
Chinese ("øB, zhongguo ren) without any distinction.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 21) 
Thus the early 20th century Chinese “nationalism” Kang Youwei represented was one 
of conservative reformism aiming at gradual reforms but keeping political 
Confucianism, its moralism, social hierarchy and ultimate goal of returning to the 
Great Unity, at the centre of Chinese collective political identity.  
The memoirs of his contemporary Dong Fangsan express the same line of thought:  
“the Manchus, Mongols and Han are different branches of a single tree. 
Originally, they came from the same ancestor and they will develop into a 
unity.”  (Zhao, 2006, p. 22) 
Kang opposed the proclamation of the Republic of China and the abdication of the 
Xuantong emperor in 1911/12. As general Yuan Shikai (̜), conservative 
protagonist of the repression of the Hundred Day’s Reform with his own imperial 
aspirations, assumed the presidency, Kang sided with the revolutionaries around Sun 
Yatsen (ī"ŗ). Kang supported the short-lived (twelve days) restoration of the 
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Xuantong emperor under general Zhang Xun (Ɓ±) in 1917.  (Thompson, 1984, pp. 
38-39) In 1919, Kang sent Woodrow Wilson a copy of his datongshu with suggestions 
concerning the League of Nations.  (Hummel, 1935, p. 350) Kang’s rejection of 
Wilson’s suggestion of the publication of an English translation of the work is 
emblematic for Kang’s insistence on the supreme mission of the Chinese culture and 
that the tasks and the target group of the datongshu is essentially Chinese.  (Thompson, 
1984, p. 41) The concern for international affairs in Kang Youwei was not 
necessarily directed at the solution of international issues, but rather a reassertion to 
all member agents (ethnicities) of China of the supreme political imaginary of their 
shared collective identity as zhonghua. As Liang Qichao observed, “historical memory 
was [...] a function, as well as a fount of a people’s collective strength”.  (Kwong, 
2000, p. 664) Kang continued to propagate his revisited political Confucianism to lay 
the foundations of the strengthening of a new China based on its moral supremacy in 
his daodehui (͹ƌV), Morality Society.  (Duara, 1997, p. 1035) 
Kang Youwei died in Qingdao, Shandong in 1927. The datongshu was published in its 
entirety only in 1935.  
8.3. Sun Yatsen’s Moral (Inter-)Nationalism 
Sun Yatsen’s career was less academic than Kang Youwei’s, his practical struggle for 
revolution left his thought scattered in speeches, letters, interviews, essays and books 
and even poems. All these utterances comprise what is now understood as his 
“thought”, “Sunyatsenism” or “Sunwenyisim” as in Dai Jitao’s (ưĭΜ) work about 
his thought immediately after Sun’s death 1925.  
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Sun Yatsen was born in 1866 in Guangdong province. He was introduced to the 
Classics at a young age. In 1879 he attended missionary schools in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
In 1885 he returned to China, moved to Hong Kong, and converted to Christianity. 
He studied medicine in Guangzhou and Hong Kong. 1894 sent a memorandum to Li 
Hongzhang on how to reform China, failed and left for Haiwaii to found the 
Xingzhong Hui ("V), the “Revive China Society”. The motto of the Xinzhong 
Hui was „Expel the Manchus, revive China, establish a unity government!“ (θͳΪ
̓Ɯď"ºŸʵÖTǎű) Around this time Sun Yatsen must have 
realised that Han nationalism did not enjoy significant support among the Han élites. 
“When [he] realized just how powerful the rival camp [the reformers, e.g. Kang 
Youwei] was, he gave in and adopted the broad concept of “greater Chinese 
nationalism”  (Zhao, 2006, pp. 22-23) 
Sun Yatsen was not a revolutionary in the Western sense of the word. When he was 
first termed a revolutionary (Ψç˩) in the Japanese press, he recognised the useful 
ambiguity of the term. For his Chinese audience it meant the end of the Mandate of 
the Qing. According to Wang Gung-wu,  “what most Chinese really understood was 
the idea that the Qing dynasty’s mandate was near its end and therefore the time had 
come to replace it.”  (Wang, 1993, p. 76) For his foreign audience it meant the 
replacement of the political system of China with a more progressive one. 
Because of a failed coup in 1895 Sun stayed in exile and was even kidnapped by Qing 
emissaries in London in 1896. Upon his release he left for Japan, where he was in the 
company of Chinese students, many of whom where critical of the state of China. In 
Japan, Sun formed his Pan-Asian thought opposing the “kingly way” (ɬ͹ wangdao) 
of the East, i.e. rule through moral precedent, to the “hegemonic way“ (Τ͹ badao) 
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of the West, i.e. rule through the exercise of violence. During this period, he 
supported the armed struggle for independence in the Philippines from American 
military administration.  (Chan, 1961, p. 105) Much later, in a speech to Japanese 
merchants in Kobe in 1924 he spoke of “Great Asianism” (8ˎ8%)).  (Duara, 
1997, p. 1038) 
In the preface to the first edition of the journal xin yaxiya (Ǚ8ˎ8, New Asia), the 
his secretary and major GMD-intellectual Dai Jitao (ưĭΜ) saw a link between the 
internal stability of China and its international moral purpose: 
“In order to reconstruct China, it is necessary to develop China’s border areas; 
in order to liberate the nationalities (minzu) of zhonghua, it is necessary to 
liberate the nationalities of the East alike”.  (Duara, 1997, p. 1040) 
Sun understood that Pan-Asianism could provide an alternative basis for solidarity 
with the non-Han. He adopted an understanding of the purpose of the Chinese 
revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China in this very context. For 
him, the independence of China was just a first stage in the great Chinese mission: 
1. Secure the independence of China 
2. Assist the small and weaker nations to gain their independence 
3. Establish the „Great Unity“  (Chin, 1982, p. 103) 
He elaborated on the second step in his 1920ies lectures: 
“Only if we ‘rescue the weak and lift up the fallen’ will we be carrying out the 
divine obligation of our nation. We must aid the weaker and smaller peoples 
and oppose the great powers of the world. If all the people of the country 
resolve upon this purpose, our nation will prosper; otherwise, there is no 
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hope for us. [...] Then we will be truly ‘governing the state and pacifying the 
world’” (Sun 1963@49) 
In 1905 Sun merged the Xingzhong Hui with other revolutionary groups in Japan 
into the Tongmeng Hui (×ʍV), the predecessor of the Guomindang (øȩ{).  
On October 20th 1905 Sun proposed his “Three Principles of the People” 
(sanminzhuyi ȩ%)) and publicized them at a speech in Tokyo in 1906.  (Chang & 
Gordon, 1991, p. 96)  
The three principles were have been generally translated as nationalism, democracy 
and socialism. According to Gregor and Chang, the Three Principles seemed 
revolutionary to the contemporary observer, but Sun only saw them as means to 
achieve the advancement of society in the terms of political Confucianism.  (Gregor 
& Chang, 1980, p. 402) 
1. Minzu zhuyi (ȩǜ%)), “Nationalism” or “people’s racialism” 
Sun considered the concept of “race” (minzu, ȩǜ) applied to China is equivalent to 
“nation”, whereas the virtues of political Confucianism are the defining threads 
holding the nation together.  (Chang & Gordon, 1991, p. 107) 
Sun lamented the sad state of the “national spirit” (minzujingshen ȩǜ˃ʣ), which 
decayed because of the corruption of the Qing dynasty and an overly open 
understanding of tianxia while neglecting the national essence. He said that “we must 
first recover our ancient morality” (Chang 1991@129) to restore the national spirit 
and envisioned four tasks to achieve this goal: (1) The restoration of “the eight 
virtues” (loyalty and filial devotion, then kindness and love, then faithfulness and 
justice, harmony and peace) (2) the restoration of traditional Confucian political 
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philosophy as laid down in the Classic “The Great Learning” (ēį, daxue) (3) The 
restoration of China’s ability for technical innovation (4) The learning from the West  
(Chi, 1986, pp. 76-78). Sun did not represent the establishment of the Chinese nation 
as the ultimate goal of his efforts, but rather as an essential step in the transitional 
period to the world of the Great Harmony.  (Gregor & Chang, 1980, p. 402) Sun 
portrayed the Great Harmony as the ultimate goal of all his all his struggled, his often 
quoted from the liyun chapter on datong the phrase tianxia wei gong (Ĕ$~), „all 
under heaven is ruled by a communal spirit”, as his personal slogan. The phrase also 
is the inscription on his mausoleum.  
2. Minquan (ȩǽ), “Democracy” or “people’s powerism” 
Sun quotes the Classics in asserting that democracy was an entirely Western concept, 
he, like present-day CCP theoreticians, asserted that the understanding of democracy 
is different, because the basic understanding of the relationship between society and 
the individual is different. Sun negates Rousseau as he did not believe the natural 
rights of every individual and their equality. But he saw democracy as a global trend, 
which was bound to arrive in China. Opposing this global development would only 
lead to civil war. Sun stated that the Western democracies arose from the need to 
deal with overly invasive governments, whereas the Chinese have had too much 
personal freedom, referring to traditional system of rural self-government in the 
China. Western democracy would not succeed, he had to think of a “Chinese” form 
of democracy suited to the establishment of order in China. Sun observed that 
already in the Zhou dynasty the Mandate of Heaven was nothing but the Mandate of 
the people. The zhou shu of the Book of Documents states: 
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Ĕ̤˸Ʈȩ̤Ĕß˸Ʈȩß 
Heaven sees what my people see, Heaven hears what my people hear. 
Sun tried to proved that in antiquity the rulers where sees as servants to the people as 
their mandate was to safeguard the wellbeing of the people29. 
3. Minsheng (ȩɷ), “Socialism” or “people’s livelihood” 
Socialism was understood as instrumental to “moral evolution’”  (Gregor & Chang, 
1980, p. 402) Martin Bernal suggested that Sun used the term shehui zhuyi, i.e. a 
modern term now in use for and literal translation of the term “socialism” two years 
before switching to the Classical term minsheng. For Sun, class struggle was not a 
cause for social progress and a means to achieve socialism, it is rather “a disease 
developed in the course of social progress”  (Chang & Gordon, 1991, pp. 116-117) 
He regarded true Communism as only not product of class struggle, but rather saw 
its definition in very familiar terms: 
Ǐȩɷ%)ŏǦʡV%)ÆØ=%)ÀǦē×%) 
The ancient minsheng zhuyi is nothing but socialism, another name would be 
communism, that is the doctrine of datong.  (Sun, 2006, p. 593) 
Sun travelled extensively to raise contributions from increasingly wealthy overseas 
Chinese – on grounds of pre-national, non-territorial discourse of community. 
Revolutionary republicans, like him or Hu Hanmin, were appalled by the absence of 
“Chinesesness” among the overseas “Chinese” except for their eagerness to receive 
                                                
29 In his lectures and articles he often referred to Mencius famous dictum „I have heard people say 
that the autocrat Zhou was killed, I have not heard the souveregin (jun) Zhou was killed.” (Β̴Ė
ˈʙǸΒŽÝ,) 
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Qing titles sold by the bankrupt Qing court. Lu Hun apparently remarked that only 
when he would have made them enough Chinese (zhongguohuale, "øµ0), they 
would cut off the queues, the traditional hairdo prescribed to Qing subjects.  (Duara, 
1997, pp. 1044-1045)  
Sun Yatsen was not directly involved in the Wuchang Uprising October 10th, 1911, 
which led to the final province-by-province renunciation of the Qing empire in 
southern China. He hastened back from the U.S. to China, where he had been 
elected provisional president of the republic. Sun passed the presidency to general 
Yuan Shikai to guarantee the abdication of the Xuantong emperor and the adherence 
of the northern province to the revolution. For Yuan, the republic was but a dynastic 
change, he proclaimed in 1914: 
„In ancient times the sovereigns governed the people in the name of Heaven. 
Such a sentiment corresponds exactly with the spirit of 
republicanism.“  (Williams, 1916, p. 271) 
With Yuan gradually aiming at establishing a dynasty under him as emperor, Sun 
participated at a failed revolt and had to seek refuge in Japan. In exile, he founded 
the Guomindang (øȩ{) together with Song Jiaoren (ĳǑD) to succeed the 
Tongmeng Hui in 1915. Sun, taking advantage of the weakness of the internationally 
recognised Beiyang government, returned to Guangdong and set up a provisional 
government.  
In 1919 Sun began to revise his Three Principles of the People particularly in regards 
to ethnic minority relations. Many of these papers were destroyed by a fire set by the 
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Guangdong military governor Chen Jiongming (Θɕǣ) in 1922. In 1924 Sun 
started giving a series of lectures on the Three Principles.  
In January 1923, the Joint Manifesto of Sun and Joffe set down the terms for cooperation 
between the Republic of China not yet unified under Sun and the Soviet Union. 
Another GMD-manifesto of the same month is it emblematic to the understanding 
of the Chinese nation and its ethnicities 
We shall continue to work for the integration of all the peoples of our 
country as a single Chinese nation. With the respect to the principle of the 
self-determination of peoples [...], we accept this principle as favourable to 
the development of all the peoples within the nation and we shall also work 
for recognized equality among the other peoples in the world. To achieve this 
goal, we must enforce universal education as a means to improvement of the 
cultural level of the whole nation.  (Kindermann, 1982, p. 85) 
Chinese sovereignty or at least suzerainty is not to be confused with occupation 
according to Sun: 
“In the past, when China was a major power, its Government had never 
intended to attack another country. Korea, e.g., was in a sense a vassal state of 
China. However, the Chinese Government left it more or less autonomous. 
In the last thousand years, China had merely offered Korea assistance. In 
contrast, Japan had only been a major power for 20 years at the time it 
occupied Korea. One can say, that the Chinese respect justice more so than 
the Japanese.”  (Chin, 1982, p. 101) 
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It seems clear that Sun has on the one hand embraces the multi-ethnic nature of the 
future Chinese “nation”, on the other hand he is also aware of president Wilson’s call 
for the self-determination of peoples/ethnicities, which is in obvious contradiction 
with any understanding of China other than the Han nation. Sun affirms Chinese 
sovereignty over all the peoples of China by reaffirms to moral responsibility of the 
Chinese state to “improve the cultural level” at its fringes.  
Shortly before his death in Beijing in 1925, Sun stated that all his thought was “a 
development and a continuation of the ancient Chinese doctrines of Confucius”.  
(Gregor & Chang, 1982, p. 55) Earlier in 1921 in a conversation with the 
representative of the Third International, Henk Sneevliet alias Maring, Sun is 
reported to have said:  
There is a continuous moral tradition in China beginning with the ancient 
sage-kings down to Confucius ... The foundation of my thought is simply a 
perpetuation of this tradition and an expansion of it”.  (Chi, 1986, p. 85) 
Shortly after his death Sun’s personal secretary Dai Jitao published The Philosophical 
Foundations of Sunyatsenism (īǖ%)*ëįąʝ). Tai had joined the Tongmeng 
Hui in Penang, Malaysia in 1910 in exile after having published editorials criticising 
the Qing government. As Sun’s personal secretary from 1912 to his death 1925, Dai 
must have been very familiar with the thought of „the father of the Chinese 
Republic“. Dai outlined how Sun’s thought originated in Confucian philosophy and 
roots in the moral standards of the Classics.  (Chang & Gordon, 1991, p. 127) 
Sun Yatsen’s success in the reform of political thought in China was in his realisation 
that “reviving Asian culture depends on the ability to absorb the new world culture 
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on the foundations of the old Asian culture.”  (Duara, 1997, p. 1042) He introduced 
the political thought-framework of Westphalia to China not in a colonial, subjected 
discourse, but rather used it in combination with the tianming imperial design 
discourse to create a vision, that was both understandable and appealing to his target 
audience, for their continued superiority and cultural-moral mission through the 
nationalist struggle.  
8.4. The 1958 “Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture” 
The New Confucian Movement (Ǚtįͦ¬) started in Beijing after the First 
World War and the May 4th Movement of 1919 as an challenging movement to the 
cultural iconoclasm and wholesale Westernisation of the early Communist and liberal 
movements. The Neo-Confucianism of the 20th century fashioned itself after the 
Confucian Revival of the Song dynasty (960-1279), Zhu Xi’s (ǻɝ ) then 
popularisation of Confucianism and the latter’s spread to Vietnam, Korea and Japan.  
(Tu, 2003, p. 265) The first-generation representatives Liang Shuming (ȐɏɌ), 
Xiong Shili (ɛ¸§), He Lin (͍π), Qian Mu (Έʮ) taught at Peking University, 
Feng Youlan (È) and Zhang Junmai (ƁÝ«, also known as Carsun Chang) at 
Tsinghua University in Beijing. Liang Shuming in his seminal work Eastern and 
Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (̠ǖµÇëį ) published in 1921 
suggests that the future world culture would be Chinese, because it leads the middle 
way between the Western extreme pursuit of the satisfaction of desires and the 
Indian negation of the self. Zhang Junmai, who had travelled to Europe with Liang 
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Qichao, condemned “scientism” en vogue in the post-May 4th era in a lecture in 1923 
and defended metaphysics as the just philosophical basis.  (Bresciani, 2001, pp. 13-15) 
These eminent scholars stood for the continuous validity of the Confucian 
worldview and propagated such thoughts in academies and journals until the 
Communist takeover led them all except Feng Youlan to exile to Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, India in the late 1940ies. 
In 1950 Qian Mu and Tang Junyi (ìÝȤ), a disciple of Xiong Shili, among others 
set up the New Asia College (Ǚ8.Κ) in 1950, founding college of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong.   
Among this circle of scholars30, the Manifesto to the World Concerning the Future of Chinese 
Culture was published in the January 1st, 1958 issue of the Hong Kong journal 
„Democratic Critique” (ȩ%̲̰). It came to be seen as the “Magna Charta of the 
whole New Confucian Movement”.  (Bresciani, 2001, p. 22) They summarised the 
Chinese political experience of the preceding decade and offered a Confucian 
alternative to complete Westernisation, Communism implied: 
ƮMÞ̩ʆŪȂ"øȩ%Ÿøͦ¬ȼ¬*ʔʔĘ͈ǮŖbɞƻ
"øʇ"øBĊɾBĊǘĘǴƮM<Þ̩"øǖµș
ûɷʄʄ˹ɷ̯ĒěƆƚɥ*͐ʅ˺ĘÅ0ÄƆ\ʄBH
ǱȼʇɷçƮM̡ȶʄx̡˰ĸʄBɷç*Īû˵qĸʄB
Ţȝ (Zhang, Tang, Mou, & Xu, 1958, p. 5) 
                                                
30 The Manifesto was jointly signed by Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi and two other disciples of Xiong 
Shili, Mou Zongsan (ɡĶ) and Xu Fuguan (Ƌď̢) 
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We do not deny, that the commotions of the movement for the construction 
of a democratic Chinese State of the last hundred years have led to failure and 
have repeatedly disappointed the Chinese and international personalities who 
cherish China. We also do not deny that the Chinese culture is a state of 
sickness, the disease has led to the appearance of many wicked superfluous 
elements, and has led [the Chinese culture] to lose its original form. 
Nonetheless a sick man is still endowed with life. In order to cure him, we 
have to ascertain whether or not the sick is still alive. We cannot wrongly 
assume that a sick man is dead. 
For the authors, the Confucian moral cultivation (k) provided a basis not only for 
the fulfilment of people’s inner true nature, but also a basis for a heartfelt compliance 
to ethical norms leading to stable, flourishing societies.  
Interestingly, around the same time even in the People’s Republic of China, the 
societal advantages of the propagation of Confucian moral cultivation was discussed 
in academic conferences and papers.  (Kindermann, 1963, p. 60) 
The alternative development model of the Neo-Confucians served to explain the 
rapid industrialisation and economic development in East Asia and eventually 
Southeast Asia. For Berger and Hsia in their 1988 study on the very Asian 
development model, “the claim of Confucian ethics, as reflected in government 
leadership, competitive education, a disciplined work forces, principles of equality 
and self-reliance and self-cultivation, provides a necessary background and powerful 
motivating force for the rise of industrial East Asia.” (quoted in  (Tu, 2003, p. 8)) 
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Singapore has been a case in point ever since two reports31 dating from 1979 
reshaped the tortuous identity statement of the Singaporean government from 
cosmopolitan - British-Malay-Chinese - towards a cosmopolitan  - predominantly 
Chinese – statement. “Asian values” and the Confucian ethos, its community-first 
governance and “sage” -centred politics (ÝĨ, junzi), have since become openly 
dominant in Singaporean State and People’s Action Party discourse.  (Tan, 2003, p. 
763) 
The “Shared Values White Paper”, issued in 1991, stated in this regard 
The concept of government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do 
right for the people and who have the trust and respect of the population, fits 
us better than the Western idea that a government should be given as limited 
powers as possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless 
proven otherwise.  (Tan, 2003, p. 764) 
Neo-Confucians thus provided an alternative path with native answers to the 
pressures of Western modernisation along Talcott Parsons’ three dimensions (market 
economy, democratic polity, individualism) and the symbolic resources to go that 
path, which most obviously served well the ruling élites in industrial East Asia since 
the 1960ies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) and in socialist 
East Asia (China, Vietnam and to some extent North Korea) since the 1980ies.  (Tu, 
2000, pp. 200-204) 
 
 
                                                
31 “Goh Keng Swee education report” (Education Study Team, Report on the Ministry of Education, 
1978) and the “Ong Teng Cheong moral education report” (Moral Education Committee, Report on 
Moral Education, 1979)  
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9. The People’s Republic’s Moral Order 
9.1. The Great Unity in the Early Thought of Mao Zedong 
Mao Zedong (ȧȹ), was born in 1893 in Shaoshan, Hunan province. He read the 
works of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in his youth and read a Tongmeng Hui. 
He later portrays himself as to have taken great interest in the communal theories of 
Hong Xiuquan (Ⱥʥ}), the founder of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the 
middle of the 19th century, at an early age. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 
advocated a idiosyncratic version of the Great Unity theory, which combined 
Christian beliefs with the native Chinese datong concept. Hong’s ideal society was 
fashioned according to the principle tianxia yijia, gongxiang taiping (ĔŁ?
ĕũ), “all under Heaven is one family, relish together the Ultimate Peace” Hong 
spelled out his vision in The Land System of the Heavenly Kingdom (Ĕǵɹ>£Ŵ) in 
1853 
Ǳɹ×˫Ǳδ×γǱ̙×ʳǱΈ×bǝčý³ǝBε
Ǫ  (Bi, 2008, p. 24) 
The fields are commonly worked on, the meals are commonly eaten, the 
money is commonly used, nowhere are there disparities, no person is not 
sufficiently fed and warmed.  
In his late youth he read translations of Western literature such as Darwin’s The 
Origin of Species, Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, Huxley, Miller, Spencer, Montesquieu 
and Rousseau. At the age of 20 he started receiving education in the Chinese Classics 
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and Neo-Confucianism at the Hunan Fourth Middle School in Changsha, the 
provincial capital. He was introduced to Chen Duxiu’s (Θɨʥ) magazine La Jeunesse 
(ǙΥŪ) in 1915 and established a preference to the writings of Chen and Li 
Dazhao (Ǿē·), both considered the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist 
Party as well as Hu Shi (˴ͱ).  
In 1971 Mao recalled, 
Ʈ̻0ŪĩĖĨʇ.Æ̻0Ū͏ǹ%)ʇ.¢ 1918 Ūƴ̻
η%) (Xia & Du, 2010, p. 79) 
 I’ve read the books of Confucius for six years, I’ve read capitalist books for 
seven years, and only by 1918 I started studying Marxism and Leninism.  
It seems that already his thoughts had been revolving around the Great Unity 
concept before being introduced to Marxism and Leninism, in one letter to his friend 
Li Jinxi (ςΌɜ) in 1917 he wrote, 
ē×˩ǝB*ξ,  (Zhang, 2006, p. 19) 
We all look eagerly forward to the coming of the Great Unity. 
After being introduced to Li by his teacher Yang Changji (ȃǢȿ), he travelled to 
Beijing to raise funds for revolt in his home province Hunan and too an 
administrative job at the library of Peking University in Beijing in 1918. One year 
later, Mao returned to Hunan via Qufu, paying homage at the Confucius shrine, and 
brought along the new ideas od Marxism and started publishing a weekly called the 
Xiang River Commentaries (ɊȰ̲̰) to eulogize the Russian October Revolution, 
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which was soon banned by local authorities.  (Lynch, 2006, p. 43) He called for a 
„doctrine of the common people“ (ũȩ%)), a socialist doctrine to “overthrow all 
kinds of power [...] including power in the international realm”, the prime function of 
which was to cope with Japanese aggression.  (Ip, 1994, p. 37) 
On December 1st 1919, he published an article in the “Hunan Education Monthly” 
(ɉ¼Ǒ˱ǰ) with the title The Work of the Students (įɷ*ŝa) called for the 
adoption of “new villagism” (Ǚǿ%)) as in the atarashiki-mura (“new village”) 
utopian commune set up by Saneatsu Mushanokji one year earlier in Japan. This 
commune is a Kibbutz-like intentional community, still existing in two Japanese 
locations.   
In 1920 Mao travelled again to Beijing. The same year he read The Communist 
Manifesto for the first time upon the recommendation of his friend Cai Hesen (̑è
ȓ). In a letter to Cai in January 1921 he said to have accepted that the Marxist 
revolutionary path was the only way forward in China.  
The Chinese Communist Party was founded in July 1921 in Shanghai. Mao had set 
up two Communist groupings in Hunan, the „Socialist Youth League“ (ʡV%)Υ
Ūõ) and the „Hunan Self-Study University“ (ɉ¼˸kēį). Mao attended the 
founding meeting of the CCP in Shanghai upon invitation of Li Dazhao.  (Lynch, 
2006, pp. 49-50) 
18 years of armed struggle later, on June 30th, 1949, shortly before the proclamation 
of the People’s Republic on October 1st, Mao delivered a speech delineating his 
vision of the mandate of the CCP titled On the Democratic Dictatorship of the People. He 
directly mentioned Kang Youwei’s ideal it: 
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˒ͥBȩèø¢ͤʡV%)è=%)¢ͤΕˊʇɁɓèɾʇ
ē×ŶǱ$0ē×.JȳǱ,Ñ˵Ʒ¢ȁ¢ͤē×ʇ
͘͏=ΕˊʇèøđøǱͥʇ"ø˵Ǳô$"øǦÌŤ
ø%)ÂͭʇøŁíʇ͘Ǧ˒ͥŝBΕˊΰņʇBȩèø  (Bi, 
2008, p. 25) 
[we will] through the People’s Republic reach Socialism and Communism, 
achieve the elimination of classes and the datong of the world. When Kang 
Youwei wrote „The Book on Great Unity“, he did not and could not find a 
path towards the Great Unity. Foreign countries may be capitalist class 
republics; China cannot be one, because China is country that suffered under 
the imperialism. The only way [to reach the Great Unity] is through the 
People’s Republic under the leadership of the working class. 
Chinese orthodox historiography tends to stress the universal validity of Marxism-
Leninism and its “scientific” philosophy void of traditional, “feudal” Chinese 
heritage. This view is only very recently being challenged in Chinese publications, 
such as Zhang (2006), Guan (2009), Xia (2010) and Dong (2011), which refer to the 
essentially Confucian idea of the Great Unity as „traditional socialism“. 
Zhang Lanying’s (2006) study in regards concludes that  
X˗ʡV%)ÑL͵ͥηzƗ%)ʇǀņ˗}øBȩʇƧƐ͵
ͥ={ʇΰņˍˏ}øBȩ̖ͪʡV%)Ÿ̱ūƆƭʡV¬ä
§ (Zhang, 2006, p. 19) 
“Traditional socialism” was able to unite the people’s aspirations of the whole 
nation through the guidance of Marxism; through the leadership of the CCP, 
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it organised the people of the whole nation to build socialism and constitutes 
a driving force of social mobilisation.”  
These recent Chinese publications generally view the influence of traditional thought 
on Mao as positive and conducive to his later adoption of communism. Bi 
Guoming’s (2008) CCP Party School journal study agrees, but also claims that the 
excesses of the Great Leap Forward (1958) and the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) to Mao’s impatience in the advent of the Great Unity.  (Bi, 
2008, p. 26)  
Nick Knight’s study (1996) sees Mao openly embracing the datong concept with a 
initially positive outlook towards the future. The CCP’s struggle, in Knight’s 
understanding of Mao’s worldview, developed according to the Marxist five-stage 
periodization of history as well as according to the classical sanshi periodization of the 
new-text Confucian gongyang School. According to Knight, after the 1950ies the 
mentioning of the realization of Communism, i.e. the Great Unity, assumed a hollow 
“ritualistic character”.  (Knight, 1996) 
Of course, the ideological causes for the disastrous policies of the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution are much more complex than Bi’s analysis and 
Knight does not answer the question of why, even if Mao’s references to the Great 
Unity were but ritualistic, it continued to be evoked and motivated millions of people 
to previously unheard of sacrifices and crimes. Nevertheless Bi’s recent assertion 
might lead to more research in the field as emotional distance to these events slowly 
takes hold.  
9.2. The Sinification of Marxism 
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Orthodox CCP history identifies the May 4th Movement (7òͦ¬) as its moment 
of spiritual birth, when on May 4th 1919 students and workers in Beijing and major 
cities demonstrated against the Versailles Treaty’s provisions on China. The May 4th 
movement was a larger cultural movement as a collective search for a new identity 
for China in a time political and cultural disintegration. The classical teachings had to 
be replaced by Western science, the collectivist approach to society was abandoned 
by some young authors and for the first time individual feelings took the prime space 
in literature, modernity was searched in the West and through it China to be 
fundamentally changed. For Benjamin Schwartz, the May 4th intellectuals were 
particularly receptive to Marxism because of its Western origin and it yet being 
critical to the state of Western societies. For Dirlik, initial interest in socialism gave 
birth, which after the frustrations of political suppression radicalised into increased 
receptivity to the Bolshevik model and anarchism.  (Ip, 1994, p. 34) 
Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the CCP, was one of the forerunners of the 
New Culture Movement (Ǚǖµͦ¬), he proclaimed: 
„some people charge us with the crime of destruction: the destruction of 
Confucianism, ritual, national essence, chastity, the established social and 
familial relationships, traditional art and religion, the literary heritage, and 
finally, the existing political system. We admit the charge but still insist that 
we are innocent. It is our love for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science that leads 
to these towering crimes.  (Ip, 1994, p. 35) 
The early Chinese communism of the 1920ies was considered a “scientific” 
philosophy simply reflecting the forces of production and the unchangeable 
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development in history towards true communism by means of class struggle. 
Evolutionary theory and class struggle were the “scientific” basis for change in China, 
Confucianism was but a symptom of a “feudal” society. As Lu Xun, a literary 
protagonist of the 20th century, wrote a year before the May 4th Movement, the old 
teachings are emblematic of a “man-eating” society. In his Diary of a Madman he 
called upon his compatriots to “save the children”.  
Still, 19 years after the May 4th Movement, the then unrivalled leader of the CCP, 
Mao Zedong, called for the “Sinification of Marxism” (ηzƗ%)"øµ). This 
seems like a complete abjuration of the founding values of the Communist Party of 
China, namely to incorporate, in Marxian terms, elements of the superstructure of 
the previous historical stage into the present stage.  
Raymond F. Wylie traced the development of the term to Chen Boda’s writings and 
Mao himself. Chen Boda (ΘZͤ) joined the CCP in 1927 and became a key 
ideological thinker when he joined the communist government in Yan’an ten years 
later shaping the Chinese orthodox understanding of communism before the 
establishment of the People’s Republic. He was in a leading position during the early 
period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, eventually purged and then did 
not participate in public life until his death in 1989.  (Wylie, 2006) 
Sinification, according to Wylie, has to be understood in two ways: politically and 
culturally.  
Politically, it refers to the ways in which the foreign theory of Marxism-Leninism is 
adapted to the Chinese socio-political conditions, such as the absence of a large-scale 
urban proletariat, the dominant role of the peasantry.  
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More relevant to this thesis is the cultural dimension, the perceived need to reconcile 
the foreign ideas with what Chinese intellectuals at the time called the “national 
essence” (ø˂).  (Wylie, 2008, p. 180) 
Chen argued in 1936 that Marxists, while considering himself being one, should 
criticise themselves for failing in providing a systematic critique of China’s old 
political thought, i.e. political Confucianism, and for not integrating Marxist theory in 
the political practise in China. For Chen, it was necessary “to defend the best 
traditions in Chinese culture”.  The theory of Marxism-Leninism combined with the 
practise of “the best traditions” would lead to an enriched, superior form of Marxism.   
(Wylie, 2008, pp. 182-183) This assumption contradicts the understanding of 
universal validity in of the “scientific” philosophy he was taught in Moscow and 
could be seen as the ancient attempt of assuming cultural superiority, even though in 
the “form” of Marxism-Leninism. Chen states that 
The real task of our philosophy is to transform the world, but in our present 
circumstances the task of our philosophy is to serve the defence of the 
motherland. Our philosophy, which will liberate all mankind, but at the same 
time it is also the present patriotic philosophy of us Chinese people. Our new 
philosophy is not abstract dogma [...] it becomes the guide of every 
progressive cause.  (Wylie, 2008, p. 184) 
Mao Zedong, probably without being aware of Chen Boda’s thought at the time, 
stated in 1937 that Leninism is but the union of Marxist theory and Russian practise. 
But Leninism is not simply their combination, but rather an advancement of Marxist 
theory. China does necessitate a union of Marxist theory and Chinese practise to 
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further elevate Marxism-Leninism.  (Wylie, 2008, p. 184) For Mao, Chinese practise 
did not necessarily equate the native political thought, but rather reflected conditions 
on the “battleground” of the class struggle and was in line with those who wanted 
the Chinese traditional thought extinguished. Mao, Wylie assumes, changed his stand 
on this issue because of Chen Boda, who in Yan’an soon became his political 
secretary. For Chen, a new theory that would combine the theory of Marxism-
Leninism with Chinese reality, i.e. discourse, was a the foundation to “establish a 
living relationship between Marxism and Chinese culture, make Marxism more 
acceptable to the average Chinese person – and very importantly – symbolize China’s 
cultural independence from the West”  (Wylie, 2008, p. 193) Mao used the concept 
of Sinification of Marxism to attack his rival Wang Ming and the Returned Students 
sticking to their Russian teachers’ culture-void interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in 
the 6th Plenum of the 6th National Congress of the CCP in October 1938. In his 
report to the 6th Plenum he said 
į-ƮMʇÁÓͺ=ɸηzƗ%)ʇǚȷ˕Lƶʇƛ˓FĔ
ʇ"øǦÁÓʇ"ø*ÊŕƮMǦηzƗ%)ʇÁÓ%)˩Ʈ
Mů̸¦ǘÁÓIĩĖĨ͹ī"ŗƮMů̸Lƛ˓ƮM̡˘Ƹ
ͩRɰĺʇͺ= (Wylie, 2006, p. 59) 
We have to study our historical heritage, use the method of Marxism to 
critically combine it. Today’s China is a development of the historical China. 
We are the historicists of Marxism. We should not separate history. We 
should combine [the development of political thought] from Confucius to 
Sun Yatsen. We should continue to recognise this precious heritage.  
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Mao copied the term zhongguohua from a newspaper article Chen wrote in July 1938 
in which he said that communism is not a foreign idea. For Chen, communism 
is something which has been dreamed of for several thousands of years by the 
most outstanding representatives of our nation. Mozi, one of our country’s 
ancient philosophers [...] used to dream of this society.  (Wylie, 2008, p. 194) 
Chen Boda thus laid the ideological groundwork for a much more widespread appeal 
of the CCP among the urban intelligentsia just was well as under the rural élite than 
ever could have happened with a culturally-void interpretation of Marxism-Leninism 
in this crucial years of the takeover of all of China; those who call for communism 
were satisfied with these words as they read it in terms of the first stage of Lenin’s 
understanding of the two-stage revolution (“Democracy and Narodism in China”, 
published in 1912) those who feared the loss of Chinese identity had a hope to cling 
to as Japanese troops ravaged through the coastal cities and the GMD’s hold on 
power increasingly saw itself weakened.  (Van der Kroef, 1962, p. 23) The term 
“Sinification” was although soon dismissed as “non-scientific” and replaced with a 
new term “Mao Zedong thought” (ȧȹƗƦ), stressing its Chinese provenance.  
(Wylie, 2006, p. 61) 
Arthur F. Wright published as early as 1953 his views of the use of symbols in 
Modern China, in which he observed that „the Chinese Communists, in their bid for 
power, played upon Chinese longings for a community-wide synthesis of values and 
institutions; they suggested that Marxism-Leninism alone offered a basis on which 
such a synthesis could be creates. They reinforced this appeal by claiming for a 
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Communist order the same universality that Chinese had for centuries claimed for  
their Confucian synthesis of institutions and values.  (Wright, 1953, pp. 31-32) 
Wu Yuzhang (áɫʸ), early Communist and later first dean of People’s University 
in Beijing, wrote in his memoirs that 
ʡV%).ˀƲǆ˔ʇBBũʻɁɓ͊ʱʇͫēɲƦēēüσ˾0Ʈ
bƮˮƦ͔ī"ŗxɷnņʇȩ%)è"øÏKɾē×į̹Ʋ
Ǳͩ9̠ûƮ˶Ĩ΃;ˏƭ0ŧǸȂʡV˥ġͫǩ (Zhang, 
2002/2005, p. 19) 
The far-reaching ideal of the equality of all men etc., the eradication of 
poverty which has been described in the socialist books inspired me 
profoundly, it reminded me of the Three Principles of the People advocated 
by Mr Sun Yatsen and the theory of the Great Unity of the world in the 
ancient China, all these things woven together in my brain created a beautiful 
prospect for the future of society.  
One therefore has to disagree with the thesis that the advent of the People’s 
Republic of China signified the final formal death warrant to political Confucianism. 
The imaginary of the Great Unity, its moral mission remained central to the political 
discourse. The violent class struggle substituted the gradual harmonisation of societal 
relations as the means of getting there, but the ultimate goal was a native and familiar 
one. One thus has to negate Dirlik’s thesis that   
[Confucianism] had articulated the interests of the “feudal” ruling class. It 
would, therefore, inevitably die a natural death as China became capitalist and 
communist, [...] Confucianism could be preserved as a mark of Chinese 
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national identity, but only in its relegation to a condemned past.  (Dirlik, 1995, 
pp. 230-231) 
Another striking aspect is how orthodoxy was maintained by the same means. Mao 
Zedong perceived the accepted role of a sovereign ideology, namely political 
Confucianism, in imperial China and how this sovereignty was perpetuated.  
He once said: 
“Even if the importance of material incentive is recognized it is never the sole 
principle. There is always another principle, namely, spiritual inspiration from 
political ideology.”  (Ling, 1994, p. 398) 
The fundamental role education in élite recruitment was maintained with 
indoctrination. All aspiring bureaucrats had to be fully indoctrinated in the official 
orthodoxy before government service and to this day, although in a hollowed form, 
still have to.  
The CCP changed thus changed the official zhonghua State-orthodoxy to Marxism-
Leninism, but it retained the ideological role of education. Ling notes “The CCP, 
however, exceeds its imperial predecessors by instituting ‘political secretariats’ and 
ideological ‘study groups’ in all walks of Chinese life.”  (Ling, 1994, p. 398) 
9.3. Leadership among the World’s Oppressed Peoples  
According to the late Sinologist Albert Feuerwerker, “the primary role [‘of the 
ideology of the Maoist ecumene’] is akin to that of the Confucian tribute system 
ideology of old; that is, as a source of legitimacy for the rulers of the P.R.C. within 
their nation and among the communist nations and communist parties of the world. 
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The ability to describe external events for this audience in terms that seem to 
endorse the infallibility of the Maoist leadership is of some consequence for securing 
domestic support for the genuinely ideological program of reshaping Chinese society.”  
(Feuerwerker, 1972, p. 10) Foreign policy was used, according to Feuerwerker’s 
analysis, as a tool for generating internal legitimacy. The idea, if universally valid, had 
to be universally spread.  
Feuerwerker identified a list of the five factors of foreign policy up to the 1970ies in 
decreasing order of importance: 
1. Nationalism 
2. The politics of the International Communist movement 
3. China’s domestic politics 
4. Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology 
5. A strategic imagery based on a traditional spatial-ideological world order 
 (Feuerwerker, 1972, p. 5) 
Earlier, in 1959, Dai Sheng-yu saw three factors: 
1. The cultural confidence of the imperial Chinese tradition 
2. The psychological energy of modern Chinese nationalism 
3. The political aggressiveness of contemporary Chinese Communism  
 (Dai, 1959, p. 112) 
Of course, the foreign policy of the young People’s Republic, formally founded on 
October 1st 1949, was strongly constrained by economic and security considerations. 
Imminent security considerations led to military action in Korea in 1950. The need 
for economic and technological recovery and advancement pushed towards the 
Leaning towards one side support of late Stalin’s Soviet Union. But these pragmatic 
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policies with profound internal impact had to be explained at home in a way that the 
pragmatic actions were justified and the mandate of the CCP strengthened. While 
Feuerwerker’s list is a valid enumeration, the list distracts from the most important 
apparant contraction in early PRC foreign policy: One the one hand, territorial 
sovereignty had to be upheld as the most precious good of the state once unification 
had been achieved. On the other hand, the governing élite had to stick to the deeply 
felt moral mission civilisatrice of its own ideological superiority. This mission derived 
both from socialist worker solidarity (“Long live the unity between the peoples of the 
world!” still inscribed on the Tian’anmen of the Forbidden City in Beijing) and from 
the traditional Great Unity ideal.  
The discourse within China in regards to its early foreign affairs, i.e. “United Front”, 
the “spread of the revolution” etc., is to understand how the non-Westphalian 
civilizational understanding of world order adapted itself and thus survived if not in 
literal content, but at least in the subjective understanding of the framework (i.e. the 
“self” and the “other”) and ultimate goal.  
The framework had become more complicated than ever before, because now two 
separate understandings of the self had emerged. One according to ethnic terms, 
whereas the Overseas Chinese or huaqiao (ºd) had to be included into the Chinese 
cultural (thus political) community and one according to ideological terms, whereas 
the suppressed proletariat in all nations had to be included into the Communist 
ideological (thus political) community.  
Pragmatist decisions and a differentiated approach solved the conundrum.  
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The differentiated approach has to be understood in a distinction drawn between 
dominion in terms of territorial monopoly of force and dominion in terms of identity, 
be that ideological and/or ethnical.   
In regards to dominion in terms of territorial monopoly of force, the early 
Communist government had to dispel fears among its neighbours on the questions 
of unsettled border demarcations and claims of sovereignty by China.  
In regards to dominion in terms of identity, the early Communist government had to 
dispel fears (1) among the South East Asian countries with large Chinese minorities 
such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and Vietnam on its influence on the latter 
and (2) among the third world in general on the Chinese support for communist 
insurgencies.  
While addressing those fears to establish sustainable foreign relations, the early PRC 
government had to portray itself assertive in terms of safeguarding the territorial 
integrity of the Chinese state and in a leadership role among those it considered part 
of the “self”, i.e. overseas Chinese in ethnical terms and foreign communist rebels in 
ideological terms. The early foreign policy of the PRC is to be seen as the learning 
period of PRC on how to act within the Westphalian system while at the same time 
addressing the necessities of its inherited worldview pervaded by political 
Confucianism. Upon suggestions by the CCP Southern Bureau to establish 
“institutions specifically in charge of international propaganda” (ŸʵΎ̈́͆øΖ
ļXʇǼ), a first Directive from the Chinese Communist Central Committee regarding 
Foreign Relations Work (""ė5đ;ŝaʇǀʟ) was issued in August 1944 
in the Yan’an revolutionary base. It stressed that the initial focus of diplomatic 
efforts  
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ůǍûƵēƮMʇƈê2ËøΖÖaΧ (Yang, 2010, p. 64) 
should be on the expansion of international impact and the attainment of 
foreign cooperation.  
It continued, “the word of diplomacy started with the internationalizing of our 
united front” and “the domestic united front policy can be transplanted onto the 
word of establishing the international united front”(quoted in  (Yang, 2009, p. 131)) 
The revolutionary policy was officially redrafted in 1949. In regards relevant to this 
thesis, State Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi (ŋě) held a speech on the direction of 
Chinese foreign policy at the Asia Committee Conference of the World Workers’ 
Council (ɾŝBɲ3V8ȻĦäVV̬) in Beijing  
Ô Ð 8 Ȼ  ¾ Ŵ ǋ ͽ ø Ł ˜ ɽ ¾ Ŵ ¾ŴŐ̠8 ηȂ
8ʻøʇŝBΕˊ~Ź̖ͪÉńŤø%)ʇȜ̟Ǘ2 (Yang, 2010, p. 
68) 
calling upon the working class of Indochina, Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaya 
etc. to openly carry out armed struggle against imperialism. 
In one of many similar statements Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) Luo Ronghuan (ˢ̉Ȏ) reportedly stated in October 1950 that „the world 
relies on the thought of Mao Zedong [... which] belongs not only to China but also 
has its international implications. Accordingly, Marshal Yejing declared, “the nations 
which have not yet been liberated also want to overthrow imperialism and feudalism 
[...] and to wage armed struggle. They very much need our experience. Therefore, we 
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should sum up our experience [...] to present it to our friends.  (Tang, 2000, pp. 329-
330) 
In the early 1950s the PRC government established nearly two dozen internationally 
oriented “people’s organizations” such as the Chinese People’s Association for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries ("øBȩńđÈġ»V), the Chinese 
People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs ("øBȩđ;įV) etc., which brought a 
steady stream of foreign cultural delegations.32   
The PRC government also established the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs 
(ºd3ªĦäV) in 1949. The institution still exists as the Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office (øªΚdª¨~Ľ) as an organ of the State Council to this day, 
asserting its claims of dominion/responsibility over these overseas minorities.  (Buss, 
1951, pp. 211-212) 
When Stalin died in 1953 and the Soviets introduced a more moderate stance of 
“peaceful coexistence” in the third world, the Chinese leadership had to rethink its 
own direction or face isolation. The Chinese stance at the Geneva Conference in 
1954 on the fate of French Indochina and the Korean Peninsula showed a turn in 
Chinese strategy. China disbanded overseas Chinese Communist associations and 
urged overseas Chinese to seek citizenship in their countries of residence.  (Yang, 
2009, p. 138) This new policy line was repeated at the Bandung Conference in 1955. 
The declaration of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, or Pancha Sila as 
first advocated by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, were wholeheartedly 
                                                
32 By 1956, the Beijing government claimed to have developed cultural ties with 75 countries, more 
countries than have recognised the Communist government.  (Dai, 1959, p. 118) 
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embraced by Zhou Enlai in the wake of the Conference. China, ever since, vocally 
supported the principles as the basis of its foreign relations: 
• Mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity (6ʏŉ
΄%ǽèΰùĴǕ) 
• Mutual non-aggression (6eɤ) 
• Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs (6Ũɂǎ) 
• Equality and mutual benefit (ũʻ6 ) 
• Peaceful co-existence (èũč) 
Beijing in embracing the above principles tried to put itself at the helm of a “morally” 
oriented Third World fighting imperialist oppression and in contrast to the 
imperialists respecting the self-determination of peoples. Friendship treaties and 
border agreements were portrayed in China as emblematic of the generous leadership 
of China among those on the right side of history.  
At the very same time Mao Zedong denounced the Khrushchev’s understanding of 
peaceful coexistence, stating that “without the eradication of imperialism or the total 
elimination of the bourgeoisie’s rule, then there cannot be world peace”  (Yang, 2009, 
p. 139). In his inauguratory speech of the 8th CCP National Congress in 1956, he said 
8ȻΦȻèƽ˥ȻÕøʇȩǜɨʵ̦Ǎͦ¬LÇɾø
Łʇèũͦ¬èș)Ǘ2ƮM΁Ǝέ˕LʫȄʇǋƿ 
We must give active support to the national independence liberation 
movement in countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as to the 
peace movement and to just struggles in all countries throughout the world. 
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Thus the Chinese government contributed 6 % of its annual expenditure to aid 
revolutionary insurgencies such as in Vietnam, Afghanistan and even Albania. The 
material and financial aid to the Indonesian Communist Party led to the escalation of 
its relations with the government in Jakarta and its annihilation in 1965 by the 
military junta.  (Yang, 2009, p. 142) In Burma, one of the first countries to recognize 
the PRC, China worked through the Democratic League to advance its interests. In 
the Malayan Federation, the Communist Party of Malaya received active support by 
China, its membership being predominantly ethnically Chinese. In the Philippines, 
China reportedly assisted and directed operations in the Hukbalahap rebellion.  (Buss, 
1951, pp. 204-209) 
In 1952, China fought India over disputed Arunachal Pradesh. China was not willing 
to accept the MacMahon line as the border demarcation, even though China 
accepted it with its border agreement with Bhutan. Of course, Indian influence in 
Tibet after the Dalai Lama’s refuge to Dharamsala played a role in the conflict. The 
repression of the 1959 uprising in Tibet, the increasingly aggressive rhetoric of the 
CCP leadership and an actual war with the other great Third World power India 
undoubtedly diminished the PRC’s “moral” credibility in the Third World and its 
guidance by the “Bandung spirit”. Zhou Enlai toured Africa in 1963-64 calling for 
revolutions in the continent stressing China’s ties with the recently decolonised 
native leaderships such as in Uganda, Burundi, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. A meeting 
of the heads of states of francophone African states in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in 
1965 denounced the subversive influence of unnamed foreign powers in Africa, 
obvioulsy directed at Chinese involvement in the internal power wrangling in 
Brazzaville-Congo, Burundi, Cameroon and Ghana.  (Vahlefeld, 1970, p. 287) The 
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same year, the massacre leading to the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist 
Party strained the relations between Indonesia, the host country of the Bandung 
Conference, and China. At the same time, negotiations for a follow-up conference to 
Bandung in Algiers failed because of Chinese insistence on the exclusion of the 
Soviet Union.  (Vahlefeld, 1970, p. 287) 
China failed to assume its leadership of the Third World countries because it had to 
follow internal pressures to continually project itself in a “moral” world leadership 
position. The radicalisation continued unabated with the beginnings of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In a landmark speech “Long Live the Victory of the 
People’s War“ commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the fight against the 
Japanese invasion, Marshal Lin Biao (ȆƇ) said in 1965, 
"øBȩΨçƯ2ʇ˳  [...] gͪ0ÕøBȩʇΨçͦ¬IȚ8
ȻΦȻèƽ˥Ȼʇȩǜ̦Ǎͦ¬ͪ|!ǙʇÁÓǡǶ (Wang, 
2003, p. 162) 
The Victory of the People’s Revolutionary War advanced the revolutionary 
movements of the peoples of every country. Since then, the peoples’ 
liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America entered a new 
historical stage.  
In the month of the official start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, May 
1966, Lin Biao stated that “Chairman Mao commands the highest prestige in the 
nation and the whole world”  (Bridgham, 1971, p. 333) The directives issued on May 
16th 1966 revealed that the main source of “revisionism” was to be located in the 
highest levels of party leadership. Diplomatic staff was called back to China from all 
diplomatic missions except the embassy in Cairo to undergo ideological training. The 
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Foreign Minister, Chen Yi (ΘȤ), had to undergo several sessions of public self-
criticism in front of masses of Red Guards. Mao decided to „revolutionize foreign 
affairs“, i.e. to convert China’s embassies into propaganda centres for spreading the 
Cultural Revolution abroad. A Communiqué adopted in August by the CCP Central 
Committee emphasised that “China’s foreign policy” would be guided by the 
“supreme principle” of “proletarian internationalism” (ǝ=ΕˊøΖ%)). Chen 
Yi, after several sessions of public self-criticism, issued a directive in March 1967 
ordering diplomatic staff „to cooperate with the youth and propagante Mao’s 
thought with every possible means, legitimate and secret“.  (Bridgham, 1971, p. 337) 
Bridgham notes that the radicalisation of foreign policy during the Cultural 
Revolution did not have the anticipated effect in the Third World, but, if any, 
influenced the student demonstrations in Europe and Japan. Chinese observers 
hyped the effect of the radical influence of Maoism on foreign students, which were 
praised in mass demonstrations all over China. This is to show that the „export“ of 
Maoism only served to prove the validity of the radical turn in domestic politics. The 
already mentioned study of Bi Guoming (2008) shows that only very recently 
Chinese observers have started explaining the justifications of the Cultural 
Revolution as then misunderstandings or contortions of traditional Chinese thought. 
For Bi, Mao succumbed to impatience in the realisation of the Great Unity.  (Bi, 
2008, p. 26) While the more pragmatic power struggle considerations provide much 
stronger arguments explaining Mao and the CCP élite behaviour at the time, it seems 
revealing how the spread of a moral “culture” to “barbarians” was used and 
understood by these Red Guards smashing all that’s old as a legitimate reflection of 
their right cause.  
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Very soon it became apparent that this kind of foreign policy was not sustainable in 
the long run and was a great risk. The more legitimising capital was put in 
“proletarian internationalism”, the more delusion the visible failure of the latter 
would cause in the domestic context. In 1969, Lin Biao relativized the previous 
foreign policy characterized mainly by “proletarian internationalism” in his report to 
the 9th CCP Nation Congress. He listed three „interrelated and 
indivisible“ principles of Chinese foreign policy: (1) proletarian internationalism”, (2) 
support for the revolutionary struggle of oppressed peoples, (3) peaceful co-existence 
according to the pancha sila with countries with different social systems.  (Bridgham, 
1971, p. 344) This return to the old bifurcated line of reasoning, i.e. exporting yet 
non-interfering, allowed for much more flexible approach to international issues and 
revealed itself much more useful to the gain of international recognition by the PRC. 
The shift towards moderation was explained as the return to normalcy. According to 
Mao’s interviews with Edgar Snow, the excesses were caused by the misleading 
actions of an ultra-leftist group around Chen Boda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liu Shaoqi: “On intra-party struggle” the party, as enlightened leadership group, 
must continually purify itself by struggle. (self-cultivation) 
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9.4. The Anti-Confucius Campaign 1973-1975 
Confucius, of course, came to be seen as the ideological architect of the feudal 
society of ancient China and alluring to his legacy equalled the most profound 
condemnation in the orthodox discourse (e.g. social hierarchy vs. equality, reform vs. 
revolution, social stability vs. class struggle, etc.) The early influence and adoption of 
the imaginary of political Confucianism does not necessarily equate with a publicly 
stated advocacy of it. The significations in this regard of the so-called „Criticize Lin 
Biao, Criticize Confucius Campaign“ (ƶȆƶĩͦ¬) is thus to elucidate the 
fundamental difference between the condemnation of Confucius for contemporary 
short-term political goals and their representation and the continuing influence of 
political Confucianism in long-term policy and its representation.  
Lin Biao (ȆƇ) was an early military leader of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
having joined in 1927 and risen to the rank of marshal in 1955. Lin was crucial in the 
political radicalisation of the PLA and the creation of the personality cult around 
Mao Zedong prior to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At the CCP’s 9th 
Congress in 1969 the then defence minister was elevated to Vice-Chairman of CCP 
and successor to Mao Zedong. Lin died in a plane crash in 1971 over Mongolia. 
Officially, he was blamed for a coup against Mao and wanted seek refuge in the 
Soviet Union.  
The origin and purpose of the „Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius Campaign“ is 
shrouded in mystery just as much as Lin’s demise had been. It started around the 
time of the 10th Party Congress in 1973, when Nixon had just visited China and the 
excesses of the Cultural Revolution had come to an end and three factions within the 
leadership where manoeuvring for their visions of the future of China: (1) The 
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radical “Gang of Four” (òBť ), i.e. Mao’s wife Jiang Qing (ȰΥ ), Zhang 
Chunqiao (Ɓǥȏ), Yao Wenyuan (ħǖu) and Wang Hongwen (ɬȺǖ), who 
politically benefited from the Cultural Revolution and attacked the trend for 
“retrogression and restoration” negating the Cultural Revolution. (2) The established 
Party elders and bureaucrats such as premier Zhou Enlai (åƞȂ) and the just 
rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping (ͼŊũ). (3) The PLA leaders who retained good 
standing after the fall of Lin Biao.  
These factions filled the Campaign against Lin and Confucius with the content that 
suited their conflicting agendas, whereas Mao publicly maintained a posture as final 
arbiter.  (Chang, 1974, pp. 871-874) 
For Merle Goldman, the campaign was predominantly filled with content by the 
regime establishment around Zhou Enlai against the regional military commanders 
and the radicals. It invoked the Qin Shihuang and the Legalists to promote 
centralization, institutionalization and pragmatism against ideological orthodoxy and 
decentralisation.  (Goldman, 1975, pp. 435-439) For James Gregor and Maria Chiang, 
the campaign was predominantly filled with content by the radicals of and around 
the Gang of Four. Emblematic was the publication of Apriorism in the History of 
Chinese Philosophy (ëįÓʇxκ̰) at Peking University in late 1972, stating that 
both Liu Shaoqi (purged, establishment Chairman of the PRC, who died in detention 
during the Cultural Revolution) and Lin Biao both worshipped at the shrine of 
Confucius and had been working against the achievements of the Cultural 
Revolution.  (Gregor & Chang, 1979, pp. 252-253) The campaign for them was to 
“go against the tide” and repress the revisionist, moderate agenda. Present-day 
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analysts mock the return of publicly advocated Confucian teachings in the PRC by 
anecdotally juxtaposing it to the Anti-Confucius Campaign four decades earlier.  
The Campaign actually but reflected the presence of Confucius in the political 
imaginary during the most radical of times in the People’s Republic and the astute 
flexibility of both moderate and radical factions in using the presence of political 
Confucianism in conveying their political messages.  
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10. Internal Impact and Response to the Recent 
International Development of China 
10.1. Truth, Benevolence and Glory in Moderation and Dissent 
How could the CCP stay in power after it shattered the lives of millions, destroyed 
the cultural heritage of a state of several nations, and without its great helmsman 
Mao Zedong after his death in 1976? The answer for those who successfully plotted 
against the Gang of Four was a declaration of the adoption of pragmatism (“seek 
truth from facts” Ļ3ȭǦ) in the pursuit of new internal and international policies 
to sustain CCP power. Lucien Pye in a paper on Chinese pragmatism in the 1980ies 
wrote, “we tend to suppose that somehow pragmatism is simply a pure form of 
rationality, untainted by cultural biases. Yet in truth there is no such thing as value-
neutral, culture-free pragmatism.”  (Pye, 1986, p. 207) Chinese pragmatism of 
Reform and Opening up indeed was not culture-free and reflected in its declared 
wish of integration into the Western world a “Chineseness” which Western 
observers mostly judged of anecdotal importance. The experience of more than 
thirty years of Reform and Opening up prove that the successful adaption of older 
discourses allowed the CCP to stay in power, because it managed to communicate to 
its clientele the only authentic identity option to them is to be “Chinese”, i.e. a great 
power culture-nation, and to be “Communist”, i.e. a power with the “morally right” 
vision of ultimate human development.  
The CCP has been able to overcome several great challenges to its rule by exactly 
framing its identity within the political Confucian worldview.  
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Pragmatism in foreign policy served economic purposes, allowed vast technological 
exchange and foreign trade, and hence realised unprecedented economic 
development. But pragmatism has not only been a deliberate policy choice, but also a 
deliberate discursive choice, that is a discursive choice with two target groups. A first 
target group has been the outside world, making up for the lost trust in Chinese 
government rationality and allowing foreign observers to project their most diverse 
aspirations onto an ideological carte blanche. But the real target group has been the 
domestic public opinion. In light of its own authorianism, the CCP continually has to 
convince its subjects of its political legitimacy. 
In regards to foreign policy, Lowell Dittmer provides several characterising points of 
continuity Chinese foreign policy since Reform and Opening most diplomats and 
journalists posted in China can agree on easily: 
1. a goal-oriented foreign policy 
2. a tendency to rhetorical hyperbole and a language of absolute values and 
norms (“principles”) 
3. a penchant for ‘preceptorial diplomacy’, persuading other countries to parrot 
“principles” to establish a common narrative  (Dittmer, 2001, p. 172) 
For foreign diplomats and journalists, the second and third points constitute 
sometimes frustrating, sometimes even amusing Chinese peculiarities. For those who 
shape Chinese policy, they are part of the lifeline of the ideological legitimacy of the 
CCP, namely projection of international consensus through Chinese moral leadership 
to the outside.   
Wang Gung-wu’s analysis of the beginning of idealistic Communist China in 1949 is 
just as valid for the beginning of pragmatic Communist China in 1978: “most people 
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in China look upon the Party cadres as having seized the reins of power from the 
traditional mandarins. [...] As long as they also manifested a similar aura of moral 
integrity and respect for learning, they would indeed be seen as having successfully 
replaced the old discredited literati. The new revolutionary elites were expected to be 
superior, more modern, efficient, and caring than the corrupt representatives of a 
bankrupt tradition“ (Wang, 1993, p. 85). The foundation of policy, i.e. benevolence, 
and the ultimate goal of political cooperation, datong or at least xiaokang, were the 
same.  
Deng Xiaoping evoked the concept of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” ("
øɣ́ʡV%)) at the 12th Party Congress in 1982. With this he later explained 
that China had to “achieve the equivalent of advanced capitalism by building a 
‘commodity economy’ before it will be ready for socialism, to say nothing of 
communism. […] Socialism with Chinese Characteristics thus means […] that China 
must develop a ‘commodity economy’ under the leadership of the Party before 
attempting to jump to socialism.”  (Pye, 1986, p. 211) 
Of course, the CCP was challenged by its imperfect worldview and the manifold 
policy choice moments on which way China was to go.  
The most critical moment undoubtedly was the Tian’anmen movement in 1989. 
Prior to it, a series of works denouncing “Chineseness” circulated widely and 
contributed to a general climate of discontent against corruption, censorship and 
unbalanced economic progress. These works were the product of a “culture fever” 
(ǖµɘ) among literati beginning in the middle of the 1980ies. An emblematic work 
was the an essay titled The Ugly Chinaman (Ιʇ"øB) by Taiwanese writer Guo 
Dingsheng commonly known under his pen name Boyang (Ȉȃ) first published in 
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Taiwan in 1985 and republished in the PRC the following year. Boyang in this essay 
decried the „spiritual“ ugliness of the Chinese, still selfish and egocentric. Chinese 
culture, for Boyang, was but “soy paste jar” (΂ˠ), containing rancid stew.  (Mitter, 
2004, pp. 262-263)  Another, much more widely circulated, intellectual challenge to 
“Chineseness” was the TV series “heshang” (ȵȟ), translated as “Deathsong of a 
River” or “River Elegy”. The TV series caught immense public interest. Rana Mitter 
reckons it to be the single most-watched documentary in the history of television, 
although it was aired only twice in 1988.  (Mitter, 2004, p. 264) The highly symbolic, 
polemic documentary contrasted Chinese culture represented by the yellow colour of 
the Chinese soil and the water of the Yellow River as a backward, captive world with 
the Western world represented by the blue ocean as an advanced, free world.   
Heshang clearly was a political statement for “wholesale Westernisation” (}ʌ̠µ)  
(Tu, 1991, p. 302) and was condemned and prohibited after the suppression of the 
Tian’anmen movement in 1989. 
The protests were much more complex than the rebellious, “freedom”-seeking youth 
that remained ingrained in public memory, as many people on Tian’anmen Square 
and other squares and campuses across China demanded rule of law, procedural 
democracy, freedom of speech without denouncing their Chinese identity. But on a 
cultural level, the importance of the protests lay in their atmosphere of denial of 
Chineseness, as it was propagated by the CCP after reform and opening up. The 
CCP having placed its founding myth in the May 4th Movement of 1919, which just 
as much questioned Chinese culture as a nation, had to look with terror at the June 
4th Movement, able to question not only CCP legitimacy but the Chineseness it 
declaredly had been founding itself on for the preceding decade.  
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The Nobel peace price laureate Liu Xiaobo (ǧȸ), one of the most prominent 
leaders of the student movement, grasped this spirit in his writings and continually 
carried it on through extreme confrontational hardship.  
ͩ!ȩǜ 
ƥ5ƺĂĉ̭ƏƭĿȣ 
ûǱĠΟ%*¥ 
ƮMŢ˒įV0 
ƕȊ͗ƴǯU˥ 
this nation 
used to turning the memories of tombs into palaces 
confronted with the slave-owner 
we have already learnt successfully 
how to kneel in front of him most pleasingly.  (Liu, 2009) 
E.P. Thompson and Scott observe that “the very process of attempting to legitimate 
a social order by idealizing it […] provides its subjects with the means, the symbolic 
tools, the very ideas for a critique”  (E.P. Thompson, Jim Scott quoted in (Shue, 
2004, p. 28)) and the students used those very symbolic tools and ideas to criticise 
the élite in power. L.H.M. Ling looked into State violence in Chinese politics and 
identified two sets of discourse repeatedly appearing in the moments of greatest 
dissent in the 20th century (Hundred Days Reform, May 4th Movement, 1989). One 
used by State élite and the other used by dissenters: “Angry parents” vs. “injured 
children”: 
State élite Dissenters 
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The parent-state is all-knowing and cares 
for its children-subjects 
Children-subjects are suffering from 
neglect and abuse 
Whatever dissent that arises must come 
from irresponsible malcontents 
Neglect and abuse is due to corrupt and 
evil officials 
The parent-state has the obligation to 
remove these deviants from society and 
restore order 
The state has a moral obligation to 
eliminate these deviants from power and 
restore parental governance 
 (Ling, 1994, pp. 399-400) 
Given the Confucian filial basis of the understanding of state-society relations, Ling 
argues, dissents moral suasion tactics originally designed to resolve family conflicts, 
transfer to the political area and are highly emotional appeals to the rectification of 
conscience  (Ling, 1994, p. 399).  
This analysis, while patronising on the surface, does not reflect the validity of claims 
made by protesters, but rather the discursive methods adopted.  
“The student’s progression from playfulness to moralizing, to shaming the 
government, to acting as a more righteous government was a sequence that could 
not have been better designed to cause maximum pain for the Chinese leaders.”  
(Pye, 1990, p. 347) 
The movement’s failure led to continued CCP pragmatism, but caused a lot of 
thinking on how “Chineseness” can be represented by the CCP.  
Nationalism - including its assertion abroad - emerged as a driving force of CCP 
legitimacy and once again falling back on representing foreign relations to the 
Chinese audience along the long-tested lines of political Confucianism. Guang Lei 
observes that “realpolitik and nationalism are often taken to represent two distinct 
kinds of historical forces shaping the destinies of nations: the former is characterized 
by level-headed and steadfast attention to national interests; the latter is evocative of 
powerful normative, and often irrational, beliefs.  (Guang, 2005, p. 498) 
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As the then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (Έɳ) in a 1990 article stated, 
“diplomacy is the extension of internal affairs”  (Zhao, 1992, p. 159). The ultimate 
challenge of the last twenty years thus became to be on top of the - powerful 
normative, and often irrational - beliefs of nationalism and provide a Confucian 
“moral” framework to it, making assertions in foreign policy based on nationalist 
interests not look “hegemonic” but rather “rightful”. Nationalism in China, in 
Vivienne Shue’s words, had to equal “Truth, Benevolence, and Glory”  (Shue, 2004, 
p. 24). These were the interests pursued by a declared pragmatism. 
For Shue, “Truth, Benevolence, and Glory” are “the very most important 
constitutive concepts in the complex constellation of Chinese thought relating to 
state power and to legitimacy” and thus deserve more detailed attention.  (Shue, 2004, 
p. 31) 
In regards to Truth, Shue argues that the tradition function of the state to uphold a 
moral order in accordance with the cosmic order through education and the 
reduction of heterodoxy survived in the general perception of the legitimacy of 
government in China.  (Shue, 2004, p. 31) Of course, the orthodox of today is no 
more the orthodoxy of the past and is pronounced in terms of scientific rationalism 
and pragmatic empiricism. “Scientific knowledge and technical know-how are 
presented by the state […] as morally sound and good because, through science and 
technology, modernization will be achieved.”  (Shue, 2004, p. 33)  
In regards to Benevolence, the PRC raised the standard of living for a large majority 
of the Chinese population since reform and opening up and repeatedly reiterates this 
argument as an answer to Western accusations of abuse of civil and political rights. 
The epic representation of the rescue work after the Wenchuan earthquake on May 
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12th 2008 and a 2010 state-funded blockbuster movie “Aftershock” (ìŗēü΢) 
praising the role of the People’s Liberation Army after the Tangshan earthquake on 
July 26th 1976 are two examples in case.  
“Glory”, says Shue, “came to be understood no longer primarily in terms of civilised 
behaviour and cultural florescence, but in the more vulgarly material terms of ‘wealth 
and power’. Tributes and other polite forms of ritualised respect from foreign 
powers would remain […] extremely important to 20th and 21st century Chinese 
rulers.  (Shue, 2004, p. 33) Expression of outrage over the “humiliation” of Chinese 
Glory in several occasions33 throughout the last decade of the 20th century and the 
first of the 21st century forced the Chinese government to actively manage nationalist 
sentiment. The 1990ies witnessed a transformation from containing these 
expressions of outrage to a first tentative moment of publicly endorsing these 
“patriotic” demonstrations and “firmly supporting and protecting all legal protest 
activities”, as then Vice-President Hu Jintao (˴ΌɃ) declared in a televised speech 
condemning the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces on 
May 7th, 1999.  (Zheng, 2000, pp. 103-104) One year before the embassy bombing, 
professor Zhang Xudong still had observed, “the rising nationalist sentiment in the 
social sphere lacks any political-intellectual formulation at the national level.  (Zhang, 
1998, p. 118) That lack allowed for nationalism and its evocation of Glory to emerge 
first outside the institutions of the state. The bestseller collection of essays “China 
can say no: political and emotional choices in the post-Cold War era” ("øÑL̹
                                                
33 American opposition in 1993 to the Beijing bid to host the Olympic Games of the year 2000, the 
Yinhe incident in 1993, the visit of the ROC President Lee Teng-hui to the US in 1995 and the 
ensuing 2nd Taiwan Straits Crisis, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute from 1996 onwards, the NATO 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 7th, 1999, the EP3-incident on April 1st, 2001, 
the Anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, the Olympic Torch relay demonstrations and Tibetan 
unrest in early 2008, the Minjunyu 5179 incident on September 7th, 2010 
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ƯÙǡKʇǎȶƣƨƹƾ), published in 1996, on the international 
position of China was emblematic of the societal creation of the 1990ies Chinese 
nationalism. The comparative lack of success of the follow-up publication in 2009 
“China is not happy: the great era, the great goals and our internal and external 
challenges” ("øμēǡKēʎȉÇƮMʇƑđƢ) shows that the 
State has successfully taken over the nationalism discourse in the meantime.  
Conclusively, two internal factors need to be mentioned, which complicate the 
government’s fulfilment of people’s demands of Truth, Benevolence and Glory on 
both sides of the equation. On the State’s side, China has witnessed a transition from 
“vertical to horizontal authoritarianism”.  (Zhao, 1992, p. 158) Since Zhao 
Quansheng’s study on the matter, has all but become ever more complex and as 
incidents such as the anti-satellite missile test on January 11th, 2007 and or the 
disappearance of artist Ai Weiwei (̃ǸǸ) on April 3rd, 2011 prove, show moments 
of great incoherence and internal lack of communication.  
On the people’s side, the massive increase in Internet usage in Mainland China and 
the inability of the central and the regional governments to contain the “new online 
public sphere”  (Shen & Breslin, 2010, p. 4) has created a new challenge in containing 
and leading nationalist sentiment. According to Sow’s recent study on online 
nationalism, Chinese nationalism entered the virtual space around the time of the 
1999 Belgrade embassy bombing and gradually reflected a rising confidence in 
China’s role in the world throughout the following decade. For Sow, Chinese online 
nationalism is now retreating from a focus on great power rivalry (vs. the US, Japan) 
and reflecting “a form of new optimism and loud confidence”.  (Sow, 2010, p. 29)  
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10.2. Return of Declared CCP-Confucianism and its 
Transformation into a Soft Power Asset 
“Overnight, what had hitherto been viewed as an obstinate obstacle to 
Chinese modernity was transformed into a dynamic force of modernity for 
others to emulate”  (Dirlik, 1995, p. 236) 
The beginnings return to declared Confucianism has to be understood as part of a 
wider culture-fever (ǖµɘ) in China throughout the 1980ies. The essence of 
“culture” and its relationship to modernity was widely discussing in study groups all 
over the newly stately “pragmatic” People’s Republic  (Lee, 1998, p. 237). Two book 
series on that very relationship, Towards the Future (͒ÚǸȂ) by Jin Guantao (΅̢
Ƀ) and Culture: China and the World (ǖµ"øɾ) Gan Yang (ɵΔ), received 
widespread attention. The “root seeking” literature movement (ŅȋȽ), named after 
the article The Roots of Literature (ǖįʇȋ) by Han Shaogong (Ϋŋ©) explored 
native cultural traits to understand Chineseness in new native terms. As discussed, 
some led the reconsideration of native identity to condemn it in its entirety (heshang), 
some used native tools to attack power and eventually, native identity, most 
prominently Confucianism, also became the new cement for the foundations of CCP 
rule.  
A first Conference on Confucianism was held in 1978 at Peking University. The 
Neo-Confucian Feng Youlan returned to his pre-1949 Confucian ideals in the first 
volume of his New History of Chinese Philosophy ("øëįÓ), published in 1982, and 
this turn received wide-spread attention.  (Bresciani, 2001, p. 421) In 1984, on the 
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rather frail pretext of the occasion of the 2535th birthday of Confucius, the semi-
governmental “China Confucius Foundation” ("øĩĨą΅V) was established 
under the State Council in Beijing. One year later, Peking University established the 
“International Academy on Chinese Culture” ("øǖµ.Κ). In the same year 
Harvard Professor Du Weiming (Ȁ˙ǣ), a student of Mou Zongsan and Xu 
Fuguan, was visiting professor at the university. Du Weiming views Confuciansim as 
an “ethico-spiritual” system of values, comparable to Christianity, Islam and 
Buddhism, but secular. He once described “humanistic socialism” as his “choice of 
political belief” and Confucianism was “his choice of religion”.  (Dirlik, 1995, p. 255) 
His lectures on the Confucian value system34 received remarkable attention; his 
lectures were immediately published to satisfy the academic interest in Confucius.  
(Dirlik, 1995, p. 238) Princeton Professor Yu Yingshi (`̆ǡ), student to Qian Mu, 
also taught in China advocating the compatibility of Confucianism with liberal values.  
(Bresciani, 2001, p. 395) 
Umberto Bresciani tells of a scholarly meeting on central government level in March 
1986, in which philosophy professor Fang Keli (ǚzʵ) from Nankai University in 
Tianjin laments the lack of study of Neo-Confucianism in China, listing it as one of 
the three major currents of thought in China since the May 4th movement, the others 
being communism and liberalism.  (Bresciani, 2001, p. 424) Forty-seven scholars 
                                                
34 For Du Weiming, „East Asian modernity under the influence of Confucian traditions presents a 
coherent social vision with at least six salient features“: (1) Government leadership in a market 
economy is not only necessary but desirable; (2) although law is the essential minimum requirement 
for social stability, „organic solidarity can only result from humane rites of interaction; (3) Family as 
the basic unit of society; (4) Civil society flourishes because it its strength lies in its dynamic interplay 
between family and state; (5) Education should be the “civil religion of society”; (6) The quality of life 
of a society depends on the level of self-cultivation of its members.  (Tu, 2003, pp. 272-273) 
Democracy in East Asia, according to Du, “more than the electoral culture” and includes 
“bureaucratic meritocracy, educational elitism and particularistic social networking”  (Tu, 2003, p. 276) 
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under the supervision of Fang and a colleague were assigned by the Ministry of 
Education to form the “Study Task Force on the Ideological Trends of Modern 
Neo-Confucianism” (ɯKǙtįƗɑʜʰ̼αˍ ).  (Geng, 2010, p. 7) A 
preliminary result was published at a first conference in Xuanzhou, Anhui, in 1987 
paving the way for putting Confucianism back at the centre of political discourse: 
The Contemporary Neo-Confucian Movement was born in this century in 
the 1920s, up to our day it is still full of live; they consider their responsibility 
the continuation of the orthodox line and the renaissance of Confucianism; 
their main characteristic is to follow Neo-Confucianism of the Song and 
Ming Dynasties […]; their aim is to absorb and combine, having 
Confucianism as essence and base, Western Learning, in order to develop a 
school of thought working for the modernization of China. (Fang quoted in  
(Bresciani, 2001, pp. 424-425)) 
A first collection of essays of the study group was published in 1989.  (Fang & Li, 
1989) In 1989, shortly after the Tian’anmen Incident, Jiang Qing (̎ŭ), a mainland 
scholar teaching at the Shenzhen Institute of Government, published The Actual 
Meaning of the Renaissance of Confucianism in Mainland China and the Issues It Encounters ("
øēΗďtįëįʇɯĻƧ)ÇΧ#ʇΐα) in two editions of the Neo-
Confucian journal Legein Society (οɉ) in Taibei, Taiwan. For Jiang, Confucianism, 
having “reached the crucial moment of its returning home and regaining its leading 
position” will bring moral standards to Chinese politics.  (Bresciani, 2001, p. 429) 
In 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1994 the China Confucius Foundation organised 
international conferences in Beijing and Confucius’ hometown Qufu, Shandong. At 
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the 1994 conference the „International Confucian Association“ (øΖtįˮÖV) 
was founded with Singapore’s then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (Ǿy˦) as 
honorary president. High-level Party members such as the Vice-Premier Li Lanqing 
( Ǿ Ř ɇ ) attended these conferences. Scholarly congresses were held to 
commemorate the late Neo-Confucians Xiong Shili (1985, Huanggang), He Lin 
(1986, Beijing), Liang Shuming (1987, Beijing), Tang Junyi (1988, Hong Kong)  
(Bresciani, 2001, p. 421).  Lin Tongqi observes that in Mainland China alone, over 
one thousand articles on Confucianism were published in the 1980ies.  (Dirlik, 1995, 
p. 238) 
In 1992 Peking University established the Research Centre on Chinese Traditional 
Culture ("øX˗ǖµʜʰ"ƍ), which was renamed to Research Institute for 
National Science (øįʜʰįΚ). Its journal Studies in National Science (øįʜʰ) 
has been publishing extensively on Confucianism until today.  
In 1993, shortly after the publication of Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead. The Changing 
Nature of American Power in Chinese in 1992, professor Wang Huning (ɬȴİ), a 
then advisor to president Jiang Zemin (Ȱȹȩ) published an article on the urgency 
of the strengthening of China’s soft power. In 1997, professor Pang Zhonying (Ų"
̆) published an article explaining Nye’s theory in more detail. In 1999 professor 
Shen Jiru (ȲλĢ) in an editorial in the national weekly Outlook Weekly (ʗǴå) 
called for the strengthening of China’s soft power. In the late 1990ies 
“comprehensive national power” (˚Öø§) emerged as a new understanding 
among Chinese scholars of the relative standing within the international system and 
the soft power concept fit well into that framework. Huang Shuofeng (ρʞβ) in 
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his Theory on Comprehensive National Power (˚Öø§̰ ), published in 1999, 
distinguished between hard power (economic, technological power), soft power 
(political, cultural and educational power) and coordinating power (decision-making, 
management capabilities). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ think-tank China Institute 
of International Studies ("øøΖΐαʜʰƲ) held a seminal conference on “The 
Importance and Influence of Soft Power in US Foreign Policy” in August 2002.  
(Young & Jong, 2008, pp. 456-457)  
Confucius as a symbol and Confucian values as the cultural message to convey filled 
the void of soft power in a first form of internal “morality” (͹ƌ) riding the wave of 
great public interest in the Confucian classics. The 2001 Outline of Implementation of 
National Morality (øȩ͹ƌĻǛˌ̡) and numerous central and regional Party 
meetings, most prominently Politburo collective seminar on “Development and 
Prosperity of Chinese Philosophy and Social Science” on May 13th, 2004  (Choo, 
2009) reflect a pragmatic effort of infusing a semblance of traditional value-
orientation into policy. The reappraisal of Confucian values on the political arena 
followed the public proclamation of the slogans “harmonious society” (è̀ʡV) 
and “harmonious world” (è̀ɾ), adopting the Confucian notion of harmony 
(è ) from the Book of Rites (see chapter 10.3) domestically and for China’s 
international relations. In domestic terms, according to a recent study, several 
hundred academic conferences on Confucianism have been held at universities 
around China in the last two decades. Confucianism Research Institutes and National 
Studies Institutes have been set up in at least ten national elite universities (Peking 
University, Tsinghua University, People’s University, Shandong University, Wuhan 
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University, etc.). Innumerable “public forums” (̮ā) on Confucianism have been 
organised in every Chinese province and abroad by central and local government 
authorities. Public veneration rites at Confucius temples has recommenced in his 
hometown Qufu, Shandong, in 1990 and at the Southern Confucian Ancestral 
Temple in Quzhou, Zhejiang, (̘ŜĩȨ¼ĶŁŰ) in 1993.  (Wu, 2010, p. 22)  
Most recently, on September 28th, 2010 the anniversary of the birth of Confucius was 
celebrated at the Confucius temple in Beijing for the first time since the founding of 
the People’s Republic in a ceremony for high government and Party officials and 
foreign representatives. While the ceremony in Qufu is a public event, the ceremony 
in Beijing was closed to the public and placed under high security.  (Straits Times, 
2010) Confucius statues, but also statues of Confucian scholars such as Dong 
Zhongshu, Zhu Xi, Wang Yuanming etc. have appeared in most major cities.  (Wu, 
2010, pp. 22-23) Most prominently, an almost ten metre tall bronze Confucius statue 
was placed just next to Tian’anmen Square in January 2011 and for reasons so far not 
publicized furtively removed on April 22nd, 2011.  (Jacobs, 2011) 
In international terms, the Leading Small Group for Foreign Chinese Language 
Education was established under the State Council in 2004. The Small Group 
prepared the ground for the establishment of “Confucius Institutes” (ĩĨįΚ) 
administered by the Office of the Chinese Language Council International (usually 
referred to by its abbreviated Chinese name Hanban). These institutes, similar to the 
British Councils, Goethe Institutes, Cervantes Institutes run by European foreign 
ministries, should increase the cultural appeal of China abroad and thus strengthen 
Chinese soft power. On June 15th, 2004 a pilot institute was established in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan. On November 21st, 2004 the first fully fledged Confucius Institute was 
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established in Seoul, South Korea. During 2006, a new Confucius Institute opened 
on average every four days. The initial target of 100 Confucius Institutes by 2010 was 
increased to over 330 by the end of 2009. In 2009 the target was again revised to 500 
Confucius Institutes by the end of 2010 and 1000 by 2020.  (Zhao & Huang, 2010, p. 
129) By the end of 2010, Hanban according to its website supervised 332 Confucius 
Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms (ĩĨįĆ, subordinate institutes) around 
the world.  
Confucian symbols and the native brand “Confucius” is ever more present in State 
and Party political-cultural statements. The character for harmony, he (è), figured 
prominently at the Opening Ceremony of the 29th Olympic Games in Beijing on 
August 8th, 2008. A biographical film on Confucius was scheduled to screen to meet 
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic and Confucius’ 2560th 
birthday in 2009, but was eventually released with delay in 2010.  
On December 9th, 2010 an organisation under the Ministry of Culture awarded a 
newly created “Confucius Peace Price” to GMD-Honorary Chairman Lien Chan (ͬ
Ư) in a reaction to Liu Xiaobo being awarded the Nobel Peace Price in Oslo shortly 
before.  
In retrospect, Confucius swiftly returned to play a central role in political discourse in 
mainland China first in academia and eventually because it met the ideological needs 
of the CCP. The Neo-Confucian scholar He Lin had observed and predicted the 
return and the use of Confucius in his 1988 late work Culture and Life (ǖµBɷ): 
Q_!ɯKʇǙƗƦ,ĢȇͥÅʇǖµĴ}ȳǱ˄, fɦĢǝɋ
*Ȫ, ǝǹ*Ƿ, ˖˵ɋͫȾ΍ȋɆ̍÷  (He, 1996, p. 4) 
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Every modern new thought, if it is completely detached from the past culture, 
it will be like water without a source, like a tree without roots, and will not be 
able to exist over a long time or ever be deep-rooted. 
 
 
 
10.3. Harmonious Society - Harmonious World  
ðƖé+*ǸÊ́*"Ê˪ʈ"̄́*è",˩Ĕ*ē
ǹ,è,˩Ĕ*ͤ͹,˺"èĔü]əɢ˱ə 
Pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy are not stirred, this is said to be in balance, 
the feelings stirred in due degree, this is said to be harmony, the balance is the 
root of all under heaven, the harmony is the path to pursue the dao, if balance 
and harmony are combined, heaven and earth will be in order and the myriad 
of things will flourish. 
Beginning of the chapter zhongyong in the Book of Rites 
Lè;øL˗ʆķL̀ȩ 
To keep the countries together through communal harmony, to keep the 
hundred officials together by unity, to keep the myriad of people together by 
coherent harmony. 
Rites of the Zhou (åʠ) 
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On October 24th, 1995 president Jiang Zemin probably was the first Chinese State 
leader to prominently use the term “harmonious” in a major speech. The term hexie 
is a term deeply linked to the Confucian understanding of a stable society and 
diametrically opposed to the Communist theory of class struggle as the means of 
advancement towards socialism. In 1995 Jiang spoke in occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations at the UN General Assembly 
in New York: 
ƮM̡Ͷƭ˸%Ͳƾȭ×ĪźʇøΖè̀ŒΧɾˉǱ4ʆ!
øŁǝ̰ǦʡV£ŴPp̢ƒèÊŕʭŴͨǦÁÓX˗ĶǑ
jNèǖµ˲ǩ΁ĪûʔŠźȋǃǹøøƣè˸šʇƧƩͲƾʡ
V£ŴèÊŕ͹͘ǦÕøBȩʇ%ǽ¡BǝǽŨɂ (Jiang, 1995) 
We have to create a harmonious internatioal situation characterised by 
autonous choice, seeking commonalities while accepting diversity. On this 
world we have about 200 states, there persist differences be those in social 
system, values and development stage, or be those in the historical traditions, 
religious faith or cultural background. Every country has to be able to chose 
its social system and development path according to its own national 
sentiment and its own wishes, this is the sovereignty of the peoples of all 
states, noone has any right to interfere.  
Jiang linked the global positive development to non-interference in internal affairs of 
third countries and respect for their cultural heritage and “national sentiment”. 
In 2004, the report of the fourth plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee, 
now under the leadership of Hu Jintao, called for Party “to heighten its capacities the 
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construction of a socialist harmonious society” (ǘǇμȅŸʡV%)è̀ʡV
ʇ˵§) in China as a means to reach the goal of a moderately well-off society (ŊŶ
ʡV) and the “renaissance of the great zhonghua minzu” (Ļɯ"ºȩǜʇWēď
).  (Xinhua News Agency, 2004) President Hu transposed the concept to the 
international arena and called for the construction of “harmonious world” for the 
first time at the African-Asian Summit in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 22nd, 2005, 
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Bandung conference  (Xiao, 2010, p. 
113):  
"ø×ǅ¬Ÿ̱è̀ɾ˓Ö͔Ȃ×ǅ¬!ɞġèũ̮jk
ʕ»è;ʇè̀˪ÆǱwȼ§ʇ"ºǖǣʇď  (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2006b) 
China combines with the creation of a harmonious world the promotion of 
the revival of the the Chinese civilation, which is harmonious in terms of 
peace-loving, promoting good will and making all nations live together 
peacefully and which is marked with vitality.  
The term „harmonious society“ was included in the Joint Communiqué by China and 
Russia on occasion of Hu’s visit to Russia in July 2005. Ten years after Jiang’s speech 
at the UN, Hu referred to “harmonious society” in his speech for the 60th 
anniversary of the UN on September 15th, 2005: 
̫ƮMǈƳÖa×$Ÿ̱!ƿ'èũ×ˇ̉ʇè̀ɾ˪
­§ (Hu, 2005) 
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Let us join hands and work together to make efforts in building a harmonious 
world of lasting peace and shared prosperity. 
On December 6th, 2005, prime minister Wen Jiabao (ɈŁĺ) also used the term in a 
speech to students in Paris. In a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo 
on Foreign Relations on August 23rd, 2006 it reportedly was decided that the purpose 
of China’s “foreign affairs work” was to „contribute to the advancement of a 
harmonious world of lasting peace and shared prosperity ($ǅ¬Ÿ̱ƿ'èũ
×ˇ̉ʇè̀ɾaͅɩ).  (Xinhua News Agency, 2006a) The 17th Party 
Congress in October 2007 approved revisions of the Party Constitution, one of 
which was the inclusion of the objective of establishing a “harmonious world” into 
the Party Constitution.  
"ø={Āƿɨʵ˸%ʇèũđ;ǎʼĀƿèũÊŕ͹͘Āƿ
6 ͑ʇŹǍƯʀ˗ʽøøΖ!ēŒʫȄÊŕńđ˄
­§$ƮøʇǌΨŹǍèɯKµŸ̱2ËǱ ʇøΖɮĈûøΖ3
ª"˙ƻƮøʇɨʵè%ǽÉńΤǽ%)èƃǽǎȶ˙ƻɾ
èũgͪBˁͪț­§ǅ¬Ÿ̱ƿ'èũ×ˇ̉ʇè̀ɾ 
(CCP, 2007) 
The Chinese Communist Party persists in a peaceful foreign policy 
characteristed by indepence and autonomy, persists in the path of peaceful 
development, persists in the strategy of opening up for mutual benefit, takes 
the national and international situations into account, positively develope its 
foreign relations, makes efforts to strive for a favourable international 
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environment for our nation’s opening up and modernised construction. In 
international affairs, [the CCP strives for] the protection of our nation’s 
independence and souvereignty, opposes hegemonism (baquan zhuyi) and 
power politics,  protects world peace, advances the development of humanity, 
makes efforts in bringing forth a harmonious world of lasting peace and 
shared prosperity. 
The inclusion into the Party Constitution as a purpose of the Communist Party implies 
that the Party leadership sees this claimed assumption of a global task as acceptable 
to the Chinese people and even, most probably, beneficial to its continued position 
in power. As a recent article in the Party Academy organ stated,  
ȅŸè̀ɾͩƯʀƗ˙Ǳ"øɣ́,ǱǨƧ) 
(Wang, 2011b, p. 100) 
The construction of a harmonious world is a strategic thought with Chinese 
characteristics, but it also has a universal meaning. 
While the “Harmonious World” concept has been continually used ever since by the 
central leadership to portray a benign nature of Chinese foreign policy to the outside 
and has been generally dismissed as a policy of vague platitudes. But these vague 
platitudes have served to portray the Chinese State in its present form as a global 
moral force, a global defender of diversity  (Wang, 2011b, p. 99) and the potential 
guarantor of a just international order to its own people. Variations on the 
governmental interpretations of the steady theme of “harmonious world” will 
provide information not only on foreign policy justifications, but much more 
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important will reflect the government’s readings of domestic public opinion on 
world events.  
 
10.4. Zheng Bijian’s Adoption of the “Rise of China”  
With China’s rise all but taken for granted, China’s fourth generation leaders 
under Hu Jintao spoke of China’s “peaceful rise” […] The messages of these 
leaders were crystal clear: under the CCP’s leadership, the Chinese nation had 
slowly, but surely, climbed out form the lowest point of its five-thousand-year 
history; the nation has finally come of age at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century.  (Sow, 2010, p. 26) 
Zheng Bijian (ͿƎĀ), the propagator of the concept of China’s “peaceful rise” has 
come to be considered one of the leading opinion-shapers within the CCP leadership.  
Zheng was born in 1932, studied political economics at People’s University in Beijing. 
Upon graduation he worked on ideological issues in Central Committee departments. 
In the 1980s he served as secretary to the reformist General Secretaries of the CCP 
Hu Yaobang (˴˦;) and Zhao Ziyang (͓ˆΔ). In 1988, he became president of 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and headed its Institute for Marxism, 
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. In 1992, he was elected to the Central 
Committee and worked in the Party’s Propaganda Department on ministerial level. 
Zheng became the executive vice president of the Central Party School of the CCP 
in 1998, then headed by now president Hu Jintao (˴ΌɃ). Zheng, having reached 
the official retirement age of 70 in 2002, stepped down from his Party functions in 
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2002. He continues to be influential as chairman of the China Reform Forum and as 
member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference.  (Suettinger, 2004, pp. 1-2) 
Zheng referred to the “peaceful rise of China” for the first time in a speech (The 16th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China and China’s Peaceful Rise – A New Path) 
at the Center of Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. on 
December 9th 2002. He used the term heping jueqi (èũŚ͔), first prominently used 
by IR scholar Yan Xuetong (Γį͵) in the title of his book The Rise of China – An 
Evaluation of the International Environment ("øŚ͔øΖɮĈ̲[) published in 
1998. Huang Renwei (ρDW) elaborated on Yan’s book in his September 2002 
publication The Time and Space of the Rise of China ("øŚ͔ʇǡΑèʲΑ).  (Niu, 
2007, p. 102) Zheng Bijian’s target audience at his Washington speech was not 
Chinese, but decidedly American advocates of the “China threat” theory. Zheng tried 
to dispel anxieties about the increasing Chinese assertiveness in the pursuit of 
economic interests.  (Guo, 2006, p. 39) China was to achieve “balanced material, 
political, and spiritual cultures”, most importantly a “socialist political culture” 
proposed for the first time at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. Without defining it, he 
correctly observes, “having this framework target of building a political culture is 
totally different from not having it”. The goal of a new political culture, according to 
Zheng, is complimentary to achieving “all-round human development”. The 16th 
Party Congress adopted two principles to achieve these goals. On the domestic front, 
“it was decided to mobilize all positive factors in the most extensive and adequate 
manner to build on the forces for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.  On 
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the international front, China should “continue to expand open up”.  (Zheng, 2005b, 
pp. 3-5) 
In November 2003, Zheng spoke again prominently on the “peaceful rise” at the 
Bo’ao Forum for Asia, his audience this time predominantly being Chinese and from 
other Asian countries. In his speech “A new path for China’s peaceful rise and the 
future of Asia” he listed three “crucial strategic principles” for the “peaceful rise of 
China” ("øèũŚ͔): (1) “ensure institutional safeguards for our peaceful rise”; 
(2) “boldly draw on the fruity of all human civilisation while fostering the Chinese 
civilisation, to ensure cultural support for China’s peaceful rise”; (3) balance interests 
to secure a social, economic and environmental “coordinated development”  (Zheng, 
2005b, pp. 15-16).  
The phrase turned from being the pet concept of an ideologue to a concept of real 
political weight when the Party leadership embraced it at the end of 2003. Prime 
minister Wen Jiabao (ɈŁĺ) referred to the “peaceful rise and development” again 
in front of a foreign audience at Harvard University on December 10th, 2003. The 
foreign Kremlinologists rejoiced when President Hu Jintao used the phrase in front 
of many members of Politburo Standing Committee and a larger audience at a 
workshop on the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth on December 26th: 
Āƿͩȁ͹͘ŏ̡Āƿ"ø={ʇΰņèʡV%)£ŴĀƿū
ûĻ͙"ǘĴïǱ 5ǅ¬"øɣ́ʡV%)3̐¯ÊŕʇÕǚ
Χʇ^££ŴèǚΆǎʼǬġüĻɯʡV%)ɯKµè"ºȩǜʇ
WēďĀƿͩȁ͹͘ŏ̡Āƿ͒èũŚ͔ʇÊŕ͹͘Āƿû
èũč7άÄʇąʝ×ÕøÈġʏčûũʻ6 ʇąʝʫ
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ȄŹŕ×Õøʇ;ȾèÖa$BˁèũÊŕʇřμ3aͅɩ 
(Hu, 2003) 
To persist in this path, we have to persist in the socialist system under the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, persist in the institutional 
systems and policies in every field, while in their realisation continuously seek 
improvements advantageous to the promotion of the vigorous development 
of the socialism with Chinese characteristics, in order to better realise the 
modernisation of socialism and the great task of the renaissance of the 
Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing). To persist in this path, we have 
to persist in following the development path of peaceful rise, persist in 
maintaining friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence on the foundation of mutual respect and 
mutual interest, and contribute to the great cause of peace and development 
for all humanity.  
Vibrant debate on the “peaceful rise” could be witness in the Chinese media, which 
generally very quickly adopted the concept.  (Suettinger, 2004, p. 4) 
In a “collective study” session of the Politburo in February 2004, Hu repeated his 
stance. On March 14th, prime minister Wen Jiabao outlined “five essentials” of the 
peaceful rise: (1) safeguard world peace through China’s development; (2) rely on 
own strength; (3) maintain openness, develop trade relations with friendly countries; 
(4) will take a long time to be realised; (5) “China today cannot be called a hegemony, 
and even when China will be stronger can never be called a hegemon.“ ("øɯû
ʬΤňȂƃē0,ȫͫVʬΤ)  (Wen, 2004)  
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Zheng organised a seminar on China’s Peaceful Rise and Economic Globalisation at the 
Bo’ao Forum for Asia in April 2004 with a scheduled keynote speech by president 
Hu Jintao. In his own speech, Zheng saw “tremendous opportunities” in China’s 
culture and tradition, and its historical influence in the Asia-Pacific region. He 
admitted that “China’s peaceful rise will somewhat intensify competition in the 
region.” Keeping up with the moralist imperative of Chinese political discourse he 
added that “this competition is characterised by friendship, cooperation, mutual 
benefit, and a win-win ideal; it is not the competition of an arms build-up or 
competition for spheres of influence or hegemony”.  (Zheng, 2005b, p. 22) He 
concludes, “our new paradigm firmly abandons the strategic framework in which big 
powers in the past vied for spheres of influence, engaged in military confrontation, 
or exported ideologies”.  (Zheng, 2005b, p. 23) Surprisingly, Hu Jintao in his keynote 
speech did not use the phrase, his key slogan was “peace and development” (èũ
Êŕ). Successive speeches by the state leadership revolved around “peace and 
development”, any talk of the “rise” of China was left to the public and intellectual 
debate. While some conjure that the change in terms was a reflection of an 
ideological power struggle between Jiang Zemin’s and the Hu-Wen power factions 
within the Central Committee  (Suettinger, 2004, pp. 4-6), it seems more likely that 
the leadership took note of the international anxieties about the “China rise” theory 
as a Chinese government admission of the validity of a “China threat” and 
substituted it with the less emotive term “peaceful development” (èũÊŕ) used 
for the first time abroad during Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United Kingdom in 
November 2005.  (Choo, 2009, p. 397) 
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In looking back, it seems startlingly that the contemporary observers missed the 
duality of the message of the “China rise” speeches. On the one hand, of course, it 
emphasised the essential “peacefulness” of China to foreigners as they worry about 
the growing economic and political influence of authoritarian China on the world in 
general and her neighbours in particular. On the other hand, more importantly, the 
“China rise” speeches were expressions of “Glory” for the Chinese audience.  This is 
why it was much more important as a pronounced concept, rather than as the 
systematic theory it certainly was not from its onset. Zhen Bijian published an article 
on Foreign Affairs magazine’s September/October 2005 issue on China’s Peaceful Rise 
to Great Power Status listing three great challenges the Chinese government faces 
before 2050 and the strategies it recurs to in dealing with those challenges. The three 
challenges are: (1) a shortage of resources, (2) environmental degradation, (3) lack of 
coordination between economic and social development. The three strategies, he 
refers to them as “transcendences”, are (1) to transcend the old model of 
industrialization, (2) to transcend the traditional way of the emergence of great 
powers and “Cold War mentality” (“China will transcend ideological differences to 
strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world”), (3) 
to transcend outdates models of social control and to construct a harmonious 
socialist society.  (Zheng, 2005a, p. 22) 
The “China rise” theory has continued to shape the identity of China within 
international relations discourse and continues to be used in publication titles of the 
most renowned international relations scholars like Yan Xuetong, Huang Renwei, 
Niu Jun (ɠ), Kang Shaogang (Ŷˑ;) and Gong Li (Ŀ§) and allows for 
research to study these understandings of the concept. Young and Jong sum up the 
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transformation of Chinese foreign policy in light of the “peaceful rise” theory in 
three ways: 
(1) Transition from an American-centred diplomacy towards a neighbour-
centred diplomacy 
(2) Transition from working for admission in international society towards 
undertaking global leadership 
(3) Transition from an emphasis on economic development towards a more 
overall enhancement of “comprehensive national power”.  (Young & Jong, 
2008, p. 466)  
On December 25th, 2005 the State Council published the white paper China’s path to 
Peaceful Development ("øʇèũÊŕ͹͘) explaining peaceful development as (1) 
inevitable path for China’s modernisation, (2) dependent upon a peaceful global 
environment, (3) dependent upon internal innovation and continuing opening up, (4) 
leading towards shared international development, (5) strives towards a harmonious 
world of sustained peace and common prosperity.  (Young & Jong, 2008, p. 468) 
According to Choo’s analysis, the white paper is characterised by the traditional 
Chinese globalism assigning to the Chinese state a moral global purpose. The white 
paper, says Choo, pronounced three ways of combining national and international 
development: (2) unifying Chinese domestic development and opening to the outside 
world; (2) relating China’s development to that of the world; (3) integrating Chinese 
people’s fundamental interests to the common concern of the world people. “In sum, 
the White Paper emphasizes, China’s own development promotes world peace and 
development, and by relying on itself and adhering to reform efforts, it creates a win-
Imaginary Empire: The Confucian Moral World Order in Chinese State Identity  
209 of 236 
win situation for co-prosperity and perpetual peace thereby enhancing the prospect 
for a harmonious world”  (Choo, 2009, p. 397) 
 
10.5. “China Model” and “Civilisation State” in Zhang Weiwei’s 
populist writings 
The term “Beijing Consensus” (¶@̳) was created by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a 
British professor at Tsinghua University, in an English-language research report (The 
Beijing Consensus. Notes on the new physics of Chinese power) published in May 2004 at the 
Foreign Policy Centre in London to suggest the existence of a Chinese alternative to 
the “Washington Consensus” on development. The Chinese version of the report 
was published with the title The Beijing Consensus: Providing a New Model (¶@̳
ǇcǙȕż). It has to been regarded as a starting point of the “China Model” 
discourse.  
Ramo’s Beijing Consensus consists of three theorems: (1) China’s development 
model is based on innovation; (2) China’s development model considers 
sustainability and equality as top priorities; (3) China strives for self-determination in 
foreign policy  (Ramo, 2004) Alike the Washington Consensus, it defined 
development not only economic but also political and social term, most importantly 
it saw itself to be more effective and practical for developing countries. For Young 
and Jong, “Ramo’s Beijing Consensus has nothing new to offer, […] it sounds more 
like a proxy measure to propagate China’s official stance”.  (Young & Jong, 2008, p. 
462) More relevant is the extensive media coverage Ramo’s report received in China, 
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it being portrayed as a realisation of a Western scholar that China has developed a 
development model that is universally applicable.   
On the occasion of the China-Africa Summit (“Forum in China-Africa Cooperation” 
3rd ministerial conference, Beijing, November 3rd to 5th 2006) Zhang Weiwei (Ɓ˙
$), professor at Tsinghua and Fudan universities, research fellow at the Geneva 
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, and former interpreter to Deng 
Xiaoping, contrasted the “Chinese model” ("øȕż) to the “American model” of 
development in an International Herald Tribune article. For Zhang, “many of the 
African leaders coming [to Beijing] are attracted not only by opportunities for aid 
and trade, but also by the Chinese model of development”. For Zhang, the Chinese 
model has been more effective than the American model, which is “largely ideology 
driven, with a focus on mass democratisation”. America, according to Zhang leads 
by “lectures and sanctions, if not missiles”, whereas “China leads by example”. He 
predicts, “the Chinese model will become more appealing to the world’s poor.”  
(Zhang, 2006) This populist account is consistent in content with the “China rise” 
discourse; its only but significant alteration is the statement of the universal validity 
of Chinese system. Zhang continued to publish on the “China model”, most 
prominently in China touches the World ("ø̧¬}ɱ) published in 2008, and the 
concept has become to be widely used in Chinese academia. Peking University 
organised a symposium on 60 Years of the People’s Republic and the China Model (Bȩ
èø 60Ū"øȕż) in December 2008, in which leading scholars from various 
fields debated the relevance of the term.  (Zhi & Zang, 2009, p. 140) 
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On October 1th, 2009 (the day of 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC) 
Zhang published an op-ed in the New York Times on “eight ideas behind China’s 
success”. He states that while “critics of China like to claim that despite its economic 
success, the country has no ‘big ideas’ to offer”, to his mind “it is precisely big ideas 
that have shaped China’s dramatic rise.  (Zhang, 2009) He lists eight ideas:  (1) “Facts 
rather than ideological dogmas should serve as the ultimate criterion for identifying 
truth”, i.e. Deng Xiaoping’s dogma of “seeking truth from facts”; (2) “Primacy of 
people’s livelihood”, stating that “this idea may have lasting implications for the 
world’s poor”; (3) Focus on “holistic thinking”, because of long-term policies not 
obfuscated by short-term political goals; (4) “Government as a necessary virtue”; (5) 
“Good governance matters more than democratization”; (6) “Performance 
legitimacy”; (7) “Selective learning and adaptation”; (8) “Harmony in diversity”.  
(Zhang, 2009) To the non-Chinese audience of the New York Times, the points 
Zhang makes are not those of a scientist, but rather of an ideologue defending his 
countries deficiencies by pointing to its uniqueness. In China, Zhang has been 
making the same points in over seventy scholarly articles since around 2002 and has 
been gaining ever more widespread attention. The “China Model” phrasing has been 
adopted by other scholars such as Pan Wei (ɐ˙), Li Junru (ǾÝĢ), Wang Huiyao 
(ɬ͠˦), Ding Xueliang (į̀) and Wang Shaoguang (ɬˑy). 
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Figure 3  (Pan, 2010, p. 11) 
 
In December 2009, Central Compilation and Translation Press in Beijing published a 
collection of essays titled The China Model: Reading 60 Years of the People’s Republic of 
China ("øȕż̦̻Bȩèøʇ 60 Ū) edited by Pan Wei, featuring 
contributions by renowned scholars working in government, Party and academia.  In 
April 2010, an editorial The Chinese Model is the ‚least bad’ model ("øȕżǦǯþ
ʇȕż) by Zhang was printed in the influential national business bi-weekly Caijing. 
He argues that the “traditional Western model” has proven incapable of solving 
many international problems such as the eradication of poverty and cultural conflicts. 
China has developed, says Zhang, its own proposition to deal with these problems 
and reiterates the eight ideas, he has been proposing for the previous years. He 
continues to list four achievements by the China Model since 1978: (1) the rapid rise 
of China; (2) the overall improvement in people’s lives; (3) enormous changes in the 
structure of Chinese society; (4) the very creation of the China Model reflecting 
China’s unique “national sentiment” (øƣ). Thus Zhang’s populist argumentation 
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lacks basic logical coherence, but this very incoherence reflects the level of 
emotionality of the discourse. Zhang continues, 
̠ǚȕżɯûǦǏț˸Ň"øȕżƊĒǚΧƆƭʇ΢¬đøB΁
Vƨ¢ƮM¨ĞͦVʇǚȷ¨ȠĞVʇǚȷͨǱÀň&¨½
ʇǚȷƮM×ΦȻʇ˄ͩ9˒ͥ"øȕżčɲŏÍƭǙʇÿ
ȉőʿͩ!ÿȉÑ˵,Ǳˡɖ,Ǳΐα\Ǧ̠ǚͨǦÌ¢0΢
ǉJʚ͹ͨǱͩȊʧɭȷ (Zhang, 2010) 
The Western model is but complacent and conservative. The tremors caused 
by the creation of the Chinese model, all foreigners have felt them. Our way 
of hosting the Olympics,  [our] way of hosting the Paralympics, and soon [our] 
way of hosting the World Expo, our relations with Africa, these have become 
new coordinates after being handled according to the Chinese model. Even 
though these coordinates have their deficiencies, have problems, but they still 
left the West feel dumbfounded, [the West now] knows there is another way 
of [dealing with issues]. 
In January 2011, Zhang published China shocks: the Rise of a ‘Civilisation State’ ("ø΢
ǉ:!ǖǣăøŁʇŚ͔) by converging his previous writings.  (Zhang, 
2011a) Three editorials35 published on the April 11th, 2011 edition of the most 
eminent central government newspaper People’s Daily (BȩǟƼ) praised the book 
for its appeal for new confidence in China.  
                                                
35 by Li Junru (Member of the Standing Committee of the CCPCC, former head of the CCP Central 
Party School); Cheng Enfu (Member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Head of the 
Department for Marxist Studies); Zhang Xiaolin (Editor-in-Chief of the CCP mouthpiece magazine 
Qiushi) 
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Zhang most recently spoke at the ceremony celebrating the centenary of Tsinghua 
University summing up his theory. According to Zhang, China is the only surviving 
“civilisation state” characterized by four “ultras” (ò!͕): ultra-vast population (͕
ēăʇBỊ̂ȕ), ultra-vast territory (͕ēăʇʂĄøù), ultra-long historical 
traditions (͕ơ'ʇÁÓX˗), ultra-rich cultural heritage (͕ɆÃʇǖµʫɄ). 
Moreover, this unique civilisation-state is characterised by eight distinguishing 
features (1) guided by practical reason, (2) strong government, (3) priority to stability, 
(4) prioritization of the people’s livelihood, (5) gradual reform, (6) sequential 
differentiation, (7) blended economy, (8) opening to the outside world. If China 
would switch to the to the Western model, then the four ultras advantageous to 
China within its own development path, would cause China to collapse. As a 
civilisation with five thousands years of history, the China Model transcends the 
Western dichotomy of democracy and dictatorship. They are but a product of a 
“McDonalds” culture incomparable with China’s eminent bada caixi culture (the eight 
cuisines of China). “The Chinese civilisation thus cannot collapse, it can only strive 
towards greater glory.” He concludes, 
Ʈ!B̩$FĔ"øBû˸šùüƲ̖ͪʇǄ˅ǦBˁÁÓǯ
Źƙʇ3ƮMʇʓyǠŏ͕͖0̠ǚȕżƮMʖʇǦ
Kʇǎȶ£Ŵ˒ȿ£ŴèʡV£Ŵ"øȕż͵ͥ"øBʇ­§
VɆ¤ʇƈêɶ˹ĸʭŴǌÍBˁʇǸȂ (Zhang, 2011b) 
It is my opinion, that the quest undertaken Chinese people on their own 
territory is mankind’s most pioneering enterprise, our vision has long 
exceeded the Western model, what we are aiming at is the next generations 
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political system, economic system, and social system. Through the hard work 
of the Chinese people the Chinese model will profoundly influence and to a 
certain extent change the future of mankind.  
 
 
 
10.6. Zhao Tingyang’s Post-International World Order  
ƅ"ø̡Ɨ˨Ǖ!ɾʇΐα̡ńɾ̈́͆Bŏ˵ńɾǝ̵
Ñ̹ (Zhao, 2005, p. 2) 
China has to consider the issue of the entire world and has to take 
responsibility for the world, [because China] cannot afford to have nothing to 
say to the world. 
Zhao Tingyang (͓ȬΔ), born in 1961, is a native of Shantou in Guangdong 
province. He had already gained a reputation as a philosopher with works on 
aesthetics and one bestseller work On possible life (̰Ñ˵ɷȼ) published in 1994. He 
has been teaching inter alia at China’s most prestigious academic institutions Peking 
University, Tsinghua University, People’s University and is now a member of the 
Philosophy Department of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 2003 he 
published his fist collection of essays in which he develops a utopian world titled A 
world without worldview (ȳǱɾ̢ʇɾ).  (Zhao, 2003) His 2005 book Tianxia 
System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution“(Ĕ^˄ɾ£Ŵë
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įņ̰) immediately again became a national bestseller. The book itself, while 
elegantly written, originates from two conference papers and is repetitive and rather 
unsystematic. In the meantime he has published at least two English language articles 
with a clearer representation of his thought.  (Zhao, 2006),  (Zhao, 2009a) His article 
The concept of ‘tianxia’ and the world system ('ĔȔƒ'ɾ£Ŵ) is the first chapter 
of the standard undergraduate textbook on international relations of Peking 
University.  (Zhao, 2007) He most recently elaborated on his tianxia concept in 
Investigations on a Bad World: Political Philosophy as a First Philosophy (þɾʜʰa$
ʺëįʇǎȶëį)  (Zhao, 2009b) His theory has had a huge impact on the 
Chinese community of IR scholars, who have been working on coming up with a 
native Chinese model of IR study as an alternative to the Westphalian system for 
several years.  (Zhang, 2010, p. 110) For Ren Qian (Qo) from Sichuan University in 
Chengdu, “his tianxia theory helps China advance her soft power, heightens the 
persuasiveness of some foreign policies, but helps most for China to stand on her 
feet while Western countries promote [their] international [public] law.” For Ren 
Qian, he achieved to turn the Chinese understanding of the world order into a 
domestic political patriotic act (øǎȶ"ʇɞø̖$) and put China once again 
in the centre [of the world order].  (Ren, 2010, p. 256) 
For his CASS colleague Zhou Fangyin (åǚΊ), Zhao in his works „reflects a kind 
of heartfelt thoughts (ƍČ) of Chinese scholars, and to a certain extent also even 
reflects a strong desire (ƃɗʇƩǴ) among Chinese scholars.  (Zhou, 2008, p. 99) 
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For Zhao, „empire is not only a geographical but also a cultural institutional 
concept“ that returns to having validity as the Westphalian system has come to be 
weakened through globalisation.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 29)  
Building on this perception, Zhao juxtaposes the Western concept of the modern 
“empire” to the Chinese concept of tianxia, whereas the first is an expression of a 
successfully expansionist nation-state, tianxia is “an institutional world” in which 
nations/states have come to be substituted by a “world/society”.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 30) 
For Zhao, the present international order is a “non-world” (Φɾ) based on the 
supreme value (sovereignty) of singular entities. Failed states are but expressions of a 
“failed world” (ǝǐɾ) and reflect the inaptitude of the Westphalian system in 
dealing with mankind’s problems.  (Zhao, 2007, p. 4) Thus tianxia has to be realised 
on three levels. (1) the geographical world, (2) the psychological world, (3) the 
political world. Tianxia has to cover the entire world territory, but also on a spiritual 
level carry the assent of the entire world population (ȩƍ) and has be embodied by 
a world institutional system (ɾ£Ŵ) securing the “values of tianxia”. (Zhao 
2007@12). This international system is different in essence from the United Nations, 
because the latter works on the basis of the “inter-nationality” of the Westphalian 
system and can only be seen as a weak “agora without a polis”.  (Zhao, 2007, pp. 31-
32) He accuses “ideologies”, i.e. communism, Christianity and capitalism with their 
universalistic aspirations to be but expressions of spiritual imperialism not 
comparable with his higher aspiration of a tianxia world containing all cultural 
differences.  (Zhao, 2007, p. 33) The ideal for the future world system, according to 
Zhao, is the world system Chinese dynasties have strived towards establishing or 
pretended to have established. In the times of the Zhou dynasty, continues Zhao, 
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“China had been an ‘ideal’ empire, close to the concept of All-under-Heaven, 
consisting of many ‘sub-states’, independent in their economies, military powers and 
cultures, but politically and ethically dependent on the empire’s institutional centre”, 
the Son of Heaven.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 34) In his article Debating China’s Future, he states 
in regards to China: 
“In the end, even the Zhou dynasty fell, perhaps a victim of its own idealism.”  
(Zhao, 2008) In Zhao’s interpretation, with the unification of China trough the Qin 
“the legal tributary system had [been] transformed into the voluntary tributary system, in 
which foreign countries volunteered to decided whether to join. ( (Zhao, 2006, p. 35), 
italics are the author’s). This voluntary adherence to the tributary system was based 
on the practise of the Confucian principle of benevolence (D) and as a corollary the 
persistence of harmony (è̀) within this “world”. Thus the Chinese tianxia is 
fundamentally different from the Western ideological universalism, because it attracts 
and doesn’t’ impose itself.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 36)  
In his 2009 book he elaborates on his theory, principally adding two strategies to 
achieve his utopian ideal arguing in terms of game theory: (1) “common imitation”, 
(2) “Confucian improvement”. “Common imitation” is key to the establishment of 
shared institutions and basically is a modern way of referring for the traditional 
Chinese practice of rites as a demonstration of adherence to the system. “Confucian 
improvement” is his alternative to “Pareto improvement” (allocation of a resource to 
a set of individuals leading to the improvement of the situation of at least one 
individual, but not the deterioration of the situation of those not affected.) For Zhao, 
Confucian improvement means that the “world institution” prioritises the interests 
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of the “world” over factional interests, and thus leads to win-win (or lose-lose) 
situations for all.  (Zhao & Huang, 2010, p. 110)  
And who is to underwrite tianxia – a system that rejects the very notion of a ‘chosen 
state’? Though originally a Chinese concept, China itself would seek no more than to 
be a part of any such system that might spring from it.”  (Zhao, 2008) 
William Callahan, probably the Western scholar to have paid most attention to Zhao 
Tingyang’s writings, asks, “While Zhao understandably criticizes the West for 
universalizing its particular worldview at the considerable expense of other 
worldviews, is he doing anything different?”  (Callahan, 2008, p. 756) Rather than 
seeing Zhao’s contribution as unique, he sees it as exemplary for a broader 
discussion of how China will be a world power and an effort by Chinese scholars to 
provide native resources to the understanding of China within the world.  (Callahan, 
2008, p. 757) Callahan rightfully concludes that “rather than give us a guide towards 
a utopian world order that will solve global problems, Tianxia is an example of the 
workings of normative power, in the sense that it re-centres Chinese understandings 
of world order a patriotic activity in domestic politics.  (Callahan, 2008, p. 759) 
His textbook message to the undergraduate élite students of Peking University, he 
concludes 
ƅɚFĔʇɾÑ˵ûΡ̡Ťø0ǞΡ̡!˥øͽȊʇ¿
ΛŤøÑ˵,Ρ̡"øÏKĔŤøͽȊʇèũŤø\ǦĔ
^˄ƊǱÑ˵͵ͥÕʧ͝ǂ˪ƭ$ͱÖ5ǸȂʇɾ£Ŵ (Zhao, 
2007, p. 35) 
Of course, todays’ world perhaps does not need an empire any more: neither 
does it need a dangerous empire like the American one, perhaps it doesn’t 
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need a peaceful empire like the Chinese one. But the tianxia system most 
likely through all kinds of conversions will be suitable to the future world 
system.  (Zhao, 2006, p. 35) 
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11. Conclusion 
In a first step, I tried to trace the concept of “ideology” from its creation in post-
revolutionary France to Marx to post-marxist social theory, Castoriadis’ concept of 
the social imaginary, to post-modernism and the End of History theory and recent 
reformulations of the original Marxian concept. The social imaginary as the vis 
formandi of social collectives is intimately linked to universalistic moral values in 
general and collective notions of statehood in particular. Empire as the politicisation 
of a worldview builds on this very assumed validity of values part of the social 
imaginary. The erosion, or illusion, of the Westphalian system of equal states with 
absolute sovereignty has come to be questioned in the last two decades not only in 
academia. “Legitimate” political and military interference by the “world community” 
in state souvereignty for the sake of enforcement of universal values have come to 
relegate state sovereignty to a still prominent, but secondary position on the still 
inter-national level. While these values are not put into question here, this thesis 
looks into how the speakers of the Chinese elite has been dealing with the ongoing 
rethinking of sovereignty not for the sake of rethinking sovereignty, but rather to 
adhere to what is “imagined” to be the native collective vision of world-order China 
is part of. The analysis of the Confucian political imaginary in this thesis is thus not a 
historical or IR analysis on “imperialist” tendencies of a rising China. It is a tentative 
politological analysis of how the Confucian political imaginary has influenced 
discourse in recent Chinese history and how this Confucian political imaginary 
influences the political discourse of those seeking to maintain (and those seeking to 
erode) the legitimacy of rule of the Communist Party of China today. 
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